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Abstract
In the tumultuous period of the 1790s, the English anarchist philosopher William
Godwin was a seminal figure whose 1793 Enquiry Concerning PoliticalJustice and Its
Influence on Morals and Happiness stood as a touchstone for the reform movement in
Britain. Godwin is primarily known today as the author of Political Justice and Things
As They Are; Or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams, a 1794 novel which many readers,
past and present, have regarded as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical claims
outlined in Political Justice.
Although his fame as a novelist largely rests on this one popular novel, Godwin
wrote and published five more novels after Caleb Williams: St. Leon (1799); Fleetwood
(1805); Mandeville (1817); Cloudesley (1830); and, finally, Deloraine (1833). Other
than Caleb Williams, however, Godwin's novels are little read today, even by specialists
in the literature of the period. Moreover, relative to Caleb Williams, these other novels
have received only marginal critical attention. The bulk of the scholarly work on
Godwin still tends to focus on either his Political Justice or Caleb Williams.
Furthermore, most earlier studies of Godwin's novels have placed his texts in an almost
exclusive dialogue with the radical "jacobin" political climate of 1790s England, or with
the philosophical rationalism of Political Justice.
My own examination of Godwin's fiction differs in emphasis from most of these
earlier studies in its sustained focus on the development of masculine identity within the
context of personal agency, language, and modes of self-expression. I take as my starting
point Godwin's Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, a 1797
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collection of essays in which he puts forth an educational theory for the proper
development of virtue, benevolence, and rational potential in the young mind. In the
Enquirer, Godwin details the pedagogical and social conditions necessary for the creation
of an "active" and "well regulated" mind committed to benevolence and reason. He also
acknowledges, however, the blighting effects of "unfavourable circumstances" in
childhood-the range of unpropitious pedagogical and social conditions that conspire to
produce a mind that is not "well regulated." As I argue in this study, Godwin's
educational theory carries within it a model of ww-education that serves as a productive
framework for examining his fiction.
In this study, I provide readings of four of Godwin's novels-Ca/e& Williams, St.
Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville-examming how this model of "mis-education"
operates in all four texts in distinctly different ways, shaping the psychological
development of the protagonists in such a way that their later years are marked by crises
in their experience of identity and, more specifically, in their sense of masculine
authority. Although a handful of critics have briefly examined the forms of "miseducation" experienced by each of these Godwinian heroes, none has explored the effects
of such mis-education within the context of identity formation-that is, on the hero's
ability to self-actualize without the experience of profound personal and social alienation.
This study thus offers a detailed examination of a cluster of interdependent
themes that has received little or no critical attention in the scholarly examinations of
these four novels: the central role that education, as the totalizing effect of one's
childhood lessons and experiences, has on the moral and psychological development of
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the subject, and-more specifically-how unfavourable circumstances conspire, in these
texts, to create forms of "mis-education" that lead to later crises in identity and
subjectivity; the importance of personal agency in the development of the
subject-specifically, the ability to have "authorship" over the narratives of one's life; the
roles that language, self-expression, the imagination, and social convention play in the
development of such agency and in the formation of an especially masculine identity;
and, finally, the mediating function of women in the development of this masculine
identity. The readings offered in this study should enrich the critical discussion of
Godwin's fiction, especially as such discussion relates to themes of gender and identity
formation.

iv
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisors on this project-Professors Kenneth W. Graham,
Markus Poetzsch, and Eleanor Ty-for their insightful comments, support, and patience.

To my family, with much love-Mom, Dad, Shannon, Nan, and Grandpa.
And to my husband Antony, who made so much of this possible.

v
Table of Contents

Abstract

i

Acknowledgments

iv

Table of Contents

v

Introduction:
Mis-Education and the Crisis in Male Subjectivity:
William Godwin's Middle Novels

1

Chapter 1:
The Weil-Regulated Mind: Enlightenment, Education, and Caleb Williams

33

Chapter 2:
In the Circle of the Hearth: St. Leon's Domestic Threats to Masculine Identity

72

Chapter 3:
Forming Her to His Mind: Fleetwood's Authorship of Consumption

133

Chapter 4:
Chained Up in Silence: Language and Alienation in Mandeville

197

Conclusion:
"Of History and Romance":
Modern Man and the Dystopian World of Godwin's Fiction

249

Endnotes

256

Works Cited

274

1
Mis-Education and the Crisis in Male Subjectivity: William Godwin's Middle Novels
For the general student of literature, William Godwin (1756-1836) is more famous
for his connections to other writers of the Romantic Period than he is for his own
considerable philosophical and literary achievements. As the husband of feminist
philosopher and novelist Mary Wollstonecraft, the father of novelist Mary Shelley, the
father-in-law of the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, and the philosophical mentor of the young
William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Godwin serves as a pivotal, yet often
marginalized, figure in the network of literary relationships that gave such momentum to
the intellectual and artistic energy of the Romantic Age. Godwin was not always so
marginalized, however. In the tumultuous period of the 1790s-when the social and
political agitation of reform-minded "radicals," energized by the recent events of the
French Revolution, threatened the conservative hegemony of Georgian England-Godwin
was a seminal figure whose 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice audits Influence
on Morals and Happiness stood as a touchstone for the reform movement in England.
With the publication of Political Justice, Godwin achieved an instant celebrity
that won him the admiration of many leading intellectuals of the period. With its
indictment of contemporary social prejudice, coupled with its reification of reason as the
only way to expose such social prejudice and effect political change, Godwin's
philosophy of rationalism proved, at least initially, both popular and useful to the radical
cause in Britain. As William Hazlitt famously remarked in his 1825 The Spirit of the
Age, "five-and-twenty years ago [Godwin] was in the very zenith of a sultry and
unwholesome popularity; he blazed as a sun in the firmament of reputation; no one was

more talked of, more looked up to, more sought after, and wherever liberty, truth, justice
was the theme, his name was not far off' (31).
Godwin's fame was solidified by the publication of Things As They Are; Or, The
Adventures of Caleb Williams, a 1794 novel which many readers, past and present, have
regarded as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical claims outlined in Political
Justice. In Caleb Williams, Godwin tells the tale of a young servant, Caleb, who is taken
into the employ of a powerful local aristocrat, Falkland. After Caleb discovers an awful
secret buried in Falkland's past-namely, that Falkand has committed a murder and
allowed two innocent men to hang for his crime-his patron engages in a sustained
persecution of his young employee that throws into relief the unjust nature of "things as
they are" in Georgian England. Although his fame as a novelist largely rests on this one
wildly popular novel-Hazlitt claims that "no one ever began Caleb Williams that did not
read it through" (49)-Godwin wrote and published five more novels after Caleb
Williams: St. Leon (1799); Fleetwood (1805); Mandeville (1817); Cloudesley (1830);
and, finally, Deloraine (1833). Other than Caleb Williams, however, Godwin's novels
are little read today, even by specialists in the literature of the period. Indeed, in his 1989
introduction to the second edition of his William Godwin: A Biographical Study, George
Woodcock lamented that his biography, which was originally published in 1946, failed to
inspire a scholarly or popular interest in the philosopher beyond Political Justice and
Caleb Williams, and that none of his other works, including his novels, had been reissued
in new editions (xiii-xiv).
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Moreover, relative to Caleb Williams, Godwin's other novels have received only
marginal critical attention. The bulk of the scholarly work on Godwin still tends to focus
on either his PoliticalJustice or Caleb Williams. There is surprisingly little critical work
on St. Ieo«-especially given that novel's use of the gothic form so popular at the time
and its rich intertextuality with Mary Shelley's Frankenstein-and even less on Fleetwood,
Mandeville, Cloudesley, and Deloraine. Furthermore, most earlier studies of Godwin's
later novels have placed his texts in an almost exclusive dialogue both with the radical
"jacobin" political climate of 1790s England, and with the philosophical rationalism of
PoliticalJustice. Perhaps most notably, this is Gary Kelly's approach to Caleb Williams,
St. Leon, and Fleetwood in The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805, published in 1976.
My own examination of Godwin's fiction differs in emphasis from most of these
earlier studies in its sustained focus on the development of masculine identity within the
context of personal agency, language, and modes of self-expression. I take as my starting
point Godwin's Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, a 1797
collection of essays in which he puts forth an educational theory for the proper
development of virtue and rational potential in the young mind. As I argue in the next
chapter, Godwin's philosophical vision of universal benevolence achieved through the
gradual enlightenment of humanity was inextricably bound up with his moral philosophy
of education. Education, for Godwin, was very much a "moral process" (Enquirer 1), and
the success of "juvenile education" should be measured in terms of its ability "to provide
against the age of five and twenty a mind well regulated, active, and prepared to learn"
(Enquirer 5).
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In the Enquirer, Godwin details the pedagogical and social conditions necessary
for the creation of this "active" and "well regulated" mind. He also acknowledges,
however, the "excesses of youth" which frequently "corrupt the disposition, and debase
the character" (Enquirer 158), particularly in terms of their long-term effects on the
developing mind. Although Godwin emphasizes the inherent pliability of a young mind
that can be shaped and "bent in a thousand directions" to desirable ends, he nevertheless
laments that this mind eventually solidifies into the permanent habits and behaviours of
an entrenched character (Enquirer 15). The young mind, argues Godwin in the Enquirer,
is frequently blighted in this way, its potential for virtue, benevolence, and personal
happiness "frost-nipped, or stunted, or distorted in its proportions" (287).
If Godwin offers in the Enquirer a blueprint for a salutary educational model, he
also provides, in his description of the "frost-nipped, [] stunted, or distorted" mind, a
model of ww-education whereby unfavourable circumstances in childhood combine to
create a mind that is not "well regulated." In this study, I provide readings of four of
Godwin's novels-Ca/eZ> Williams, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville-ex&mmmg how
this model of "mis-education" operates in all four texts in distinctly different ways,
shaping the psychological development of the protagonists in such a way that their later
years are marked by crises in their experience of identity and, more specifically, in their
sense of masculine authority. While Godwin, as a philosopher, was focussed on the
ultimate development of a utopic state effected through humanity's unlimited potential
for reason, as a novelist, he was repeatedly drawn to the creation of psychologically

5
troubled and irrational characters, whose later crises can be traced back to childhood miseducation.
Indeed, in most of Godwin's novels, the narrative centres on the extended and
often detailed representation of a single protagonist, a man who is usually (although not
always) an aristocrat, and a man who is almost always tormented by a complex
psychology which alienates him from the social context around him. In his
representations of these men, Godwin makes use of the Bildungsroman as the structuring
frame for his exploration of themes relating to misanthropy, marriage, friendship,
domestic happiness, ambition, envy, madness, and masculine subjectivity. Critical
scholarship on the novels, moreover, has emphasized the way in which Godwin's use of
the Bildungsroman dovetails with the psychological realism of the texts. William
Brewer, for example, has argued that Godwin's novels "serve as thought-experiments in
the 'science' of mental anatomy" {Mental Anatomies 19), case studies of the
psychological development of complex characters in distress. Significantly, Godwin's
psychological "experiments" are most often of a pathological nature, in that his
protagonists suffer mental distress and social alienation stemming from misanthropy,
neuroses, and even insanity. As Mona Scheuermann has pointed out, Godwin is
fundamentally fascinated with the "mind as it ^functions" ("Study of Mind" 17;
emphasis added).
Even the early critics of Godwin's work recognized the pathological nature of his
psychological narrative style: Godwin has "proved himself intimately skilled in the
perversity of the human mind, and in all the blackest and most horrible passions of the
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human heart," contends the Quarterly Review in an 1817 assessment of Mandeville
(Graham 368). In his Sketches of Modern Literature, and Eminent Literary Men, Being A
Gallery of Literary Portraits (1846), George Gilfillan similarly recognized the intensity
of Godwin's representations of "morbid" character: "He imagines a character after his
own heart; a quiet, curious, prying, philosophical being, with a strong underdash of the
morbid, if not of the mad; and he thickens around him circumstances, which, by making
him altogether a misanthrope, and nearly a maniac, bring out all the powers and the
passions of his nature" (32).
These critical responses underscore the conflicted nature of Godwin's protagonists
and their troubled relationships with the world around them. Woodcock argues that, in
Godwin's fiction, the "hero is always victim," and he identifies the "crushing of the
individual by social and moral forces" as a recurrent theme running throughout his novels
("Notes" 687). In this study, I combine an attention to the psychology of the Godwinian
hero with an examination of the deleterious effects certain "social and moral forces," as
forms of mis-education, have on the childhood development of the character. Although a
handful of critics have briefly examined the forms of mis-education experienced by each
of these Godwinian heroes, none has explored the effects of such mis-education within
the context of identity formation-that is, on the hero's ability to self-actualize without the
experience of profound personal and social alienation. In Caleb Williams, St. Leon,
Fleetwood, and Mandeville, the central characters experience a host of unfavourable
circumstances in childhood: excessive isolation, exposure to destructive value systems,
and unhealthy relationships with parents or parental figures (or, alternatively, the absence
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of such figures). These circumstances produce in the novels toxic environments that
function to corrupt the developing mind and foster later crises in identity.
Godwin's first in-depth exploration of this theme of mis-education occurs in
Caleb Williams, a novel in which defective childhood education produces, in both Caleb
and Falkland, the kind of distorted psychological state that renders each man acutely
vulnerable to the destructive passions of the other. Caleb is both a victim of his own
curiosity and a victimizer, a young man whose passion "for the unravelling of an
adventure" (60) destroys his patron's tenuous hold on rational existence. Caleb's
childhood reading in books of "narrative and romance" (60)-unsupervised by a rational
"preceptor" who, in Godwin's view, helps to shape and regulate the student's "temper of
mind" {Enquirer 144-46)-operates as a form of mis-education, exacerbating the reckless
curiosity already present in his character.
Mis-education also underpins the moral development of Falkland, whose early
reading in the "heroic poets of Italy" (67) inculcates a love for chivalric values at odds
with benevolence and justice. Falkland's embrace of chivalry compels him to reify his
reputation at the expense of all other moral considerations, and his subsequent experience
of public disgrace is aggravated by a fatal sensibility which heightens his experience of
dishonour and causes him to feel, too acutely, its effects. As a man of both chivalry and
feeling, Falkland prefigures Godwin's next two fictional heroes-St. Leon and
Fleetwood-and his significance in this study is largely as a "prototype" for the miseducation of these two later figures.
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In St. Leon, his first novel after Caleb Williams, Godwin revisits the theme of
chivalry, once again representing the chivalric value system as a destructive ideology that
mis-educates young men by encouraging them to embrace ideals antithetical to
benevolence and virtue. The narrative centres on a French aristocrat of the sixteenth
century, a man who fails, in his youth, to achieve a defined sense of self independent of
the social codes around him. The recipient of a childhood "education" that emphasized,
above all else, a form of identity organized around the aristocratic traditions of public
honour and acclaim, St. Leon develops into a man driven by a destructive desire for
"fame" and social recognition. His need for public validation is symptomatic of his
fractured sense of self, and becomes a central factor in his subsequent tragedies, as he
falls victim to the seductive allure of the Philosopher's Stone and finds himself
increasingly alienated from the domestic and social orders. For St. Leon, his early miseducation ultimately results in a dramatic alienation of the self on both a literal and a
symbolic level.
In Fleetwood, the interdependent themes of sensibility and misanthropy underpin
Godwin's portrait of a young man neurotically focussed on the development and
operation of his own mind. As Godwin calls him in the novel's subtitle, Fleetwood is the
"New Man of Feeling," a figure whose sensibility, like Falkland's, ironically divorces
him from the benevolence and empathy associated with traditional men of feeling like
Harley, the sympathetic and charitable hero of Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling
(1771). As I argue in chapter one, emotional sensitivity, in Godwin's view, ideally results
in outward expressions of philanthropy. With Fleetwood, however, sensibility follows a
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self-reflexive pattern in which emotional response stays rooted within the subject.
Instead of stimulating benevolence, Fleetwood's sensibility devolves into a pathological
self-absorption. This self-absorption, as I argue in chapter three, stems from a childhood
mis-education characterized by excessive isolation, a childhood informed by indulgent
"reveries" structured around the imaginative "consumption" of the beautiful scenes of
nature surrounding him in North Wales. Fleetwood's developing sense of manhood is
simultaneously staged against, and cultivated by, the natural world he genders female, and
his later misanthropy stems from his realization-as he grows older and enters public and
domestic life-that the social world of human interaction falls outside of his imaginative
authority. Presented with a wife who refuses to submit to his transcribing hand,
Fleetwood experiences marriage as a threat to his identity and masculine authority. He
subsequently experiences an emotional breakdown that radically compromises his sense
of self.
Although, in Mandeville, Godwin revisits the theme of misanthropy once again, in
that novel, the misanthropy of the protagonist degenerates into a form of paranoid
madness that ultimately divorces Mandeville from the social community and fractures his
identity. As I argue in chapter four, Mandeville experiences, from a very young age, a
crisis in self-actualization stemming from a childhood mis-education that demanded
constant repression on his part. This repression takes its most notable form in the
suppression of voice that ultimately consumes his character. Mandeville's inability to
express himself in the face of crisis compromises not only his sense of masculine
authority, but his very appreciation of his own identity. Unable, through self expression,
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to consolidate a coherent sense of selfhood, Mandeville turns increasingly inward,
ultimately sliding into a state of madness that eventually effaces his own subjectivity.
This study thus offers a detailed examination of a cluster of interdependent themes
that has received little or no critical attention in the scholarly examinations of these four
novels: the central role that education, as the totalizing effect of one's childhood lessons
and experiences, has on the moral and psychological development of the subject,
and-more specifically-how unfavourable circumstances conspire, in these texts, to create
forms of "mis-education" that lead to later crises in identity and subjectivity; the
importance of personal agency in the development of the subject-specifically, the ability
to have "authorship" over the narratives of one's life; the role that language, selfexpression, the imagination, and social convention plays in the development of such
agency and in the formation of an especially masculine identity; and, finally, the
mediating function of women in the development of this masculine identity. The
readings offered in this study should enrich the critical discussion of Godwin's fiction,
especially as such discussion relates to themes of gender and identity formation.
My study also differs from other critical examinations of Godwin's novels in its
focus on the representation of women in these texts. In these novels, female characters
play a central role in the identity crises suffered by the male protagonists. St. Leon
experiences his marriage to Marguerite as a very specific threat to his masculine public
identity, and he is partially driven to accept the Philosopher's Stone as a testament to his
masculine autonomy in the face of a domestic sphere he perceives as emasculating. For
Fleetwood, marriage is similarly experienced as something which threatens his masculine
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authority, as his wife, Mary, becomes the last in a line of female partners who escapes the
confines of his controlling hand. Finally, Mandeville's sister, Henrietta, functions as his
most significant connective link to humanity, and he thus perceives her as the socializing
agent through which he can assert his own voice and selfhood. His failure to achieve
complete communion with her drives him into madness.
Godwin's exploration of masculine subjectivity in these four novels is resonant of
wider cultural anxieties regarding the ideal and appropriate forms of behaviour for men in
late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century British society. In his study of the changing
conceptions of gender in the eighteenth century, G.J. Barker-Benfield has charted the
influence of the emerging cult of sensibility on new visions of masculinity. As BarkerBenfield argues, the public sphere, throughout the eighteenth century, served as an active
site for the re-negotiation of a masculine identity organized around a kind of bourgeois
chivalry that emphasized honour and polite manliness as the new standards of socially
ideal behaviour.
Such re-negotiations imply certain anxieties about the shifting roles of men in the
political and social climates of the late eighteenth-century, anxieties which Tim Fulford
examines in Romanticism and Masculinity. Traditional conceptions of "chivalric"
masculinity, contends Fulford, were destabilized by the political turmoil of the 1790s.
The war with France, the disruptive effects of revolutionary discourse, and the political
and social agitation of previously marginalized groups within society (most notably,
women and the working classes)-all of these cultural forces implied the perceived failure
of British men (especially those in traditional positions of power) to "live up" to the
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conventional ideals of chivalric manliness which were understood by some to maintain
social order and political stability. These anxieties are perhaps most famously articulated
in Edmund Burke's lament, in the Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), that
the "the age of chivalry is gone" (80). Although Burke makes his declaration within the
context of the French Revolution, locating chivalry's death in the French men who failed
to protect their Queen from the assaults of the revolutionary mob, his lament nevertheless
conveys the sense of a cautionary warning to British men who would overthrow the
established codes of traditional masculine behaviour.
In Volume 2 of Political Justice, Godwin reframes Burke's eulogy for the passing
of chivalry as an elegy for political justice instead, declaring, "indeed 'the age of chivalry
is' not 'gone'! The feudal spirit still survives that reduced the great mass of mankind to
the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of a few" (454-55). However, despite
Godwin's dismissal of chivalry as an ideology synonymous with political oppression and
social injustice, he nevertheless registered his own anxieties about the crisis in modern
masculinity and the failure of modern men to achieve their psychological and intellectual
potential. In the Enquirer essay, "Of Posthumous Fame," Godwin enters into the wellworn debate comparing the merits of ancient men with those of modern men, voting
firmly on the side of the ancients, who rise far above the "miserable level of the men of
modern times" (291). "One would have thought that no man could have perused the
history of Rome and the history of England, without seeing that in the one was presented
the substance of men, and in the other the shadow," he declares (291).
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Godwin elaborates on the distinctions between modern and ancient men in "Of
History and Romance," a 1797 essay that remained unpublished in his lifetime. For
Godwin, the value of a written history resides in its ability to inspire moral excellence in
its readers, and he goes on to compare "modern" history unfavourably with "ancient"
history on the basis of the fact that the subjects of modern histories-that is, modern
men-are inferior in character and spirit to their ancient predecessors. Whereas the
ancients were "men of a free and undaunted spirit," the moderns are their "degenerate
successors," "pygmies" who are stunted, distorted and "weighed down," unable to
develop the "bold and masculine virtues" that are the product of intellectual
enlightenment and political freedom (458-59). Modern men, argues Godwin, are
degenerate not on account of their own inherent weaknesses, but because a corrupt
political system combines with irrational social prejudice to enslave and debase them.
"There is something in the nature of modern governments and institutions," he argues in
the essay, "that seems to blight in the bud every grander and more ample development of
the soul" (459).
In Volume 1 ofPoliticalJustice, Godwin articulates his broad vision of education
as a process to be understood in the "most comprehensive sense" as "including every
incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections"
(45). It is clear, therefore, that Godwin's perception of the political-the "modern
governments and institutions" which are responsible for modern man's crisis-also
includes social practices like education. The mis-education of modern man, like his
exposure to political oppression, thus contributes to this crisis in masculine self-
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actualization. Indeed, his description in the Enquirer of childhood potential corrupted by
the social forces of mis-education deploys the same gardening metaphor used to convey
the political debasement of modern man: whereas "every grander and more ample
development of the soul" is "blight[ed] in the bud" by the political injustice of "modern
governments and institutions" ("Of History and Romance" 459), genius is "almost
constantly frost-nipped" by the mis-education of unfavourable circumstances in
childhood {Enquirer 287).
Within Godwin's theory of education, therefore, is a concern for the potential
crisis of masculinity experienced by modern men, a crisis that can be traced back to
childhood mis-education grounded in a host of pedagogical, social, and political forces.
If Godwin turned to ancient men to find the "bold and masculine virtues" he felt were
lacking in modern British men, the British nation, argues Fulford, symbolically looked to
the naval hero Lord Horatio Nelson to articulate a powerful image of a vigorous
masculinity worthy of emulation. Nelson conveyed a vision of manliness organized
around the chivalric ideals of self-sacrifice, duty, and courage in the face of danger:
Nelson was revered for defeating Napoleon, for his adherence to duty, for
his gentlemanly conduct towards his men, and for his bravery. His body,
mutilated by many battles in which he had exposed himself to fire, was
proof of a manliness defined by the ability to command himself and others.
He was resolute rather than vainglorious, a hero who redefined chivalric
duty and courtesy in terms of a self-controlled and self-sacrificial
patriotism. Dying to ensure victory, Nelson then became subject to a
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popular cult which immortalised him in monuments and mementoes. And
his heroism was made available to all through the fictional heroes in the
romances of Sir Walter Scott, heroes who resembled him in their courage,
courtesy and defeat of foreign invasion. (Fulford 6-7)
Literature, as Fulford here recognizes, has the potential to both celebrate and
interrogate this image of idealized masculinity. Moreover, the image of Nelson, as
described by Fulford in this passage, is a productive starting point for considering how
Godwin engages with this idealized model of chivalric manliness. As I argue in chapters
one and two, Godwin was quite critical of chivalry and the way in which apologists for
the status quo like Burke yoked chivalric ideals with benevolence, honour, and the
maintenance of a stable social order. Indeed, in both Falkland and St. Leon, Godwin
creates protagonists whose embrace of chivalric values results not in benevolence but in
dishonourable and self-interested behaviour that completely alienates them from society
and robs them of their happiness.
Although Godwin clearly resists the image of chivalric manliness represented by
Nelson, in other ways, he engages with many of the central values underpinning this
idealized model of manhood. Within such a model, ideal masculinity is equated with
honour, duty, and self-sacrifice. Perhaps more importantly, this ideal man, to use
Fulford's terminology, is "resolute," "self-controlled," and "able to command himself and
others." He is, in other words, the picture of uncompromised masculine authority-selfassured, successful militarily and socially, and confident both in himself and with his
place and role in society. With his personal self-assurance and social success, this ideal
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man serves as a compelling foil to the Godwinian heroes, who are all experiencing
profound crises of identity and masculine authority. Driven by a curiosity which takes
"possession of [his] soul" (60), Caleb is the very anti-thesis of the "self-controlled" man;
his failure in this regard is even more significant given that one of the primary purposes
of "juvenile education," according to Godwin, was the creation of a "well regulated"
mind (Enquirer 5). Falkland, as well, with his "paroxysms" of anguish and rage (63), and
his self-interested obsession with reputation, is far from the controlled and self-sacrificing
vision of heroic manliness.
In the three novels after Caleb Williams, Godwin continues to chart the miseducation of his heroes in terms evocative of this image of chivalric manliness. As a man
who beggars his family through his compulsive gambling, St. Leon, for example, fails to
exhibit both a sense of paternal duty and the kind of self-control for which Nelson is so
celebrated; completely reliant on the social codes of aristocratic identity for any sense of
selfhood, St. Leon is caught up in the "vainglorious" quest for a social acclaim that is
always beyond his reach. Fleetwood is likewise mired in "vainglory," sunk in a selfindulgent preoccupation with his own imaginative desires; whereas the chivalric man
enjoys a benevolent relationship with a humanity he feels duty bound to protect,
Fleetwood, with his excessive sensibility, experiences only misanthropic alienation when
interacting with society. Mandeville is no doubt the furthest removed of all the
Godwinian heroes from this ideal of chivalric masculinity. He feels no sense of duty or
benevolence towards humanity, only alienation and hatred. Unable to express himself in
the face of crisis, Mandeville is the very antithesis of the man who can "command
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himself and others." In each of these novels, childhood mis-education, itself the result of
unfavourable social and familial circumstances, produces in the protagonist a crisis in
identity which underscores the discrepancy between this ideal vision of masculinity and
the fractured subjectivity of the hero.
In chapter one of this study, I discuss Caleb Williams, Godwin's most famous and
widely read novel, within this context of mis-education, limiting my examination of that
text to its engagement with forms of mis-education prefiguring those of Godwin's later
fictional heroes-namely, St. Leon and Fleetwood. My analysis of Caleb Williams,
therefore, is accordingly limited to the ways in which the characters of Caleb and
Falkland stand as early examples of Godwin's engagement with this notion of miseducation. My examination of that novel also focusses on Falkland as a kind of
"prototype" for the later characterization of St. Leon and Fleetwood. The bulk of this
study-chapters two, three, and four-are devoted to sustained examinations of what I am
calling the three "middle" novels of Godwin's fictional corpus-S^. Leon, Fleetwood, and
Mandeville. It is my contention that these three novels, each of which is structured
around the subjective narration of the eponymous male hero, serve as Godwin's most
compelling studies of childhood mis-education culminating in crises of identity and
masculine authority.1
In limiting my focus to these four texts, I am excluding from my study the three
short novels Godwin wrote and published when he was in his late twenties and in the
early stages of his career as a professional writer. Although Damon and Delia, Italian
Letters, and Imogen are of definite interest in terms of both their publication history2 and
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Godwin's development as a novelist, most critics, while recognizing some admirable
qualities of style and sentiment in these early tales, regard the texts as minimally
significant in the larger scope of the philosopher's literary achievements. To be sure,
these early novels do not provide the kind of sustained study of mis-education and
masculine identity in crisis that is found in Godwin's later fiction.
I am also excluding Godwin's last two novels from my examination-C/owafe.s7ey
and Deloraine, which were published in 1830 and 1833, respectively. Written at the end
of his career, and a decade and a half after the publication of his last novel, Mandeville,
both Cloudesley and Deloraine are quite removed in time from the earlier phase of
Godwin's career when he was, as nearly all critics agree, at the height of his imaginative
powers as a novelist. In this sense, both of these later texts fail to offer up psychological
studies as compelling as those found in the earlier novels.3 For the purposes of my own
study, therefore, I have chosen to focus on the three novels which I feel provide the most
intense and sustained examinations of mis-education and masculinity in crisis-^. Leon,
Fleetwood, and Mandeville.
Now that I have delineated the parameters of my study, and the theoretical
approach informing my analysis of Godwin's middle novels, I want to provide, in the
remainder of this introduction, a brief overview of Godwin's historical reception as both a
philosopher and a novelist.
*

*

*
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As a philosopher, Godwin was influenced by the utilitarian theory that society
should be governed by principles which result in the greatest good for the greatest number
of people. The fundamental argument of Godwin's Political Justice was that humanity,
through the sustained and intensive cultivation of reason, could reach a point of
"perfectibility" in its moral conduct that would allow society to gradually shed the
political and social institutions which the philosopher saw as inherently oppressive to the
human condition and a testament of humanity's failure to govern itself through its rational
powers alone. In this sense, Godwin is often regarded as the first "anarchist" philosopher,
in that his Utopian society would function without government (even a democratic one),
religion, and even social institutions like marriage. "It is earnestly to be desired," argued
Godwin in Volume 1 of Political Justice, "that each man should be wise enough to
govern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint; and, since
government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object principally to be aimed at is, that
we should have as little of it, as the general peace of human society will permit" (246).
Only the intensive application of rational thought will allow humanity to acquire
the amount of wisdom necessary to govern itself in this anarchic state, and reason must
therefore be the foundation of our political and social interactions. "The salutary
condition of the human mind," asserted Godwin in the 1797 Enquirer, "is that in which it
is prepared to bring every principle upon which it proceeds, within the scope of its own
examination; to derive assistance from every means of information, oral or scriptory; but
to admit nothing, upon the score of authority, to limit or supersede the touchstone of
reason" (223).
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Central to Godwin's philosophical anarchism is his notion of "universal
benevolence," the argument being that the "private" or "domestic" affections of
individual attachments which we may feel for family members and close friends must, in
order to achieve this perfect society governed by unadulterated reason, be sacrificed for
the greater good. Thus, universal benevolence must take precedence over the domestic
affections, so that society can achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people,
a central principle of the utilitarian philosophy that Godwin favoured. In what was
perhaps the most controversial passage in Political Justice, Godwin constructs a
hypothetical situation in which the rational man, governed by reason alone and entirely
committed to this principle of universal benevolence, must make the "correct" choice for
the greater good of humanity by choosing to sacrifice his brother's life to save the life of
the French poet Francois Fenelon:
In a loose and general view I and my neighbour are both of us men; and of
consequence entitled to equal attention. But, in reality, it is probable that
one of us, is a being of more worth and importance than the other [....]
In the same manner the illustrious archbishop of Cambray [Fenelon] was
of more worth than his valet, and there are few of us that would hesitate to
pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them
could be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred [...] that life
ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good.
In saving the life of Fenelon, suppose at the moment when he conceived
the project of his immortal Telemachus [a didactic epic poem by Fenelon],
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I should have been promoting the benefit of thousands, who have been
cured by the perusal of that work, of some error, vice and consequent
unhappiness [....] Suppose the valet had been my brother, my father or
my benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life
of Fenelon would still be more valuable than that of the valet; and justice,
pure, unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most
valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fenelon at the
expence of the other.4 (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 126-28)
For Hazlitt, writing a generation after the publication of PoliticalJustice, the
intellectual significance of Godwin's magnum opus was clear: "No work in our time gave
such a blow to the philosophical mind of the country as the celebrated Enquiry
concerning PoliticalJustice," he declares (33). For the later Victorians, Godwin's
philosophical vision was perhaps even more radical. Gilfillan, in his Sketches of Modern
Literature, declared that "on titles and on property, on monarchy and on marriage, on
commerce and on gratitude, [Godwin] trode with disdain" (29). Likewise, in his 1902
Studies of a Biographer, Leslie Stephen spoke ofPolitical Justice as a book "crammed
with intellectual explosives" (128). "It was a brilliant, but dangerous vision," Gilfillan
had recognized, "one of those sun-tinted phantasmatas which rose from the gulf of the
French Revolution, ere it had yet become an abyss of blood" (30).
Although later generations joined Godwin's contemporaries in emphasizing the
radical or "dangerous" nature of the philosopher's views, Godwin's anarchic vision was
actually quite conservative in its description of political and social innovation. While
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Gilfillan declared that Godwin "trode with disdain" on established institutions, the
philosopher, in reality, advocated for slow, cautious, and incremental change. As he
asserted in the Enquirer, "the rational advocate of new systems of government, would
touch actual institutions with a careful hand. He would desire further changes and fresh
improvements; but he would consider the task of innovation as an arduous business, nor
is there any thing that would excite more the apprehensiveness of his mind, than a
precipitate and headlong spirit" (322). "Innovation," he argued, "is a measure attended
with peculiar peril" and "should be entered upon with caution, and introduced in portions,
small and detached" {Enquirer 320).
Despite Godwin's aversion to the "precipitate and headlong spirit" that, in his
view, led to irrational social upheaval, his philosophy became a touchstone for the radical
cause in England, to the eventual detriment of his reputation. As the ideals of the French
Revolution degenerated into the Terror (Gilfillan's "abyss of blood"), Godwin and his
philosophy became increasingly open to virulent attack from the conservative forces in
England threatened by the social and political upheaval in France. By the middle of the
1790s, the ongoing war between Britain and France, combined with the images of violent
excess associated with French revolutionary turmoil, had made the sort of reformist
philosophy espoused by Godwin dangerously unpopular and left its adherents open to
direct personal attacks from anti-jacobin conservatives like Richard Polwhele.5
The reformers were also targeted politically. In 1795, William Pitt's government
passed the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act (informally known as the "gagging
acts" by those sympathetic to the cause of reform) in an effort to suppress the voice of the
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radical movement agitating for social and political change in England. The Act-which
made it punishable by transportation to write, speak, publish, or disseminate anything that
might threaten the authority of the monarchy-came just months after Godwin's close
friend, Thomas Holcroft, was indicted for high treason in the autumn of 1794. A wellknown reformist who had been actively involved in the publication of Thomas Paine's
The Rights of Man (1791), Holcroft was only saved from trial after Godwin penned his
Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand
Jury, a pamphlet which successfully challenged the government's interpretation of
treason as it had been applied in the charges against Holcroft and the reformers with
whom he had been indicted. Indeed, it was the "sharpness of Mr. Godwin's pen," Hazlitt
tells us, that "saved the lives of twelve innocent individuals, marked out as political
victims" (52-53). Moreover, as Stephen relates in Studies of a Biographer, Godwin
himself was likely only saved from government prosecution on account that the twovolume Political Justice, at a cost of three guineas, was simply too expensive for the
average Englishman, and thus had little chance of encouraging wide-spread social unrest
(128).
While Godwin might have been saved from formal government prosecution, he
was not so lucky in the courts of public opinion, as the popularity he enjoyed in the mid
1790s gave way to an obscure existence tinged by the shadows of notoriety. Indeed,
immediately after the passage in which he extols Godwin's fame, Hazlitt laments that the
philosopher now, in the year 1825, has
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sunk below the horizon, and enjoys the serene twilight of a doubtful
immortality [ . . . . ] Mr. Godwin's person is not known, he is not pointed
out in the street, his conversation is not courted, his opinions are not
asked, he is at the head of no cabal, he belongs to no party in the State, he
has no train of admirers, no one thinks it worth his while even to traduce
and vilify him, he has scarcely friend or foe, the world make a point [...]
of taking no more notice of him than if such an individual had never
existed; he is to all ordinary intents and purposes dead and buried.
(31-32)
Godwin's obscurity was so great in the early years of the nineteenth century that his
future son-in-law Shelley, in his first correspondence with the infamous philosopher he so
admired in early 1812, had to register the '"inconceivable emotion'" he experienced upon
first finding out that Godwin was in fact still alive and not yet '"enrolled [...] in the list
of the honourable dead'" (qtd. in Woodcock, Biographical Study 208). A little more than
twenty years later in 1834, two years before Godwin's death, William Maginn of Fraser's
Magazine constructed the aged philosopher as a "strange" oddity of a bygone era, a
defeated figure whose radical ideas have been rendered benign by the passage of time and
by the social and political hegemony of Victorian culture (463).
The roots of Godwin's obscurity in the nineteenth century lie no doubt in the slow
slide from fame to infamy which he experienced from the mid 1790s. As the
conservative establishment tightened its hold on the English cultural landscaipe in the
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wake of the French Revolution and the war with France, a backlash against the so-called
"jacobins" resulted in a wide-ranging smear campaign against the more outspoken of the
reformers, Godwin being a favourite target. Indeed, Godwin, describing the "fickleness
of reputation and popularity" in the 1797 Enquirer (293), was well aware of the personal
price people often pay for their commitment to ideological principles which run contrary
to, or which challenge, popular opinion. "Particularly in the case of reputation," argues
Godwin, "no man can without pain realise as to himself, the facility with which
partialities are discarded, friendships dissolved, and the man who was your warmest
advocate, subsides into indifference or worse" (Enquirer 293). Kenneth W. Graham's
William Godwin Reviewed: A Reception History, 1783-1834 charts the way in which
Godwin's reputation suffered, throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as
a result of reviews of his work in literary magazines increasingly committed to upholding
the conservative status quo and punishing those who were not so inclined. Godwin's
ideas were "anathema to the most powerful interests during his lifetime," points out
Graham, and thus were "seldom fairly represented by reviewers sensitive to the wishes of
the powerful" (8).
As the reviews collected in Graham's book illustrate, assessments of Godwin's
work were often, especially during the polarized years of the late 1790s, not much more
than simple attacks on his character and ideas. By 1798, the conservative British Critic
readily dismissed any publication that issued from the pen of "this dangerous and
extravagant author" (Graham 114), and the negative responses to Godwin's work and
character only intensified after the 1798 publication of the Memoirs, Godwin's biography

of his deceased wife Mary Wollstonecraft, a text which shocked contemporary readers
and reviewers with its frank discussion of her life and ideas. Godwin published his
Memoirs of the Author of A. Vindication of the Rights of Woman in an attempt to "give to
the public some account of the life of a person of eminent merit deceased," an attempt
meant to counter and defuse the "thoughtless calumny" that had dogged his wife in the
final years of her life {Memoirs 43). In composing the Memoirs, Godwin expressed his
hope that a balanced, affective, and sincere portrayal of Wollstonecraft's "picture and
story" would do much to combat the "pernicious sentiments" spread in the "malignant
misrepresentation" of his late wife {Memoirs 43).
To be sure, Godwin must be given credit for his commitment to Wollstonecraft's
legacy: as her biographer, and as the editor of her unpublished and unfinished
manuscripts, the philosopher devoted himself in the immediate wake of his wife's death
to the public preservation of her history and literary accomplishments.6 Godwin's
unyielding commitment to an uncensored narration of Wollstonecraft's "picture and
story," however, meant that readers were privy to all the details of a scandalous personal
history replete with such indiscretions as pre-marital sex, suicide attempts, and the birth
of an illegitimate child. Mary Jacobus has characterized the Memoirs as "a case of
published indiscretion" (274), and "indiscreet" is perhaps the most insistent adjective
used—in both contemporary and later critical evaluations—to characterize the text and its
author. In 1798, The Monthly Review expressed its shock over the narration of events
that "we should have advised the author to bury in oblivion" (Graham 150), and every
subsequent critic has felt compelled to foreground what Pamela Clemit and Gina Luria
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Walker call the "unprecedented biographical frankness" of Godwin's text (11). Nicola
Trott points to the "double exposure" of Wollstonecraft, whereby Godwin's commitment
to biographical honesty resulted in a wave of contemporary satirical representations of the
feminist philosopher as a debauched and disorderly threat to the chastity of a bourgeois
feminine subjectivity cultivated for, and by, middle-class women (34). Indeed, in the
index to its inaugural issue in 1798, The Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine would
unequivocally mark Wollstonecraft in these terms, cross-referencing her name with a
superfluous notation for "Prostitution."7
After enjoying literary success and tremendous social celebrity with the
publications of PoliticalJustice and Caleb Williams in the early to mid 1790s, Godwin
became known after 1798 as the scandalous biographer who, according to the poet Robert
Southey, "strippfed] his dead wife naked" (qtd. in Luria and Walker 11). Throughout the
early years of the nineteenth century, it "became fashionable to pour [abuse] upon
[Godwin's] head," Gilfillan tells us (50-51), and his legacy was surely not helped by
Stephen's 1890 Dictionary of National Biography article, in which he dwells in great
length on Godwin's financial troubles in the last decades of his life and famously
characterizes the philosopher as the "venerable horseleech" who "tried to extort money
from his son-in-law" (67). Ironically, in the Enquirer, Godwin seemed to anticipate
Stephen's prejudicial representation, calling attention to society's intolerant attitudes
towards debtors: "People in general accustom themselves to forget the anguish of the
insolvent debtor, and the unwearied struggles he has perhaps made to appear in a different
character," he laments (266).
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This is the image of Godwin inherited by modern readers, an image which has
coloured our knowledge and perception of the man as both a philosopher and a novelist.
In the 1834 Fraser's Magazine article already mentioned, Maginn declares Caleb
Williams and St. Leon to be the only two of Godwin's novels "which will be
remembered" (463), and even Hazlitt, while lavish in his praise of Caleb Williams and St.
Leon, regards Fleetwood Q.& "mawkish" and Mandeville as "morbid" (52). By the time of
Cloudesley's publication in 1830, the reviewers of the Athenaeum felt the need to lament
that "the announcement of a new novel by so distinguished a writer as Mr. Godwin, was
received with more indifference than we looked for by the reading world" (Graham 512).
Moreover, if the reviews in Graham's collection are any indication, Godwin's last novel,
Deloraine, received little notice in the periodical press, although the reviews it did
receive were, for the most part, positive. Little was said of Godwin's work as a novelist
throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, but Stephen's 1902 Studies of a Biographer
did include an essay on "William Godwin's Novels." Curiously, however, while the title
of the piece logically leads one to expect a discussion of all, or at least most, of Godwin's
novels, Stephen dismisses all of the books after St. Leon as unworthy of any commentary.
Even for St. Leon he has little praise, and Stephen ultimately ends his essay with the
assessment that, "if any one should be prompted to push his study into [Godwin's] other
novels [besides Caleb Williams], I fear that he is destined to disappointment" (154).
There are, no doubt, a number of reasons for this critical and readerly neglect. As
Woodcock pointed out in a mid-1970s review of Godwin's work in the genre, his "novels
have certainly grown less readable over the generations" ("Notes" 685). To be sure,

Godwin's rather verbose and heavily philosophical prose style can be off-putting to a
modern reader-in 1955, P.N. Furbank conceded that Godwin was sometimes "painfully
prosy in language" (222)-and his formal prose is often not helped by his tendency to
insert, into the narratives of his stories, extended digressions on moral and philosophical
matters. Combine this with what George Sherburn has deemed Godwin's "tendency to
exhibit his learning" (77), in the form of lengthy historical and literary allusions, and you
have a prose style that sometimes acts as an impediment to the narrative momentum of
the plot.
Moreover, there are deficiencies in the narrative structure of many of his novels
that also have a deleterious effect on the development of the plot. Godwin's inclination
towards multiple narrators, for example, often leads him to embed lengthy sub-narratives
into his novels that sometimes stall, rather than complement, the development of the main
story. This is perhaps most apparent in Fleetwood-where Ruffigny's life story continues
for ten chapters, comprising almost a fifth of the entire text-and in Cloudesley, where an
even larger chunk of the text is given over to the life story and adventures of a character
who plays no central role in the main plot. On a related note, there is sometimes very
little in the way of plot in Godwin's novels, a flaw his reviewers often highlighted: very
little happens in Fleetwood until the end of the second volume, when the narrator's
marriage seems to kick start the action of the story; in Mandeville, there is very little
action at all outside of the delusional mind of the main character. Even with St. Leon,
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which is perhaps Godwin's most plot-driven novel after Caleb Williams, one reviewer
complained that, "considering the length of [the tale], it is bare of incident" (Graham
158).
In addition to these issues of style and narrative structure, Godwin's novels
concern themselves with themes and characters that are no doubt unappealing to some
readers. Misanthropy is one of his favourite themes-most of his protagonists suffer some
sort of neurotic alienation from society and the people in their lives-but, as Sherburn
aptly points out, "misanthropy makes for rather doleful material for novels" (67). Indeed,
in its 1817 review of Mandeville, the Quarterly Review remarks on the "morbid anatomy"
informing so many of Godwin's stories and characters: "It appears to us somewhat
singular, that this gloomy style should have such charms for Mr. Godwin, that it should
be, in fact, the one in which he seems to feel himself most truly in his element; but so it
is; all the heroes of all his novels are infected with this malady" (Graham 367).
Ultimately, to read Godwin's novels is to spend a considerable amount of time in the
company of what are, in many cases, some fairly unlikeable characters.
Notwithstanding such reservations, many critics have recognized the unique value
of Godwin's texts and his role as a novelist. Hazlitt, of course, was effusive in his praise
of Caleb Williams and St. Leon, deeming both novels to be "two of the most splendid and
impressive works of the imagination that have appeared in our times" (48). Indeed,
Hazlitt's enthusiasm for Godwin's early fiction is reflective of the broader assessment by
the more generous reviewers of the nineteenth century that regarded Godwin as the only
substantial peer to Sir Walter Scott in the genre of historical fiction. At numerous points
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throughout his 1846 "sketch" of Godwin, for example, Gilfillan favourably compares the
philosopher with Scott (36, 47). Moreover, by the early 1830s, most of Godwin's novels
were apparently sufficiently established within the canon of British literature to warrant
their inclusion in the Bentley's Standard Novels Series, a collection of cheap editions of
"classic" novels printed by the London publishers Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley.
Caleb Williams, St. Leon, and Fleetwood were reissued as numbers 2, 5, and 22,
respectively, in the Bentley's Series.
Twentieth-century critics, as well, have praised Godwin's achievements as a
novelist. In his 1981 William Godwin As Novelist, B.J. Tysdahl recognized the
philosopher's unique role as an experimentalist in narrative forms, arguing that his novels
stand as "some of the most interesting technical experiments of the Romantic period" (3).
Likewise, Woodcock regards Godwin as the first major British author to use fiction as a
"vehicle of socio-political criticism" ("Notes" 685). On a more particular note, Ivanka
Kovacevic, referring to Fleetwood's extended description of Ruffigny's experiences in a
silk mill at Lyons, credits Godwin with writing fiction's first critical representation of the
'"factory system'" (qtd. in Tysdahl 109). Indeed, Ruffigny's narrative may very well be
one of the first representations of child labour in British literature.
Fortunately, Godwin's novels have also become increasingly available to modern
readers in new editions published throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.
In 1992, the Collected Novels and Memoirs of William Godwin was released by Pickering
& Chatto, making all of Godwin's novels available to modern readers in one complete,
eight-volume scholarly collection. More recently, Broadview Press has published new
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editions of many of Godwin's works, including Caleb Williams, in 2000; the Memoirs
and Fleetwood, in 2001; and St. Leon, in 2006. The availability of these new editions is
perhaps partially responsible for what seems to be a moderate surge of scholarly interest
in Godwin's novels of late. William Brewer and A.A. Markley have both examined
representations of masculinity and homosociality in the novels, and Gary Handwerk and
Steven Bruhm have each put forth provocative readings of Fleetwood. Justine Crump
and Anne Chandler, moreover, have provided their own interesting analyses of St. Leon.
The work of these scholars has been instrumental in shaping my own critical approach to
Godwin's texts, and I hope that my work will in turn encourage further scholarly enquiry
into Godwin's much-neglected fiction.
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The Well-Regulated Mind: Enlightenment, Education, and Caleb Williams
For Godwin, political justice could only be achieved through the progressive
enlightenment of humanity. The progressive nature of this enlightenment means that,
through the cultivation of reason and the rational faculties, humanity will one day reach
the state of "perfectibility" necessary to establish the anarchic state freed from
government institutions and the oppression of social prejudice. Godwin's philosophical
vision is thus fundamentally also a vision of ideal education, for the ultimate success of
the anarchic state depends on the proper process of enlightenment. Indeed, Godwin's
political argument is so inextricably bound up with the educative process that Gary
Handwerk and A. A. Markley have described Political Justice as "less a theory of
political institutions and processes [...] than a theory of political psychology and social
education" (Introduction to Caleb Williams 21).
In the Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature-published in
1797, four years after the political treatise which made him famous-Godwin tackles the
question of how best to prepare the young mind for the long process of gradual
enlightenment. The key, argues Godwin, is to cultivate in the young pupil a certain frame
of mind that will be well adapted for the intensive study required later in life. Godwin
shows little interest in detailing the specifics of a prescribed curriculum. Instead, he
asserts that the content of childhood education should be subordinate to the larger, and
much more important, process of fostering a certain mental disposition. "The true object
of juvenile education," contends the philosopher, is "to teach no one thing in particular,
but to provide against the age of five and twenty a mind well regulated, active, and
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prepared to learn" (Enquirer 5). As if to stress its centrality to his theory of education,
Godwin reiterates this assertion, verbatim, later in the text (78). If content is subordinate
to the formation of a certain frame of mind, then the tutor-or "preceptor," as Godwin
often calls him-should assume the position of a farmer who cultivates untilled land in
order that it may one day yield fruit. "The preceptor," argues Godwin, "is like the
incloser of uncultivated land; his first crops are not valued for their intrinsic excellence;
they are sown that the land may brought into order" (Enquirer 5-6). The tutor thus
functions as the force which "tames" the juvenile mind, regulating its growth and
ordering its activity; in the fertile soil of such a mind, the seeds of intellectual curiosity,
rational examination, and habits of industry can take proper root.
Godwin makes it clear at the beginning of the Enquirer that education, like "every
other moral process," benefits both the individual and society (1). "The true object of
education," he argues, "is the generation of happiness"-"happiness to the individual in
the first place," and to society in the second, for "if individuals were universally happy,
the species would be happy" (Enquirer 1). People are happy, moreover, because they are
virtuous, virtue being "essential to human happiness" (Enquirer 2). A well-ordered and
regulated mind, a mind "prepared to learn" (Enquirer 5), is capable of great
enlightenment through the development and use of its rational powers, and this
enlightenment necessarily leads in Godwin's view to virtuous sentiments. Godwin
furthermore associates virtue with benevolence, arguing that virtue is inherently in
sympathy with what is good for humanity and will inevitably encourage philanthropic
behaviour: "The first object of virtue is to contribute to the welfare of mankind. The

35
most essential attribute of right conduct therefore is, that it shall have a beneficent and
salutary tendency" (Enquirer 252). That which is not beneficent, argues Godwin, cannot
be virtuous (Enquirer 252-53). We see here the utilitarian influence of Godwin's moral
theory: virtuous conduct, by his definition, is that which benefits humanity and which
furthers the Godwinian ideal of universal benevolence. It is through the cultivation of
virtue-itself the product of a well-designed education-that society will reach its
"perfected" state.
Godwin's philosophy of education was shaped by what was no doubt the most
influential eighteenth-century work on educational theory-Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
Entile (1762). Rousseau, a Swiss philosopher and novelist, combined in Emile theory and
fiction to create his portrait of the hypothetical Emile and his education, as conducted by
his enlightened tutor. Rousseau's pedagogical approach in Emile was a radical departure
from conventional practices of child-rearing, and his "half treatise half novel," as P.D.
Jimack calls it (vii), made practical recommendations on almost every aspect of a child's
physical, intellectual, and psychological development: he advocated against swaddling,
arguing instead for loose clothing that allowed free movement of the limbs (10-11); he
recommended fresh air and exercise as indispensable to proper development (26, 42); and
wrote that mothers should breast feed their own children, rather than sending them out to
wet nurses (11-14); if a nurse must be used, she should be healthy, of good disposition,
and a vegetarian (24-26).
In Volume 1 of Political Justice, Godwin defines "education" in the "most
comprehensive sense that can possibly be annexed to that word, including every incident
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that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" (45).
Rousseau puts forth a similarly broad vision of education as a totalizing process involving
every aspect of our experience and development. "All that we lack at birth, all that we
need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of education," argues Rousseau at the
beginning of Entile (6), and "we begin to learn when we begin to live" (9). The object of
a good education, contends Rousseau, is to both respect and promote the child's "natural
tendencies" so that he can ward off the corrupting influences of society. According to
Rousseau, the child is born into a natural state, the very primitivism of which signifies its
superiority, and misguided social customs and oppressive institutions then function to
destroy the inherent goodness of this "natural" child-they "stifle nature in him" and
distort his natural state:
God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil.
He forces one soil to yield the products of another, one tree to bear
another's fruit. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural
conditions. He mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave. He destroys
and defaces all things; he loves all that is deformed and monstrous; he will
have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his
paces like a saddle-horse, and be shaped to his master's taste like the trees
in his garden. {EmileS)
This, argues Rousseau, is the tendency of dominant educational practice, as he knew it in
the eighteenth century-to remove man from his "natural" state and impose on him habits
and customs antithetical to his physical, psychological, and moral well-being. Through
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the hypothetical Emile, Rousseau delineates an educational programme that would allow
man to cultivate his natural tendencies so that they can be reconciled with the inevitable
demands of society.
Rousseau's ideal model of education is experiential and student-centred. The
teacher's primary responsibility is to cultivate an interactive learning environment
whereby his student can engage in a sustained relationship with the natural world.
"Nature, not man, is his schoolmaster," asserts Rousseau of his imaginary pupil (Emile
84). Education, moreover, should be limited to those things which are directly relevant to
the student's life and experiences, and he warns the tutor not to begin the process of
reasoning with his charge too soon. Instead, the enlightened tutor will emphasize activity
of the body and the senses over that of the mind. The rational capacities of the mind
should be developed at a later stage, when the child is more capable of reason. "Since
everything that comes into the human mind," argues Rousseau, "enters through the gates
of sense, man's first reason is a reason of sense-experience. It is this that serves as a
foundation for the reason of the intelligence" (Emile 90). Childhood education, for
Rousseau, is therefore predominantly an empiricist process, the student receiving all of
his knowledge through a sensory exploration of the environment.
Rousseau makes it clear that the tutor plays an indispensable role in structuring
this kind of interactive education. While the student must feel, at all times, that his
education is an entirely self-directed and improvisational exploration of the world around
him, in reality, the tutor must play a controlling role in manipulating that world to create
the series of scripted lessons experienced by the student as impromptu explorations. In
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order to encourage independence and self-assertion in his student, the tutor must strive to
construct the appearance of equality between him and his pupil, ostensibly repudiating his
role as the superior in both power and knowledge. However, while the tutor adopts the
appearance of equality, portraying himself as a fellow explorer in the learning process, he
nevertheless maintains complete control of events as they unfold. "Let [the student]
always think he is master while you are really master," advises Rousseau to the
prospective tutor (Emile 84). This, he argues, is how the tutor tames the student and
brings him fully under his controlling sway, for "there is no subjection so complete as that
which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive"
(Emile 84). The tutor must therefore maintain the illusion of freedom, while
simultaneously ensuring a complete manipulation of his student's thoughts and actions.
The tutor must actively shape his pupil's behaviour and sentiments, but must veil that
shaping influence so that the pupil experiences a sense of complete autonomy in his
education. "No doubt he ought only to do what he wants," argues Rousseau of the
hypothetical pupil, "but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do. He
should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell"
(Emile 85). In developing and delivering this Rousseauvian model of education, one
which will not "stifle nature in the child" (Emile 5), the teacher must master the "art of
controlling without precepts, and doing everything without doing anything at all" (Emile
84). This, contends Rousseau, is the "only road to success" (Emile 84).
While Godwin admired Emile as a "work of the highest value" (Enquirer 107),
and Rousseau for the "magnitude and originality of his speculations" (Enquirer 106), he
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was deeply suspicious of what he saw as the deception inherent in the philosopher's
system of education. For Godwin, all education should be predicated on the intrinsic
motivation of the student, on the student's desire to learn for the sake of knowledge itself,
and for the self-improvement that such knowledge will inevitably foster. "The most
desirable mode of education," writes Godwin in the Enquirer, "is that which is careful
that all the acquisitions of the pupil shall be preceded and accompanied by desire. The
best motive to learn, is a perception of the value of the thing learned" (78). "The boy,
like the man, studies, because he desires it," continues Godwin. "He proceeds upon a
plan of his own invention, or which, by adopting, he has made his own. Every thing
bespeaks independence and equality" (Enquirer 80). It is vital that the student achieves
this independence; the "preceptor" should guide the student and facilitate his learning, but
should never dictate the process. "Let [the student] explore the path for himself," advises
Godwin. "Without increasing his difficulties, you may venture to leave him for a
moment, and suffer him to ask himself the question before he asks you, or, in other
words, to ask the question before he receives the information" (Enquirer 82).
While the preceptor should cultivate independence in his student, and strive for a
relationship of equality, he should nevertheless acknowledge his place as the instructor
and should not play the part of deception by pretending to be less skilled or
knowledgeable than he truly is. Such disingenuousness on the part of the tutor is
Godwin's main complaint against Rousseau's educative model: "his whole system of
education," laments Godwin,
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is a series of tricks, a puppet-show exhibition, of which the master holds
the wires, and the scholar is never to suspect in what manner they are
moved. The scholar is never to imagine that his instructor is wiser than
himself. They are to be companions; they are to enter upon their studies
together; they are to make a similar progress; if the instructor drop a
remark which facilitates their progress, it is to seem the pure effect of
accident. While [the tutor] is conducting a process of the most uncommon
philosophical research, and is watching every change and motion of the
machine, he is to seem in the utmost degree frank, simple, ignorant and
undesigning. (Enquirer 106)
This pedagogical approach, argues Godwin, is not much more than a "system of incessant
hypocrisy and lying," whereby an ostensibly "undesigning" tutor constructs a relationship
of "fictitious equality" with his pupil in order to veil the contrived and duplicitous nature
of his educational programme (Enquirer 120). The Rousseauvian teacher, in Godwin's
view, commits the unjustifiable error of practicing deception on his student, and his
pedagogy-predicated as it is on this foundation of insincerity-becomes a programme of
manipulation made that much more insidious by the fact that it masquerades as a
relationship of equality. Indeed, for Godwin, this system seeks to conceal the power
imbalance which he recognizes as inherent in the educational dynamic of teacher and
student. "Whatever may be [the] merit [of Emile] as a vehicle of fundamental truths, as a
guide of practice it will be found of the most pernicious tendency," argues Godwin
(Enquirer 107).1
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Rousseau believed in the inherent virtue of humanity in its natural state-"God
makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil," asserts the
philosopher at the beginning of Emile (5). For Godwin, however, the young mind is
neither good nor evil. Instead, the child enters the world as an empty space ready to
receive the "impressions" of everything around him or her:
In infancy the mind is peculiarly ductile. We bring into the world with us
nothing that deserves the name of habit; are neither virtuous nor vicious,
active nor idle, inattentive nor curious. The infant comes into our hands a
subject, capable of certain impressions and of being led on to a certain
degree of improvement. {Enquirer 15)
In this respect, Godwin follows in the empiricist tradition of John Locke, the seventeenthcentury English philosopher whose conception of the mind as a tabula rasa or "blank
slate" is similar to Godwin's later vision of the "ductile" mind. In An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1690), Locke argues against the existence of innate ideas in
humanity, instead contending that all knowledge and understanding develops from our
sensory impressions of the world. "The senses," asserts Locke,
at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the
mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in
the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding
farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In
this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the

42
materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty [....] The
knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way
that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it
still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: it being about those first,
which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to
do, and which make the most frequent impressions on their senses.
(11-12)
Like Locke, Godwin conceives of the mind in these non-essentialist terms, as a pliable
object that can be shaped in any number of ways by sense experience and the forces of
history and culture-all of which, for Godwin, qualifies as "education." Indeed, in many
ways, Godwin prefigures later twentieth-century conceptions of subjectivity in his
recognition of the infant as a "subject" who comes into the world ready to receive the
"impressions" of the cultural order.
Although the infant mind is initially "ductile," it does not always remain so.
Impressions will take, argues Godwin, and the initial pliability of the mind will inevitably
give way to the developed habits and behaviours of an entrenched character. The child's
mind, contends Godwin, "is like his body. What at first was cartilage, gradually becomes
bone. Just so the mind acquires its solidity; and what might originally have been bent in a
thousand directions, becomes stiff, unmanageable, and unimpressible" {Enquirer 15).
Godwin particularly laments this "solidity" of the mind in terms of the errors and
character flaws which so often develop in youth, and which prove so difficult, if not
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impossible, to ameliorate. Indeed, Rousseau had voiced a similar concern for the young
pupil in Entile, calling the first twelve years of the boy's existence "the most dangerous
period in human life" (57). This period, contends the philosopher, "is the time when
errors and vices spring up, while as yet there is no means to destroy them; when the
means of destruction are ready [i.e., the ability to reason], the roots have gone too deep to
be pulled up" {Entile 57).
For Godwin, the bad habits cultivated in childhood are just as damaging to the
later character of the man. "It too frequently happens that the excesses of youth, not only
leave an unfavourable stain upon the reputation, but that they corrupt the disposition, and
debase the character," he contends {Enquirer 158). "It is not every youthful folly that
men shake off when they arrive at years of discretion. The wild and inconsiderate boy
will often entail some of the worst features of his character on the man" {Enquirer 158).
It is for this reason, asserts Godwin, "that we frequently meet with that mixed character in
the adult over which humanity weeps. We have often occasion to observe the most
admirable talents, and even the most excellent dispositions, in men, whose talents and
virtues are nevertheless rendered abortive by some habitual indiscretion" {Enquirer 158).
Education-understood by Godwin as the totality of the child's experiences in the
world, as well as the more direct pedagogical guidance he may or may not receive-is
therefore essential to human development, for a sound education, as the single most
important factor in the ultimate development of the subject, serves as the best way to
guard against the production of such a "mixed character." As Godwin argues at the
beginning of the Enquirer, education is a "moral process," and without a sound education

founded on the principles of reason, justice, and benevolence, there can be no happiness
or virtue (1-2). A proper education is indispensable to the development of a happy,
virtuous, and rational human being, and even those born with great potential still must
receive the improving benefits of a salutary education:
Genius perhaps is indebted for its earliest birth to the occurrence of
favourable circumstances. But, be this as it will, certain it is that it stands
in need of every advantage to nurse it to perfection, and that for this
reason, it is almost constantly frost-nipped, or stunted, or distorted in its
proportions, and scarcely in any instance arrives at what genius is capable
of being. (Enquirer 286-87)
While the educative process plays, for Godwin, a central role in producing the
virtuous and happy subject, it is also an inherently precarious process whereby early
promise and ability are easily blighted by a lack of "favourable circumstances" in
childhood, a "mis-education." For Godwin (as for Rousseau), the corrupt nature of
political and social institutions contributes to the mis-education of the subject. This
reality is perhaps best captured by Caleb Williams, who portrays Falkland's fall into
immorality and despair as the inevitable consequence of a corrupt social order that
destroys even its most promising. "Of what use are talents and sentiments in the corrupt
wilderness of human society?" asks Caleb at the end of the novel. "It is a rank and rotten
soil, from which every finer shrub draws poison as it grows. All that, in a happier field
and a purer air, would expand into virtue and germinate into usefulness, is thus converted
into henbane and deadly nightshade" (434). Indeed, in the two central characters of this
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novel-Caleb and Falkland-we encounter two separate narratives underscoring the
connection between character flaws fostered by a childhood "miseducation" and later
personal tragedy.
There is a tension in Caleb Williams between psychology and social critique. On
one level, Godwin seems drawn to the troubled psychologies of his characters in
documenting their moral degeneration. This is particularly true for Caleb, whose passion
for the "unravelling of an adventure" (60) is at certain moments suggestive of an innate
psychological failure that transcends the influence of education. Indeed, the earliest
memories shared in his memoir all relate to the fundamental curiosity which Caleb
presents as the primal impulse of his character. Godwin himself seemed to perceive
curiosity as almost intrinsic to the human condition, calling it "one of the strongest
impulses of the human heart" {Enquirer 131).
On another level, however, Godwin insists on having Caleb document the
pedagogical conditions of his early years, a strategy which underscores the central role
these educational challenges play in his process of mis-education. The limitations of
Caleb's humble upbringing are specifically highlighted by Godwin: his parents have little
education beyond the utilitarian kind, and do not have the resources to offer their son
supplementary guidance in the form of a tutor (59-60). As a consequence, Caleb is left to
his own limited resources in cobbling together an education that ultimately makes him illsuited for his own class position as a peasant. Of course, his education cannot make him
into a gentleman either. Caleb is thus mired in the injustice of "things as they are," and
his dilemma operates as a form of social critique in the novel, an indictment of a class
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system that fails to meet the educational and social needs of promising young men like
Caleb. In another class milieu, Caleb's curiosity may have developed into an asset, rather
than a liability. As I argue shortly, a tutor or enlightened "preceptor" might have
channeled Caleb's curious energies in more fruitful directions, directions more suited to
benevolence and personal happiness. Without such a resource, however, his curiosity
remains unchecked, and ultimately develops into the destructive passion that forms the
basis of his mis-education.
In his portrait of Falkland, Godwin similarly deploys the theme of mis-education
to critique the established class system. A member of the landed gentry, Falkland has the
economic power and social privilege denied Caleb, and these resources allow him to
wage his campaign of persecution against his young employee. Despite his very real
power, however, Falkland is also presented as a victim in the text, a man corrupted by the
ideologies that underpin his class position. Falkland is not just duped into worshiping a
false "idol," as he later comes to recognize (215); he is literally destroyedpsychologically, morally, and even physically-by the chivalric value system he embraces.
The romance of chivalry is not just "'idle and groundless,'" as Falkland's steward asserts
(166); it is a vitiating ideology that corrupts Falkland's psychological development and
blights his potential for virtue and benevolence.
For both Caleb and Falkland, therefore, childhood mis-education is rooted in the
flawed nature of an established class system that oppresses one man and turns the other
into his oppressor. Although it is Caleb who cries out at novel's end against the "corrupt
wilderness of human society," with its "rank and rotten soil" (434), it is clearly Godwin,
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as philosopher and social reformer, who makes this lament. In much of his fiction,
including Caleb Williams, Godwin marries social critique to psychological realism
through the theme of mis-education.
Habits of Mind and Meditations: Caleb Williams
Published in 1794, one year after Political Justice, Caleb Williams puts into
narrative form the philosophical arguments of that text regarding the systemic corruption
of contemporary class and social structures, or "things as they are." A huge success, the
novel solidified Godwin's celebrity in Britain where, as William Hazlitt tells us, "he
blazed as a sun in the firmament of reputation; no one was more talked of, more looked
up to, more sought after, and wherever liberty, truth, justice was the theme, his name was
not far off' (31). With its thematic treatment of secret histories and their exposure, as
well as its chase narrative and murder plot, Caleb Williams was as much gothic novel as
it was social critique, a fact that no doubt contributed to its success, as Godwin adeptly
heightens the suspenseful tension of the narrative through a tortuous pursuit sequence that
postpones the final confrontation between the protagonist and his oppressor and thus
allows readers to witness the slow psychological and physical deterioration of Caleb.2
It is in Caleb Williams that Godwin first explores the theme of mis-education as it
impacts the novel's two central characters, Caleb and his employer, the country squire
Ferdinando Falkland. The opening pages of the novel chart the physical and intellectual
development of Caleb as a child, and the reader is informed at some length of Caleb's
"habits of [] mind" and "meditations" (59-60). Largely left to his own devices in terms of
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his education, Caleb gravitates towards activities and books that gratify what he calls the
"spring of action" informing the "whole train of [his] life"-curiosity:
The spring of action which, perhaps more than any other, characterised the
whole train of my life was curiosity [....] [T]his produced in me an
invincible attachment to books of narrative and romance. I panted for the
unravelling of an adventure with an anxiety, perhaps almost equal to that
of the man whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue. I read,
I devoured compositions of this sort. They took possession of my soul.
(60)
As Caleb himself recognizes, his later misfortunes are rooted in this unbridled curiosity,
in this propensity for the " unravelling of an adventure." Indeed, he mentions these
"habits" and "meditations" of his mind precisely because they have "influenced the
history of [his] future life" (59).
Caleb constructs his curiosity as an inherent feature of his personality, something
present in him from birth, and he regards the stories he "devours" as the natural means of
gratifying this innate element in his psyche. In reality, however, Caleb's curiosity and
passion for adventure are as much the products of his reading as they are the instigating
forces stimulating it. Caleb's curiosity and thirst for adventure are no doubt satisfied by
the "books of narrative and romance" he devours, but they are also simultaneously fueled
by these books, his curiosity developing and growing in response to this steady diet of
adventure and romance. In this sense, Caleb's reading can be interpreted as a form of
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"mis-education," for it exacerbates the destructive propensity for curiosity already present
in his character. Significantly, Caleb has no tutor or "preceptor" to act as a guiding hand
in his education. "Born of humble parents," he is "taught the rudiments of no science,
except reading, writing, and arithmetic" (59). The education he receives from his parents
is of the most basic, utilitarian kind, and Caleb must consequently fashion for himself an
education "greater than [his] condition in life afforded room to expect" (59). With his
"inquisitive mind," he "neglected no means of information from conversation or books"
(59).
As a largely self-taught student, therefore, Caleb is left to his own resources in not
only choosing his reading materials, but also in evaluating the moral tendencies of these
materials and in monitoring their effects on his developing character. In the Enquirer,
Godwin argued against censoring the reading choices of the pupil-"suffer him to wander
in the wilds of literature," he advises (144). "The impression we derive from a book,"
argues Godwin, "depends much less upon its real contents, than upon the temper of mind
and preparation with which we read it" (Enquirer 144-45). Of course, that "temper of
mind and preparation" is shaped by the "skilful preceptor," whose sound judgement
teaches the student to think critically and rationally. Even in cases where the pupil's
reading contains the "thickest clouds of error," the mindful preceptor should be able to
"triumph over corruption and sophistry, with the advantage of being continually at hand,
of watching every change and symptom as they may arise, and more especially with the
advantage of real voice, of accommodated eloquence, and of living sympathies, over a
dead letter" (Enquirer 145-46).
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Caleb, however, has no such guidance. With no preceptor available to shape his
education, and to monitor the moral effects of the "books of narrative and romance" he
devours, he indulges in the "excesses of youth" which Godwin warned would "corrupt
the disposition, and debase the character" of the man (Enquirer 158). Caleb's improvised
education ultimately functions as a kind of mis-education which fails to produce the
"well-regulated mind" which Godwin identified as one of the primary objects of "juvenile
education" (Enquirer 5). Instead, Caleb's mis-education allows for the destructive
passion of curiosity to take deep root in his character. Without the guidance of an
enlightened teacher, who might have channeled his student's thirst for tales of adventure
into more productive or appropriate pursuits, Caleb allows his curiosity to take
"possession of [his] soul," overwhelming his better judgment and leading him into
recklessness. Indeed, even in Caleb's assertion that his childhood curiosity was not
"entirely ignoble"-"village anecdotes and scandal had no charms for me," he claims
(60)-lies his awareness of its potential indiscretion.
Once employed by Falkland, Caleb becomes a quintessential example of the man
later described by Godwin in the Enquirer-a man whose "talents and virtues are
nevertheless rendered abortive by some habitual indiscretion," an indiscretion which
takes its root in the corrupting "excesses of youth" (158). After hearing the story of
Falkland's history from the steward Collins, he allows his curiosity about his employer's
mysterious past to consume all his mental energy: "The story I had heard was for ever in
my thoughts, and I was peculiarly interested to comprehend its full import. I turned it a
thousand ways, and examined it in every point of view" (179). It became, writes Caleb,
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"the great enquiry which drank up all the currents of my soul" (203). Indeed, his intense
curiosity induces him to enter into the narrative of Falkland's life as a psychological spy.
In his relentless pursuit of Falkland's secrets, he acts as a "watch upon [his] patron"
(180), and the very recklessness of his behaviour heightens its appeal: "The instant I had
chosen this employment for myself," remarks Caleb, "I found a strange sort of pleasure in
it" (180). "That there was danger in the employment, served to give an alluring pungency
to the choice" (180).
Godwin had reflected, in the Enquirer, on the negative correlation which so often
exists between curiosity and the possibility of its gratification:
Curiosity is one of the strongest impulses of the human heart. To curiosity
it is peculiarly incident, to grow and expand itself under difficulties and
opposition. The greater are the obstacles to its being gratified, the more it
seems to swell, and labour to burst the mounds that confine it. Many an
object is passed by with indifference, till it is rendered a subject of
prohibition, and then it starts up into a source of inextinguishable passion.
(131)
This dynamic certainly characterizes Caleb's increasingly reckless pursuit of Falkland's
secrets. He laments the "restless propensity" of curiosity, which "often does but hurry us
forward the more irresistibly, the greater is the danger that attends its indulgence" (187).
Caleb's behaviour, moreover, becomes increasingly irrational, as his desire for details
turns into a need for complete omniscience regarding his patron: "I will watch him
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without remission," he vows. "I will trace all the mazes of his thought" (203). Indeed,
Caleb ultimately loses control of his own capacity for self-regulation, as his judgment,
reason, and instincts for self-preservation are all overwhelmed by the "demon" of
curiosity: "The more impenetrable Mr. Falkland was determined to be, the more
uncontrollable was my curiosity," Caleb remarks (181); "I had a confused apprehension
of what I was doing, but I could not stop myself," he later laments (188); '"I have always
tried to stop myself, but the demon that possessed me was too strong for me,'" he finally
admits to Falkland (195). Indeed, the overwrought nature of Caleb's mental state during
these psychological exchanges with Falkland has led Peter Melville Logan to classify
Caleb as a "nervous narrator" whosefirst-personnarration, fraught with the signs of his
emotional distress, is symptomatic of the sickly state of his mind and body (48-55).
Caleb is not the only character in the novel whose early reading constitutes a miseducation that proves fatal to his future happiness. Falkland is almost always analyzed in
terms of the relationship he shares with Caleb, critical examinations of the novel often
positioning patron and servant as either "doubles" of one another (a relationship
sometimes read in erotic terms, as both Robert J. Corber and Alex Gold, Jr. do), or as
representatives of opposing value systems.3 In terms of characterization, however,
Falkland signifies more broadly in Godwin'sfictionalcorpus as a seminal figure
informing the characterization of the philosopher's later fictional heroes-namely, St.
Leon and Fleetwood. Indeed, in Falkland we find afigurewhose mis-education gives rise
to the specific forms of moral failure characterizing these later heroes. Like St. Leon,
whose childhood education in the chivalric code leads him to embrace the ideals of fame
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and public honour largely to the exclusion of all else, Falkland nurses a similar passion
for chivalry that compels him to regard '"honour and the esteem of mankind as a good []
preferred to all others'" (Caleb Williams 195-96). Falkland's acute awareness of the stain
of dishonour, moreover, is symptomatic of, and feeds into, an underlying sensibility that
foreshadows the destructive misanthropy of Fleetwood, the "New Man of Feeling." We
find in Falkland, therefore, a prototype of sorts for Godwin's next two fictional heroes,
and his characterization in Caleb Williams foreshadows the later identity crises
experienced by St. Leon and Fleetwood.
Godwin's critique of chivalric ideology can be traced back to his position as the
radical reformer who actively agitated throughout the 1790s against Britain's established
class structures, structures which allowed an aristocratic oligarchy made up of men like
Falkland to oppress those below them in the social order. Perhaps the most famous
apologist for the old order was Edmund Burke, whose impassioned response to the
revolutionary turmoil in France, the 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, stood
as a lightning rod for the radical movement, and which partly inspired Mary
Wollstonecraft and Godwin to write their own philosophical rebuttals-^ Vindication of
the Rights of Men (1790) and Political Justice (1793). A number of critics have pointed
out the way in which Godwin's Caleb Williams also critiques Burke's veneration of the
old order as it is embodied in aristocratic value systems. As Marilyn Butler has argued,
the novel "re-enacts and even verbally echoes the debate on the merits of the old system
conducted since 1790 by Burke and his republican opponents" (252). Godwin's story,
contends Butler, particularly the first volume in which the misfortunes of Emily Melville
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and the Hawkins family are recounted to Caleb by Collins, exists to illustrate the "variety
and range of circumstances in which the power of the upper orders can be felt by other
citizens" (245).4
Godwin himself was quite blunt about the political aims of his novel, arguing, in
the original Preface to the text in 1794, that he "proposed, in the invention of the
following work, to comprehend, as far as the progressive nature of a single story would
allow, a general review of the modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism by which
man becomes the destroyer of man" (55). In a 1795 letter to the British Critic, he
reiterated the polemical intention of the text to "expose the evils which arise out of the
present system of civilized society" (451). One of these evils, of course, was the
contemporary class system, and Butler is surely correct in arguing that Falkland was
largely modelled on a vision of the chivalric aristocratic order venerated by Burke.
Central to Godwin's critique is the notorious passage from the Reflections in
which Burke paints the highly sexualized scene of Marie Antoinette's arrest by a "band of
cruel ruffians and assassins," who, after bursting into the Queen's chambers, "pierced
with a hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted
woman had but just time to fly almost naked" (Reflections 75-76). Burke laments this
moment as symbolic of the fall of chivalry-the demise of a golden age in which men,
actuated by gallantry and honour, would have felt compelled to react immediately and
violently in the defense of a noble woman: "Little did I dream that I should have lived to
see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour,
and of cavaliers," laments Burke (Reflections 80).
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I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to
avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry
is gone [...] and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never,
never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that
proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the
heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted
freedom. (Reflections 80)
In Volume 2 of Political Justice, Godwin directly evokes Burke's language but
reverses his lament. In his argument against the unequal distribution of wealth and
property, Godwin contends that chivalry, unfortunately, is still alive and well in Britain,
corrupting the rich and cultivating servility, moral weakness, and despair in the poor:
"Indeed 'the age of chivalry is' not 'gone'!" he declares. "The feudal spirit still survives
that reduced the great mass of mankind to the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of a
few" (454-55). In Caleb Williams, this corrupting feudal spirit is best expressed through
Falkland, who serves as Godwin's paradigm for the ignoble and blighting potential of
chivalric ideology on those who embrace its ideals, as well as on those who are its
recipients.
Falkland's passion for chivalry takes root in his youth, and his reading, like
Caleb's, plays a central role in the development of the passion which will prove so
destructive to his future happiness. "Among the favourite authors of his early years were
the heroic poets of Italy," Caleb tells his reader. "From them he imbibed the love of
chivalry and romance" (67). Caleb's use of the verb "imbibed" posits chivalric ideology
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as a form of sustenance that should theoretically foster Falkland's moral development.
The nourishing potential of chivalry, however, is belied by the reality of its effects on
Falkland's character. Having in his youth "drunk so deeply of the fountain of chivalry"
(67), Falkland finds himself poisoned, rather than nourished, by the corruption of his
ideological fare. Falkland's love of chivalry is so entrenched that it shapes every aspect
of his imaginative development, as evidenced by the "Ode to the Genius of Chivalry" he
composes as a young man (84). He subsequently grows up to embrace a chivalric code
that emphasizes not only benevolent and philanthropic behaviour, but also the honour
attached to rank and reputation. Indeed, for Falkland, his sensibility to public reputation
is a direct function of his virtue. "He believed that nothing was so well calculated to
make men delicate, gallant, and humane, as a temper pereptually alive to the sentiments
of birth and honour," writes Caleb (67).
To be sure, Falkland's early education in the ideals of chivalry produces an
accomplished young man celebrated for his honour and integrity. While in Italy, and
mired in a lover's quarrel, he deftly avoids a duel while still managing to maintain the
'"reputation of [his] courage'" (73). Even in this situation, however, Falkland's embrace
of the chivalric code has a darker side: he admits to Count Malvesi, his antagonist in the
quarrel, that his strict adherence to the '"rigid"' rules governing chivalric interactions
between men might have compelled him to take the life of his challenger. '"The laws of
honour are in the utmost degree rigid,'" he tells Malvesi, '"and there was reason to fear
that, however anxious I were to be your friend, I might be obliged to be your murderer'"
(73). It is only lucky, he remarks, that Malvesi's challenge had been made privately
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rather than publicly, as a public accusation would have forced him to defend his courage
and honour, whatever the costs. '"It would not have been in my power,'" he tells
Malvesi, '"to have avoided the combat'" (73).
Despite the ostensible beneficence of Falkland's conduct in this situation, it is
clear that he unequivocally embraces and is the proud representative of what Daniela
Garofalo has called the "carefully codified and gentlemanly violence of chivalry" (238).
As Falkland's behaviour in this affair suggests, all other values-including the sanctity of
human life-must ultimately be sacrificed for the protection of his good name, a sentiment
which foreshadows his later tragedies. Indeed, he admits as much to Caleb: '"As soon as
I was capable of a choice, I chose honour and the esteem of mankind as a good I preferred
to all others,'" he tells his young employee (195-96). '"I have sworn to preserve my
reputation, whatever be the expense,'" he later warns Caleb. '"I love it more than the
whole world and its inhabitants taken together[]'" (235).
Collins, too, recognizes Falkland's fatal sensibility to dishonour and the way in
which it threatens to overwhelm his judgment and philanthropic potential. As he
recounts to Caleb the story of Falkland's combative history with the neighbourhood bully
Barnabas Tyrell, Collins characterizes his employer as "a man whom, in the pursuit of
reputation, nothing could divert; who would have purchased the character of a true,
gallant, and undaunted hero, at the expense of worlds, and who thought every calamity
nominal but a stain upon his honour" (172). For Collins, the beating Falkland suffers at
the hands of Tyrell in the rural assembly hall constitutes a public "disgrace," an attack on
his honour from which it was impossible he should ever recover: "To Mr. Falkland
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disgrace was worse than death," he tells Caleb. "The slightest breath of dishonour would
have stung him to the very soul. What must it have been with this complication of
ignominy, base, humiliating, and public?" (164). "Every passion of his life was
calculated to make him feel it more acutely" (164).
This moment, Caleb learns, marks the '"crisis of Mr. Falkland's history'" (166).
With Tyrell mysteriously murdered immediately after this confrontation, Falkland finds
himself under suspicion of having committed the crime. While Falkland must suffer the
public disgrace of defending himself against a "'crime, the most black that any human
creature is capable of perpetrating'" (170), he must also compound his psychological
distress in the service of preserving his reputation. Lying to the magistrates, feigning
innocence, and allowing the execution of two innocent men may be abhorrent to
Falkland's sense of virtue and his philanthropic sentiments, as well as fatal to his future
happiness and psychological stability, but these acts are nevertheless constructed as
necessary "sacrifices" to the larger project of protecting his good name. Although
Falkland claims that he has now only the '"empty remains of honour'" to protect-his
reputation having been "blemished" beyond repair by the simple taint of suspicion-he
still demands of the magistrates that they offer him the '"feeble consolation'" of
vindicating his public image (172).
The public beating-that '"complicated personal insult,'" as Collins calls it
(168)-and the taint of public suspicion combine to create an existential crisis for
Falkland. After his confrontation with Tyrell, Falkland yearns for "annihilation, to lie
down in eternal oblivion" (164); after his defense, he is alienated from humanity by a
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"stately coldness and reserve" punctuated only by periods "of a furious insanity" (175).
As Collins remarks, Falkland was
'too deeply pervaded with the idle and groundless romances of chivalry,
ever to forget the situation, humiliating and dishonourable according to his
ideas, in which he had been placed upon this occasion. There is a
mysterious sort of divinity annexed to the person of a true knight, that
makes any species of brute violence committed upon it indelible and
immortal.' (166)
Collins's language yokes the chivalric with the divine and initiates a recurrent motif in
the novel whereby honour and reputation become "idols" requiring both worship and
sacrifice. Falkland tells Caleb that '"reputation has been the idol, the jewel of [his] life,'"
a '"deity"' he has chosen to '"worship"' (171-72). The public humiliation in the
assembly hall, coupled with the suspicion of murder attached to his name, render the
sacred-Falkland's honour and reputation-profane, a sacrilege he experiences as
irreversible. For Falkland, the divinity attached to an '"unblemished reputation'" can
never be recovered after these events, despite his being ultimately cleared of the charge
with much celebration and "every circumstance of credit" (172). It becomes a paradise
forever lost to him: '"It is not in the power of your decision to restore to me my
unblemished reputation, to obliterate the disgrace I have suffered, or to prevent it from
being remembered that I have been brought to examination upon a charge of murder,'"
Falkland tells the magistrates who gather to hear his defense (171). '"No future lustration
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could ever remove the stain'" of the dishonour attached to Falkland's name, laments
Collins, continuing the religious motif (166).
While the stain of ignominy cannot be washed away, Falkland nevertheless
protects the '"empty remains of [his] honour'" (172) by offering up his '"virtue, []
honesty, [] [and] everlasting peace of mind'" to the preservation of his public image
(215). These, he tells Caleb, are '"cheap sacrifices to be made at the shrine of this
divinity'" (215). Towards the end of the novel, Falkland accuses Caleb of inappropriately
sacrificing benevolence, and compassion for his former master, to '"barren truth'" when
he refuses to sign a declaration recanting his accusation against Falkland. '"Perhaps you
may scruple out of a regard to truth,'" he tells Caleb. '"Is truth then entitled to adoration
for its own sake, and not for the sake of the happiness it is calculated to produce? Will a
reasonable man sacrifice to barren truth, when benevolence, humanity, and every
consideration that is dear to the human heart, require that it should be superseded?'"
(384). Caleb, however, reverses this language of sacrifice, arguing that, by signing such a
declaration, he would be sacrificing '"benevolence and humanity"' to Falkland's '"mad
and misguided love of fame,-to that passion which has been the source of all [his]
miseries'" (384).
That Falkland's "love of fame" has been both misguided and the cause of his
personal anguish is evident to everyone, including himself. Collins calls his employer the
"fool of honour and fame" (172), a sentiment Falkland echoes later in the text (215).
Caleb's indictment of Falkland's obsession with reputation is even more damning, and
his description of his patron's tragic history identifies Falkland's early mis-education in
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the "poison of chivalry" as the root cause of his blighted potential and later misfortunes:
Falkland! thou enteredst upon thy career with the purest and most
laudable intentions. But thou imbibedst the poison of chivalry with thy
earliest youth; and the base and low-minded envy that met thee on thy
return to thy native seats, operated with this poison to hurry thee into
madness. Soon, too soon, by this fatal coincidence, were the blooming
hopes of thy youth blasted for ever. From that moment thou only
continuedst to live to the phantom of departed honour. From that moment
thy benevolence was, in a great part, turned into rankling jealousy and
inexorable precaution. (434)
i

Just like Caleb, whose early education fosters a destructive propensity for curiosity that
turns his later years into a "theatre of calamity" (59), Falkland also receives a youthful
mis-education that blights the most promising qualities of his character. Caleb's
description of his patron's embrace of chivalric ideals is appropriately couched in archaic
language which underscores the outmoded nature of Falkland's values, values that poison
his character and its potential for benevolence.
As we see in the next chapter, Godwin returns to the theme of chivalry in his next
novel, St. Leon, in which the eponymous hero also "livefs] to the phantom of departed
honour" to similarly destructive ends. Falkland also foreshadows another Godwinian
hero, however-Fleetwood, whose status as the "New Man of Feeling" evokes Falkland's
emotional turmoil and his highly developed capacity for feeling. Indeed, when Caleb first
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encounters his patron, he radiates sensibility: "I found Mr. Falkland a man of small
stature," remembers Caleb,
with an extreme delicacy of form and appearance. In place of the hardfavoured and inflexible visages I had been accustomed to observe, every
muscle and petty line of his countenance seemed to be in an inconceivable
degree pregnant with meaning. His manner was kind, attentive, and
humane. His eye was full of animation; but there was a grave and sad
solemnity in his air [....] His look bespoke the unquietness of his mind,
and frequently wandered with an expression of disconsolateness and
anxiety. (61)
While the delicacy of Falkland's body is perhaps reflective of his highly refined
sentiments and powers of feeling, his modest stature and delicate form also belie the
ferocious intensity of his inner turmoil, as expressed in the emotional outbursts frequently
witnessed by Caleb. "His disposition was extremely unequal," remarks Caleb, and
the distemper which afflicted him with incessant gloom had its paroxysms.
Sometimes he was hasty, peevish, and tyrannical [....] Sometimes he
entirely lost his self-possession, and his behaviour was changed into
frenzy: he would strike his forehead, his brows became knit, his features
distorted, and his teeth ground one against the other. (63)
Like Audley Mandeville, the melancholic uncle of Godwin's 1817 novel, Mandeville,
Falkland, by the time Caleb encounters him, is a broken man, reclusive and mired in
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sadness. "His mode of living was in the utmost degree recluse and solitary," Caleb
writes. "He had no inclination to scenes of revelry and mirth. He avoided the busy
haunts of men; nor did he seem desirous to compensate for this privation by the
confidence of friendship" (62). Falkland's anguish is made that much more apparent to
Caleb on account of the older man's innate sensibility, which reveals itself in "every
muscle and petty line of his countenance" (61).
Collins describes for Caleb a young Falkland renowned for his happiness and
levity, both of which were nevertheless '"chastened with reflection and sensibility'" (65).
The youthful Falkland had enough sensibility to give him "a spirit of the most ardent
enthusiasm" (67), a '"genuine hilarity of heart'" which '"imparted an inconceivable
brilliancy to his company and conversation'" (65). His "frankness, ingenuity, and
unreserve" (67), however, were '"always accompanied with dignity'" (65), and
functioned to cultivate compassion and respect for humanity. The current Falkland,
Collins tells Caleb, is but the '"ruin"' of this younger version, and this ruin is manifested
in the blighting of that dignified sensibility which so distinguished him in his youth:
'"The most unusual promise'" of Falkland's youth is '"tarnished,"' and the result is a
sensibility '"shrunk up and withered'" (65).
Sensibility is initially cast as Falkland's most admirable and promising quality-a
testament to his moral superiority over those with less refined feelings and sentiments. Its
degeneration into the kind of emotional frenzy witnessed by Caleb is thus a reflection of
Falkland's fall, of his "shrunken" and "withered" state. Collins-and later Falkland, as
well-identifies his master's excessive and misguided love of chivalry as the root cause of
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his emotional degeneration. In Collins's view, the '"idle and groundless romances of
chivalry'" (166) served to create in the young Falkland a '"mind [] fraught with all the
rhapsodies of visionary honour'" (65-66). The perceived dishonour he subsequently
experiences proves too much for Falkland's pride, argues Collins.
However, sensibility itself can also be read as the reason for Falkland's moral
deterioration: as a man "impatien[t] of stain or dishonour" (73), he feels too acutely the
taint of ignominy; his feelings are too attuned to the allure of chivalry, rank, and
reputation, and threaten to subsume the more dignified and reflective aspects of his
character. Indeed, Mr. Clare, the famous poet who comes to reside in the county and who
befriends Falkland, ultimately characterizes the younger man as '"too passionate, too
acutely sensible of injury'" (94). Celebrated as much for his moral excellence and
sagacity as for his imaginative powers, Clare recognizes Falkland's dangerous flaw as one
of excessive sensibility that may overwhelm his benevolent potential. '"I am acquainted
with your weakness as well as your strength,'" Clare, on his deathbed, tells Falkland.
'"You have an impetuosity, and an impatience of imagined dishonour, that, if once set
wrong, may make you as eminently mischievous as you will otherwise be useful'" (94).
As a man of sensibility, Falkland follows in a long cultural and literary tradition
featuring men with highly developed capacities for emotional response. As Janet Todd
has pointed out, the eighteenth-century cult of sensibility was both reflected in, and grew
out of, a spate of sentimental novels featuring hyperbolic portrayals of distress, suffering,
and emotion. Sentimental novels, argues Todd, served a "pedagogical function" (4) by
yoking the affective power of literature to its didactic potential for the moral purpose of
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shaping the emotional responses of the reader. A primary goal of the sentimental novel
was to teach readers how to respond, both emotionally and behaviourally, to life and the
people around them. The reading of such novels would show readers how to feel-that is,
how to properly respond to another's suffering with their own appropriate emotional
responses-and also instruct them in what to feel, by inculcating the virtues of sympathy,
compassion, and empathy. Seeing literary displays of sentimental feeling in fictional
characters would, theoretically, inspire such sensibility in the reader, whose new-found
capacity for strong and refined emotion leads him or her to embrace the moral virtues of
benevolence, philanthropism, sympathy, and empathy.5
Sensibility, therefore, is constructed as an outward process, in that a highly
developed capacity for feeling should ultimately result in philanthropic behaviour and
acts of benevolence. Sensibility within the subject properly manifests itself in outward
action: although the feeling is generated and experienced from within, it is channeled
outward in the form of compassion and empathy for others, as well as through virtuous
acts of charity and kindness. This is certainly true for Harley, the hero in what Todd calls
"one of the great blockbusters of sentiment" (90), Henry Mackenzie's 1771 novel, The
Man of Feeling. The novel, as Mackenzie describes in a 1769 letter, grew out of the
premise of'"introducing a man of sensibility into different scenes where his feelings
might be seen in their effects'" (qtd. in Vickers xii). Indeed, Mackenzie's emphasis on
the effects of Harley's feelings underscores this causal link between sensibility and
external action. As perhaps the quintessential figure of feeling in the eighteenth-century
cult of sensibility, Harley combines virtue with emotion, moving through numerous
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episodic encounters with a variety of formulaic victims of worldly injustice, all of which
allow him to reveal his sentimental virtues and overwrought capacity for emotional
response-the tears he copiously sheds throughout the text.
Harley is the proper Man of Feeling in that the sensibility activated by his
exposure to scenes and stories of misfortune moves him to virtuous acts. While visiting
Bedlam, for example, he encounters a woman reduced to madness after her lover dies in
the West Indies. Harley gives the keeper's cursory explanation of her history the "tribute
of some tears," but first-hand exposure to her grief compels him to take her hand in his
and "bathe it with his tears" (34); standing "fixed in astonishment and pity," he then gives
the keeper two guineas, advising him to '"be kind to that unfortunate'" (35). Similarly,
after witnessing first-hand the effects of starvation in the repentant prostitute Miss Atkins,
Harley gives her a half-guinea to relieve her immediate distress (49-50); after hearing her
extended story of seduction and subsequent abandonment by the eldest son of a country
squire, he is so moved by the woman's story of misfortune, and by her father's display of
grief, that he "undertakes] her cause," wins her father's forgiveness, and accommodates
them both at his lodging (67-69).
For Godwin, sensibility was similarly perceived as something which leads to
outward expressions of sympathy and benevolence. In his Enquirer essay, "Of
Politeness," the philosopher speaks of sensibility in external, public terms as a concern
and appreciation for the feelings of others, and as an awareness of how one's behaviour
affects the emotions of others. Sensibility, for Godwin, is much less about the indulgence
in overwrought feeling, and more about how aware and empathetic one is regarding the
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feelings of others-and, by extension, how solicitous one is in trying to alleviate the
emotional distresses of another. "That man knows little of human nature," argues
Godwin, "and is either endued with a very small portion of sensibility, or is seldom in the
habit of putting himself in the place of another; who is not forward in the practice of
minute attentions" (Enquirer 333-34). "When a modest and unassured person enters a
room," he continues, "he is anxious about his gestures, and feels the disposition of every
limb and feature as a sort of weight upon his mind. A supercilious look, a dubious smile,
an unceremonious accost, from one of the company, pierces him to the soul" (Enquirer
334). While a man of sensibility may be "pierced" by the slights and vagaries he
experiences in social intercourse, he is perhaps more attentive to the "piercing"
experienced by others. Indeed, for Godwin, it is the "practice of minute attentions"
towards this "modest and unassured person" that truly distinguishes the man of
sensibility. The man of sensibility will not only perceive the anxiety, and feel empathy
for the person, but will also act in such a way as to minimize the discomfort, for, argues
Godwin, "in proportion to the acuteness of any man's feelings, will be, in a majority of
cases, his attention and deference to the feelings of others" (Enquirer 336).
It is this "attention and deference" which underpins all civilized behaviour,
contends Godwin. While reason still plays the central role in the philosopher's theory of
progressive enlightenment, the feelings increasingly serve a complementary function in
cultivating universal benevolence. The polite rituals of civilization both demonstrate our
emotional capacity for empathy and foster the happiness of others: "The silent
communication of the eye, the lively attention that marks every shade of gradation in
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another's pleasure or pain, the nameless kindnesses that persuade the receiver more
forcibly, or, at least, more cordially, of the attachment of the performer, than great
services are ever enabled to do"-these, asserts Godwin, are the "great circumstances
distinguishing between the civilised and the savage state" (Enquirer 332). Sensibility is
thus inextricably bound up with "civilization" for Godwin, and sensibility itself is seen as
inseparable from benevolence: "Where-ever civilization exists, sensibility will be its
attendant; a sensibility, which cannot be satisfied without much kindness, nor without a
kindness of that condescending nature, that considers the whole chain of our feelings, and
is desirous, out of petty materials, to compose the sum of our happiness" (Enquirer 33435).
For Godwin, individuals with the greatest potential for benevolence-those who
"promise to be, in more than an ordinary degree, useful members of the commonwealth"
(Enquirer 333)-are almost invariably also creatures of sensibility: "it is inconceivable
how numerous and delicate are their sensations," he writes, "and how exquisite is their
feeling of pleasure or pain" (Enquirer 333). To the extent that such individuals are
sensible of their own "sensations" and impressions of "pleasure or pain," they are perhaps
more perceptive of the subtle emotional reactions in the people around them: for these
creatures of sensibility, argues Godwin, "the slightest circumstances, imperceptible to a
common eye, and scarcely adverted to by the agent, often produce an indelible
impression" (Enquirer 333). Furthermore, while those with great potential for
benevolence may be inherent creatures of feeling (as Godwin seems to argue), sensibility
itself also directly facilitates benevolent tendencies in others. As Godwin contends, "it is
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rarely that the opportunity occurs for a man to confer on me a striking benefit. But, every
time that I meet him, he may demonstrate his kindness, his sympathy, and, by attentions
almost too minute for calculation, add new vigour to the stream of complacence and
philanthropy that circulates in my veins" {Enquirer 329).
It is clear that, far from viewing sensibility as an overwrought indulgence in one's
own emotional responses, Godwin perceives sensibility in reciprocal terms-as a dynamic
relationship between the feeling subject and the world around him or her. Sensibility, as
originally modeled by archetypal men of feeling like Harley, and as theorized by Godwin
in the Enquirer, is as much an outward extension of sympathetic feeling and kind
behaviour as it is an internal acuteness of feeling. For Godwin, sensibility, if properly
cultivated in the subject, should naturally lead to benevolence and virtue. In short, it
should make one a more humane person, and the world around the feeling subject should
be made better on account of his or her sensibility.
Godwin's portrait of Falkland, therefore, is so compelling precisely because it
departs from this model of sensibility outlined in the Enquirer. To be sure, in Falkland,
sensibility is initially yoked with benevolence and virtue. Collins, in his narrative to
Caleb, continually returns to the theme of his master's moral superiority and capacity for
philanthropic behaviour, both of which still exist, in the steward's eyes, despite the
"poison of chivalry" contaminating his character. As Mr. Clare recognizes, however,
Falkland feels perhaps too much-he is '"too passionate, too acutely sensible of injury'"
(94), particularly where his much-valued honour and public reputation are involved.
Indeed, while his sensibility endows him with the potential for great benevolence, it is

also dangerously self-reflexive and mired in an overwhelming sensitivity to his own
feelings-his own '"impatience of imagined dishonour'" (94), as Mr. Clare deems it.
For Godwin, sensibility is only healthy for the subject (and beneficial for society)
so long as it functions along reciprocal lines: the subject's strong capacity for refined
feeling and emotional response should ultimately be projected outward in the form of
sensitivity to the feelings of others, empathy for their suffering, and virtuous acts of
kindness. Falkland's sensibility, however, is perverted in that feeling, for the most part,
stays within the subject, devolving into a paranoid and obsessive self-absorption that
alienates him from both the world and his own philanthropic tendencies. As Isabelle
Bour has aptly recognized, Falkland "exemplifies the deleterious solipsistic potential of
sensibility" (815). His strong capacity for feeling thus functions as a kind of "inverted"
sensibility: emotional response which should be channeled into benevolent, external
action instead feeds Falkland's inner demons-his obsession with honour and the
preservation of his public image, as well as his guilt over the immoral acts he has
committed in the service of preserving these things. When Falkland's sensibility is
projected outward, it results not in acts of benevolence or kindness, but in quite the
opposite-in dishonest acts of persecution against a young man his inferior in social rank
and power. Falkland's "inverted" sensibility is thus a liability, rather than an asset, to his
well-being, and the world is rendered a worse, rather than better, place because of it.
Just as we can read Falkland's destructive love of chivalry as prefiguring St.
Leon's similar embrace of fatal chivalric ideals, Falkland's brand of inverted sensibility
resurfaces in Godwin's portrait of Fleetwood-the "New Man of Feeling," as that novel's
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subtitle characterizes him. Like Falkland, Fleetwood is governed by a perverted form of
sensibility: unlike Harley, the "old" man of feeling, whose sensibility results in
benevolent compassion and acts of charity and kindness, Fleetwood-in his role as this
new, perverse man of feeling-is marked by a sensibility at odds with compassion and
benevolence. Fleetwood's specific form of "inverted" sensibility will be examined in
greater depth in Chapter 3.
In Caleb Williams, therefore, Godwin creates two characters whose childhood
reading and experiences combine to create a form of mis-education which proves fatal to
their own personal development and, especially in the case of Falkland, to their potential
for benevolent action. If Godwin was concerned in the Enquirer with detailing the
salutary educational conditions necessary for the personal happiness which leads to
virtuous enlightenment and universal benevolence, in the earlier Caleb Williams, he
seemed preoccupied with what could potentially go wrong in the educational and moral
development of the young mind. This preoccupation, moreover, also marks Godwin's
next three novels, as all three of his fictional "heroes"-St. Leon, Fleetwood, and
Mandeville-similarly experience a distinct form of mis-education that manifests itself in
later crises of identity and masculine authority.
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In the Circle of the Hearth: St. Leon's Domestic Threats to Masculine Identity
As Godwin records in his diary, he began his second novel, St. Leon: A Tale of the
Sixteenth Century, on December 31, 1797, in the immediate wake of Wollstonecraft's
death and his subsequent composition of the Memoirs. In his preface to the original
edition, published on December 2,1799, Godwin voiced his hopes that the novel's
"boldness and irregularity of [] design" would be excused by the "impressive and
interesting" combination of "human feelings and passions with incredible situations" (5152). St Leon is, indeed, bold in conception and sweeping in design: the tale follows the
forced "travels" of Reginald de St. Leon, a sixteenth-century French aristocrat who,
having been given the alchemical gifts of the Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae
from a mysterious stranger, is persecuted from one European state or kingdom to another
and ultimately driven into a resigned isolation.1 Godwin's gamble, however, seemed to
pay off, for the novel proved quite successful. The author would live to witness four
English editions published in his lifetime, as well as Irish and American issues and
French and German translations (Tysdahl 184, n. 15).
Moreover, despite numerous reviews which censured parts of the novel as
irreligious, St. Leon won some significant critical praise: The Dublin Magazine and Irish
Monthly Register appreciated the novel's "variety of interesting matter" and declared it
the "work of a man of genius and learning" (Graham 161); even Godwin's old nemesis,
the Antijacobin Review, praised a number of "good symptoms" in the tale, conceding that
the "evil it contains is little" (Graham 157-58). According to William Maginn, one of the
story's biggest fans was apparently Lord Byron, who, in response to Godwin's declaration
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that writing another novel would "kill" him, reportedly replied, '"and what matter [...]
we should have another "St Leon"'" (qtd. in Clemit, Introduction vii). If the highest form
of flattery is indeed imitation, then the popularity of the tale is perhaps best signaled by a
satirical homage to the novel published one year later in 1800-Edward Dubois's St.
Godwin: A Tale of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries by Count
Reginald de St. Leon. In Dubois's text, St. Leon is replaced by a profligate Godwin, who
experiences three centuries of hyperbolic adventures before settling in England and
writing PoliticalJustice (Brewer, Introduction 35-36).2
St. Leon closely aligns with the Bildungsroman: the text traces the physical,
psychological, and moral development of the protagonist from childhood into middle age.
In accordance with the characteristics of the Bildungsroman, and in keeping with Caleb
Williams and his later novels, Godwin highlights the central role that "education" plays in
the development of his protagonist. In Volume 1 of PoliticalJustice, Godwin had argued
that "the characters of men are determined in all their most essential circumstances by
education" (45), and we see this argument illustrated in St. Leon, where the hero's
"education," like the educations of so many of Godwin's protagonists, is deeply flawed,
planting the seeds for his later personal failures in life. Indeed, we find in the figure of St.
Leon, as we found in Falkland, a man whose obsessive devotion to personal reputation
initiates a tragic series of events that culminate in his complete alienation.
St. Leon, like Falkland, finds himself dangerously absorbed in the cultivation and
protection of his public image, an image organized around a noble identity defined by the
ideologies of chivalry and honour and sustained through wealth and aristocratic power.
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Raised in an environment that emphasized these public codes of identity, St. Leon fails to
achieve a defined sense of self independent of the social codes around him. Instead of
cultivating an independence of character, St. Leon's childhood instead produces a young
man with a "passion for splendour and distinction" (56) that can only be satiated through
active participation in the formalized social codes of the aristocratic tradition. Unable to
consolidate a clear sense of his own identity independent of the codes and narratives
underpinning his social position as aristocratic knight, St. Leon is driven to seek out
public validation as the only way to achieve any sense of his own value or worth, any
sense of selfhood. As we shall see, his weak hold on his identity comes to be the
instigating factor in his future tragedies: it leads to his embrace of gambling and his
subsequent fall from aristocratic prosperity, his increasing alienation from his family, and
the ultimate loss of his identity in both a literal and symbolic sense.
"The Theatre of Glory"
Whereas Caleb Williams derived its suspense through a relatively focused plot
organized around one man's relentless pursuit of another, St. Leon is a sprawling
narrative covering over fifty years of the protagonist's life as he wanders across Europe in
the midst of the political, religious, and cultural turmoil brought about by the
Reformation. Critics have long recognized that St. Leon, like Caleb Williams before it,
stands in some measure as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical tenets outlined in
PoliticalJustice. Indeed, at times, Godwin is quite explicit about the topicality of the
novel's narrative to political events in his own time, as when St. Leon, while detained in
the prisons of the Spanish Inquisition, anachronistically connects the religious persecution
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he is currently experiencing to the contemporary persecution of radicals in 1790s
England: "human affairs, like the waves of the ocean, are merely in a state of ebb and
flow," philosophizes St. Leon. "Men shall learn over again to persecute each other for
conscience sake; other anabaptists or levellers shall furnish pretexts for new persecutions;
other inquisitors shall arise in the most enlightened tracts of Europe" (334).
Although this passage stands as the only explicit reference in the text to Godwin's
own age, the entire narrative is often read allegorically as a novelistic depiction of the
larger societal injustice and human prejudice which Godwin saw as impeding progress
and rational development. The novel's allegory, as Pamela Clemit argues, is even more
specifically interpreted as a coded critique of a post-jacobin English society that hunts
and persecutes radicals who seek to disseminate political views and social knowledge. In
Clemit's opinion,
Godwin's distinctive mode of historical fiction [in St. Leon] is best
understood as an extension of the narrative model developed in Caleb
Williams. Godwin exploits the increased range of historical narrative for a
figurative rendering of contemporary concerns, expanding his earlier blend
of confessional narrative and symbolic Gothic themes to include a
sweeping survey of European history that bears directly on the situation of
beleaguered radicals in the mid 1790s. {Godwinian Novel 88)
Gregory Maertz joins George Woodcock in positioning St. Leon as an allegorical
figure for Godwin as the "beleaguered" rationalist philosopher, and his magna opera-the
Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae-as symbols for the progressive knowledge
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encoded in the philosophy ofPoliticalJustice. "The philosophical novelist is, like St.
Leon, a reluctant sorcerer," argues Maertz. "As agents of inexplicable powers the radical
thinker and the alchemist suffer persecution-the latter because he cannot explain to
anyone's satisfaction how he suddenly becomes rich; the former because in Political
Justice he challenges the arbitrary power of government with the divine authority of
reason" (220). For Woodcock, St. Leon's troubles-most notably, his domestic tragedies
and the social and political persecution he experiences-represent Godwin the
philosopher's own experience of trying to help a stubbornly ignorant and ungrateful
humanity. In Woodcock's interpretation of the text, the gold which the Philosopher's
Stone yields St. Leon symbolizes wisdom and, more importantly, the opportunity to use
that wisdom to improve the lot of humanity: St. Leon thus "conveys the teaching that a
man who gains power through wisdom and seeks to use it for the general good must
expect to forego the comforts of ordinary life, the benefits of domestic affection, even the
support of friendship. Every hand will be against him, and men will understand and hate
the good he seeks to bestow on them" ("Notes" 691). This scenario, argues Woodcock,
echoes "Godwin's own experience as a result of telling men how they can become happy
and free" ("Notes" 691).
However, while St. Leon may in some respects evoke the potential of Godwin's
rationalist philosophy, in other respects, the text critiques his earlier celebration of
rationalism as the panacea for all of humanity's ills. As David Collings has argued,
Godwin was quite often "his own most searching and perceptive critic" (848), and St.
Leon stands as a text in which he re-examines some of the central tenets of his philosophy
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as outlined in Political Justice. Indeed, as Collings demonstrates, Godwin in fact
deconstructs in St. Leon the very Utopian possibilities he had attached in Political Justice
to an "immutable reason" detached from all social constraints or political contexts. As
Collings argues, Godwin's theory of an "immutable reason" independent of historical or
cultural constraints is ultimately realized in the figure of St. Leon with his "impossible
knowledge," that is, his possession of the Philosopher's Stone-which frees him from not
only poverty, but the constraints of all economic activity-and the elixir vitae, which
liberates him from the most fundamental constraint experienced by humanity-death (86371). However, St. Leon's possession of these "impossible" secrets, this incredible
knowledge which should theoretically lead to the most perfect human existence
imaginable, fails to yield utopia, and instead only produces tragedy for both himself and
his family. "The promise of total abundance leads to wholesale destruction," asserts
Collings (865).
Indeed, at points in the novel, Godwin has his characters voice sentiments clearly
out of step with the argument, put forth in Political Justice, that humanity is potentially
"perfectible." For example, when the enlightened marchese Filosanto-"a man universally
admired for subtlety of reasoning" (285)-witnesses the destruction of St. Leon's Pisan
residence at the hands of an angry mob driven by superstitious frenzy, he is overwhelmed
by a "transport of misanthropy" against a humanity incapable of transcending ignorance:
"He saw that there was a principle in the human mind destined to be eternally at war with
improvement and science" (293). St. Leon ultimately offers up a much more pessimistic
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vision of humanity's potential to achieve perfectibility through the acquisition of
knowledge.
In addition to its sprawling narrative structure and complex engagement with the
philosophical themes of Political Justice, St. Leon is also marked by tremendous generic
diversity. As Maertz has demonstrated in his study of the novel's "generic fusion," the
text incorporates elements of political allegory, travel writing, and psychological realism,
as well as qualities of the Bildungsroman, the romance, and the gothic and historical
novels. The gothic, in particular, has seemed to many critics and readers a particularly
odd choice of genre for the philosopher who continued to advocate the power of
enlightened thinking to dispel the enslaving effects of superstitious beliefs aind practice.
B.J. Tysdahl, for example, argues that the gothic for Godwin was a "hazardous" choice
(90), in that the genre, with its supernatural trappings and often conservative affirmation
of the dominant social and economic codes of society, was a "danger to something quite
fundamental to the intellectual system of the calm, rational radical" (82).3 Tysdahl joins
Wallace Austin Flanders, however, in emphasizing the financial and literary benefits
associated with the gothic as a genre in the late eighteenth century, a period in which the
popularity of novelists like Ann Radcliffe and Matthew Lewis revealed the extent of the
reading public's hunger for novels which married the sentimental with the supernatural.
St. Leon, argues Tysdahl, could thus be read as Godwin's "deliberate attempt to win a
prize in the Gothic race which promised such substantial rewards" (81). Indeed,
Woodcock remarks that the £400 St. Leon earned Godwin rescued him from "immediate
financial disaster" (Biographical Study 160).4
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However, despite the prevalence of supernatural imagery and subject matter in the
novel, Godwin primarily uses the gothic in St. Leon as a hook upon which to hang his
larger arguments regarding the importance of shared human experience founded on
meaningful social connections. For Flanders, Godwin employs gothic tropes and
conventions to put forth a moral condemnation of St. Leon's acceptance of supernatural
powers, an acceptance which forever cuts him off from the community of humanity. This
moral condemnation, argues Flanders, is Godwin's primary motivation in making use of
the gothic for his tale. For both Flanders and Mona Scheuermann, St. Leon's greatest
failure as a moral being lies in his acceptance of "secrets" which forever alienate him
from family and society. Indeed, as Scheuermann notes, "it is repeatedly observed [in the
novel] that the gifts of the stranger are destructive not because they are immoral but
because they set a man apart from his fellows" (Novels of William Godwin 153).
Flanders, moreover, foregrounds how St. Leon's social and familial alienation contributes
to his tragic history: "Every step St. Leon takes toward freeing himself from the common
hazards and necessities of human life takes away as well a portion of the potential
happiness resulting from his common humanity and leaves him more unnatural and
miserable" (538).
Significantly, St. Leon's childhood, a childhood spent in seclusion with his
widowed mother, foreshadows in a way his later social isolation. For Godwin, the social
and educative experiences of childhood played an essential role in shaping future
character, and in all of his novels much narrative space is devoted to lengthy descriptions
of the formative years of his protagonists. In Political Justice, Godwin had argued that
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character is a product of external social influences, that the forces of society-history,
politics, culture, and education-operate on the young mind to shape temperament,
intellectual aptitude, and morality. "The actions and dispositions of mankind," asserts
Godwin, "are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of any original
determination that they bring into the world" (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 26). Thus,
education, in the broadest sense of what one learns about the world and how one learns it,
was for Godwin one of the primary influences in the development of moral character.
"The characters of men," asserted Godwin, "are determined in all their most essential
circumstances by education. By education in this place I would be understood to convey
the most comprehensive sense that can possibly be annexed to that word, including every
incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections"
(Vol. 1 ofPoliticalJustice 45).
Raised by his mother on the paternal estate situated on the banks of the Garonne,
St. Leon receives a "mis-education" defined by a social isolation not unlike that
experienced by two of Godwin's later male protagonists, Fleetwood and Mandeville.
However, unlike Fleetwood and Mandeville, whose childhood isolation results from the
inclinations of distant and melancholy paternal figures, St. Leon is kept from society by a
strong-willed mother intensely involved in the education of her young son. Indeed, the
shaping force of young St. Leon's mis-education is undoubtedly his mother, who, in her
overt manipulation of his emotional, psychological, and physical development, is
suggestive of the phallic mother who usurps the literal and symbolic authority of the
Father. From the later vantage point from which he is writing his memoirs, St. Leon
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remembers his mother as a "woman of rather a masculine understanding" (55), a woman
heavily invested in the historical narratives of the traditional class structure and the social
power and authority of the family's aristocratic lineage. She was "full of the prejudices
of nobility and magnificence," writes St. Leon (55). "Her whole soul was in a manner
concentrated in the ambition to render me the worthy successor of the counts de St. Leon"
(55). Literature, for Falkland, was the source of his early love of honour and fame, the
"heroic poets of Italy" serving as the means through which he "imbibed the love of
chivalry and romance" (67). For St. Leon, however, the source is much more immediate
and forceful, residing in the overwhelming ambitions of his mother.
Of course, as a woman, St. Leon's mother is circumscribed by a patriarchal
ideology that only allows her to achieve familial and social honour by cultivating it in a
male relative, namely her son. St. Leon thus becomes, for his mother, the recipient of all
her hopes and ambitions. "Inflamed with the greatness of [the family's] ancestors," she
"indefatigably sought to kindle in [her son's] bosom a similar flame" (55). The result of
this passionate embrace of "greatness" is a woman who lives vicariously through her
son's achievements and future expectations. As St. Leon tells his reader, "my mother
loved me to the very utmost limits perhaps of human affection. I was her darling and her
pride, her waking study, and her nightly dream" (55). As he rightly suspects, however,
his mother's love affair with the chivalric displays of honour associated with her
aristocratic heritage compromises her ability to forge a truly nurturing and loving
relationship with her son. "My mother," laments St. Leon, "loved my honour and my
fame more than she loved my person" (56).
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It is St. Leon's potential honour and fame, however, that his mother most loves,
and she guides her son's educative processes in such a way as to maximize his future
ambitions. In order to foster her son's desire for social prestige and glory, St. Leon's
mother keeps the family in the "most sequestered retirement" (56), delaying her son's
entrance into public life out of a calculating desire to increase his lust for social
recognition. St. Leon briefly encounters the glories of chivalry and sociality in 1520,
when, at the impressionable age of 15, he witnesses the celebrated meeting between
Francis I of France and Henry VIII of England at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. After
allowing her son this brief indulgence in courtly life, however, St. Leon's mother ensures
that his desire for social renown is further inflamed by deliberately denying him that
which he most craves-entrance into public life. As St. Leon recalls,
she did not wish for the present that my eye should be satiated with public
scenes, or that the public should grow too familiarly acquainted with my
person. She rightly judged that my passion for the theatre of glory would
grow more impetuous, by being withheld for some time from the
gratifications for which it panted. (58)
This strategy works: St. Leon, from this point on, is consumed with a restless
desire for public distinction, for scenes of glory "acted in the midst of a vast amphitheatre
of spectators" (57). Moreover, his brief encounter with chivalric glory helps to cultivate
the seed of reverie that has taken shallow root in his mind. "I had before formed some
conceptions of the career of honour from the books I had read," recalls St. Leon, "but my
reveries were impotent and little, compared with what I had now seen [....] I never shut
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my eyes without viewing in imagination the combats of knights and the train of ladies"
(59). Like Falkland, who had "drunk so deeply of the fountain of chivalry" that notions
of honour and fame became the sole sustenance of his being (67), St. Leon indulges in
romantic visions which become the foundation for his personal identity. From this early
age, St. Leon's sense of self takes its cue from the social codes and narratives of
aristocratic identity, such codes and narratives ultimately becoming the only reference
point by which St. Leon is able to measure himself.
The parting farewell of St. Leon's mother, given on her deathbed to her eighteenyear-old son, is thus ironic and speaks to the way in which she is blinded to the
consequences of her manipulative guidance of her son's aristocratic ambition. She
remains confident that the nature of her son's education has been successful in fostering
an appreciation of social rank within a larger independence of character. As she tells St.
Leon,
'You must now, my son, stand by yourself, and be the arbitrator of your
own actions [....] You have been taught to know your rank in society,
and to respect yourself. You have been instructed in every thing that
might most effectually forward you in the career of glory [....] When I
am gone, you will be compelled more vividly to feel that singleness and
self-dependence which are the source of all virtue.' (59-60)
The deathbed speech of St. Leon's mother contains numerous sentiments not easily
reconciled with one another. Although St. Leon has been "taught to know [his] rank in

society," and therefore theoretically already knows "every thing that might most
effectually forward [him] in the career of glory," he must nevertheless rely on a
"singleness and self-dependence" in life, an independence of character thatwhich seems
to lie outside of social class and chivalric ideology. Madame de St. Leon seems blind to
the fact that her educative emphasis on social rank, combined with the various
manipulations she has engaged in to further her son's desire for social acclaim, has
actually robbed her son of any sense of "singleness and self-dependence" he might have
otherwise developed. Farfrombeing able to "stand by [him] self' and "serve as the
arbitrator of [his] own actions," the youthful St. Leon is entirely dependent on the social
framework of the courtly tradition for any sense of identity. Instead of cultivating an
independence of character, the sequestered nature of St. Leon's childhood instead
produces a young man with a "passion for splendour and distinction" (56) that can only
be satiated through active participation in the formalized social codes of the aristocratic
tradition.
There is a striking irony, however, in the fact that St. Leon's desire for social
recognition precludes himfromengaging in truly meaningful social relationships,
relationships that go beyond the ritualized conventions of class and social status. As St.
Leon relates to the reader, his youthful imagination revolved around "fairy fields of
visionary greatness" that rendered him "more than indifferent to the major part of the
objects around [him]" (56). Upon the death of Madame de St. Leon, we witness the
extent to which St. Leon's commitment to "visionary greatness" is bound up with a
developing sense of manhood that demands the suppression of familial love. Early on
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for St. Leon grief over the loss of familial and domestic ties is cast as emasculating and
detrimental to the cultivation of masculine character. After his mother's death, St. Leon
is visited by his uncle, the Marquis de Villeroy, who constructs his grief over his dead
mother as an '"effeminacy of sorrow'" that must be '"throw[n] off" in order for St. Leon
to '"prove [him]self a true soldier of the standard of France'" (61). As a young man
whose ambitious thirst for glory has rendered him "indifferent" to the real value of
interpersonal relationships, St. Leon is quick to respond to the Marquis on these terms,
declaring himself eager to join in the French military resistance arming against Charles V,
King of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor. Disavowing his grief for his dead mother,
he thus "shook off the inglorious softness of [] melancholy, and was all activity and
animation" (62), his endeavours eventually leading him to Italy and the ill-fated siege of
Pavia.
Defeat at Pavia, however-a defeat that, in St. Leon's view, delivered a "deadly
wound to the reign of chivalry" (74)-robs him of this clearly articulated purpose. He
consequently gravitates to Paris, where a young and newly disenfranchised French
aristocracy assuages its blighted ambitions through various forms of profligacy, one of the
most notable being gambling, which, in St. Leon's words, "drew multitudes into its
destructive vortex" (75). "The nobility of France," recalls St. Leon, "exchanged the
activity of the field for the indulgences of the table: that concentrated spirit which had
sought to expand itself upon the widest stage, now found vent in the exhibition of
individual expense" (75). As St. Leon suggests, the aristocratic value system that
privileged recklessness on the battlefield implicitly sanctions the risky behaviour
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associated with gambling. Indeed, Justine Crump, in a particularly provocative recent
reading of the novel, argues that the nobility's embrace of gambling in the Renaissance
can be read as a specific strategy used to consolidate an aristocratic identity threatened by
certain cultural and economic shifts in Europe. As Crump contends, the representation of
gambling in St. Leon speaks to the larger cultural and economic shift away from the value
systems of an older aristocratic order towards those of a commercial and capitalist ethos
associated with the emerging bourgeois classes, for whom money was valuable capital in
and of itself, something not to be squandered in an ostentatious display of chivalry or
social class. Faced with such threats to its existence, the chivalric order to which St.
Leon so clearly belongs thus embraces gambling as a highly symbolic act. It is in
gaming-with its associations of risk, heightened emotion, and expendable wealth-that a
fledgling nobility struggles to assert an aristocratic identity structured around, in Crump's
terms, a "willingness to confront risk with equanimity" (397).5
Even before St. Leon, Godwin had made a number of reflections on the nature of
gambling and on the moral character of debtors. "Gaming," argued Godwin in the 1797
Enquirer, "accustoms [a man] to the worst habits of mind, induces him to seek, and to
rejoice in, the misfortunes of others" (270). Gambling is thus antithetical to the
philanthropism which should inform the conduct of the rational man committed to the
principles of justice and universal benevolence. Moreover, the "conduct" of the gambler,
whose behaviour so often results in a "continual accumulation of debt," is destructive to
his own moral character and psychological state {Enquirer 170). The debtor is "drive[n]
[] to the perpetual practice of subterfuges" and experiences "an ever gnawing anxiety that
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poisons all his pleasures," argues Godwin (Enquirer 170). "He is altogether a stranger to
that genuine lightness of heart, which characterizes the man at ease, and the man of
virtue. Care has placed her brand conspicuous on his brow. He is subject to occasional
paroxysms of anguish which no luxuries or splendour can compensate" (Enquirer 170).
These remarks form a compelling description of St. Leon's descent into ignominy and
deception, and foreshadow the mental despair and personal alienation that indirectly
result from his love of fame and social distinction.
St. Leon's attitude towards gambling is marked by a deep ambivalence. On one
hand, he fears the dangers inherent in a habit that "drew multitudes into its destructive
vortex" (75). The dangers-as St. Leon recognizes, and as Godwin had emphasized in the
Enquirer-are not just financial, but also moral: there is something ignoble-"base and
sordid" (76)-about a habit that leads a man to "rob[], perhaps, his brother, his friend, the
partner of his bosom" (77). Writing from the vantage point of middle age, St. Leon is of
course better able to appreciate the "bitter anguish" brought on by his gaming (77). As a
young man, however, his anxieties about the habit are decidedly overwhelmed by his
"restless desire [for] distinction" in a vice which he ultimately constructs as reflective of
aristocratic notions about money and risk (76).
St. Leon certainly sees gambling as quite compatible with the ideological
assumptions underpinning aristocratic identity. To be a man of rank entails having a
laissez-faire attitude towards money in general and one's own wealth in particular. "The
possession of some degree of wealth I regarded, indeed, as indispensable to a man who
would fill a lofty and respectable character in the world," writes St. Leon. "But, in the
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picture I drew of this man in my mind, I considered wealth as an accident, the attendant
on his birth, to be dispensed with dignity, not to be adverted to with minuteness of
attention" (76-77). St. Leon is thus able to reconcile aristocratic honour with his passion
for gaming, but, ironically, his desire for distinction amongst his peers only serves to
further drive his profligacy and exacerbates his fall from honour: "The whole tendency of
my education had been to inspire me with a proud and restless desire of distinction; and I
was not content to play a second part in the career of my vices, as I should not have been
content to play a second part in the genuine theatre of honour and fame" (76).
For St. Leon, then, the moral distinction between vice and virtue is subsumed
within his larger, all-consuming desire for public recognition. He thus "plays his part" in
his own "theatre of glory"-gambling-in such a way as to outstrip the recklessness of his
peers. "In all that was thoughtlessly spirited and gaily profligate," recalls St. Leon, "I led
the way to my compeers, and was constantly held up by them as an example" (76). St.
Leon's gains and losses on the gaming table appear less important than the social eclat he
receives from the "compeers" who marvel at his extravagance and easy assumption of
extreme risk. The destructive need for social acclaim thus drives his compulsive
gambling: just as St. Leon had been "in the foremost rank"-both literally and
figuratively-at the siege of Pavia (64), he also leads the way in profligacy during his
youthful years in Paris.
Significantly, St. Leon is quick to point out that his "sordid and inglorious passion
for gaming" (75), while financially deleterious to his estate, did not compromise his
public image or "good name":
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My expenses of all kinds, during this period of self-desertion, drained my
resources, but did not tarnish my good name. My excesses were regarded
by some as ornamental and becoming, but by all were admitted as venial.
The laurels I had won in the field of military honour were not obscured by
my subsequent conduct. I was universally ranked among the most
promising and honourable of the young noblemen of France. (80)
Writing from a later vantage point, and reflecting on his youth, St. Leon posits that "a
very young man rather takes the tone of his passionsfromthose about him, than forms
one that is properly his own" (78). As St. Leon's history unfolds, we see the extent to
which this statement foreshadows the tragedy of his life: unable to cultivate a clear sense
of his own identity independent of the social codes and narratives underpinning his social
position as an aristocratic knight, St. Leon is driven to seek out public validation from his
peers as the only way to consolidate any sense of his own value or worth, any sense of
selfhood. Robbed, by the forces of history and politics, of the one clear avenue by which
he could validate and shape his developing manhood-military triumph-he turns instead to
the act of gaming, finding in gambling an alternative way to achieve the social
recognition and acclaim he so desperately craves. Although the "theatre of glory" has
shifted to the gaming tablefromthe battlefield, identity and honour for St. Leon still
remain very much the function of public display and social performance. It is only upon
meeting Marguerite Louise Isabeau de Damville, the future "partner of [his] life" (80) and
the "unhappy partner of [his] fortunes" (112), that St. Leon encounters the possible
satisfactions found within the private spaces of the domestic realm.
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"The Unhappy Partner of My Fortunes"
Godwin wrote St. Leon in the wake of Wollstonecraft's sudden death in
childbirth, and critics have long recognized the traces of Mary's influence on the text.
This is most obvious in the character of Marguerite, St. Leon's long-suffering wife,
whom Woodcock identifies as "the first of a series of fictional portraits" of
Wollstonecraft ("Notes" 691). Similarly, Clemit regards St. Leon as Godwin's attempt to
fictionally rework the austere rationalism of PoliticalJustice into a philosophy for living
that could accommodate Wollstonecraft's emphasis on the value of love and the domestic
affections {Godwinian Novel 73-74). In its review of the novel, the Antijacobin Review
was "delighted to find the social and domestic virtues placed in their proper rank"
(Graham 158) and speculated that the author "would not be sorry to have an opportunity
of retracting many of the opinions advanced in his former works" (Graham 157).
Indeed, in the Preface to the original 1799 edition of the novel, Godwin goes on
guard against those readers of his "graver productions" who might "accuse [him] of
inconsistency; the affections and charities of private life being every where in this
publication a topic of the warmest eulogium, while in the Enquiry concerning Political
Justice they seemed to be treated with no great degree of indulgence and favour" (52). To
these potential charges of inconsistency, Godwin declares that St. Leon stands as a
refinement of his earlier political philosophy which, while consistent with its original
fundamental principles, now recognizes the central place of love and personal affections
in the evolution of moral and rational character. "I apprehend domestic and private
affections inseparable from the nature of man," writes Godwin in his 1799 Preface, "and
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from what may be styled the culture of the heart, and am fully persuaded that they are not
incompatible with a profound and active sense of justice in the mind of him that cherishes
them" (52).6
In St. Leon, sensibility and the domestic affections are repeatedly celebrated and
set in contrast to the detached rationalism for which Godwin had advocated in Political
Justice. When St. Leon is reunited with his son, Charles, after an estrangement of fifteen
years, he marvels at the strength of "natural affection," which "winds itself in so many
folds about the heart, and is the parent of so complicated, so various and exquisite
emotions, that he who should attempt to divest himself of it, will find that he is divesting
himself of all that is most to be coveted in existence" (413). Likewise, when St. Leon
reflects on the death of his faithful dog, Charon, he justifies his grief on the basis that
emotional response functions independently of the processes of reason. "A morose and
fastidious reader perhaps will ask me why I lay so great a stress upon so petty and
insignificant an incident as the death of a dog," writes St. Leon, but "feeling does not stay
to calculate with weights and a balance the importance and magnitude of every object that
excites it; it flows impetuously from the heart, without consulting the cooler responses of
the understanding" (280).
Indeed, William D. Brewer points out that affect shapes the very conditions of St.
Leon's composition: at numerous points in the text, St. Leon acknowledges the disruptive
influence of painful memories on the physical act of writing, and such "melodramatic
gestures," Brewer argues, foreground the "subjectivity of St. Leon's narrative," a
narrative which is a "record of feelings [...] as well as events" (Introduction 25). As a
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"record of feelings," St. Leon clearly stands as a testament to Godwin's initiation into
Wollstonecraft's "culture of the heart." As Elton Edward Smith and Esther Greenwell
Smith describe it, St. Leon
marks a long step forward in Godwin's recognition of the importance of
emotion as a motive for conduct and as a basis of relationship. The novel
expresses his hard-won conviction that the experience of family affection
is essential to the complete development of the individual personality, and
can, in its turn, act as a stepping stone toward universal benevolence.
(91-92)
When St. Leon meets the nineteen-year-old Marguerite, he is certainly in need of
the moral reformation which she provides. Having been for "two years in habits of life
and a mode of expense extremely injurious to [his] patrimony," St. Leon is only delivered
from the "ruinous consequences of [his] own folly" through his introduction and
subsequent marriage to Marguerite (80). Indeed, Marguerite seems to function in the text
primarily as a vehicle for her husband's moral and financial reformation. Although
beautiful as well as artistically and intellectually accomplished, she is most notably
constructed as a paragon of moral virtue whose most significant gift is the ameliorative
effect she has on her husband's profligate ways. "Amidst the singular assemblage of her
intellectual accomplishments," writes St. Leon, "there was nothing by which she was so
much distinguished, as the uncommon prudence of her judgments, and the unalterable
amiableness of her manners" (81).
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Like Fleetwood, the protagonist of Godwin's next novel, St. Leon develops an
appreciation of his future wife's virtuous superiority to the other women with whom he
has been romantically and sexually involved. As he tells the reader,
I was like one, who, after his eyes had grown imperceptibly dim till at
length every object appeared indistinct and of a gloomy general hue, has
his sight instantaneously restored, and beholds the fabric of the universe in
its genuine clearness, brilliancy, and truth [....] I could not endure the
comparison between the showy, unsubstantial attractions of the women I
had hitherto frequented, and the charms of the adorable Marguerite. The
purity of her mind seemed to give a celestial brilliance and softness to the
beauties of her person. (82)
Also, like Fleetwood, St. Leon is introduced to his wife via the bond of friendship he
forges with her father, the Marquis de Damville, a man who, like Fleetwood's father-inlaw Macneil, was "one of the most benevolent and enlightened of mankind" (81). And,
just as Macneil does with Fleetwood, the Marquis bestows his daughter in marriage
almost as a commodity meant for the moral reformation of his future son-in-law.
Macneil encourages Fleetwood's courtship of his daughter, Mary, out of an
expressed belief that marriage to an amiable, uncorrupted young woman will cure
Fleetwood's misanthropy. Likewise, the Marquis is willing to '"bestow"' his daughter on
St. Leon-to '"commit[] her happiness to the risk'" (84)-in a bid to renovate the younger
man's profligate behaviour-to cure his passion for the vices of public, courtly life in
general and for gaming in particular. '"She is a treasure, the equal of which perhaps the
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world does not hold,'" the Marquis tells St. Leon of Marguerite:
'In understanding, accomplishments, and virtue, I firmly believe no
woman living can compare with her. In possessing her, you will be
blessed beyond the lot of princes [....] Her portion will redeem the injury
which your patrimony has suffered from your excesses [....] I cannot
believe that, with such a deposit intrusted to you, you will consent to bring
her to misery and ruin.' (84)
Regarding St. Leon as a '"man in the high road to ruin'" (82), and '"determined
on [his] reform'" (83), the Marquis '"bestows"' his daughter on St. Leon for the purpose
of alleviating his financial distress through Marguerite's dowry. More importantly,
however, he offers her as the ideal exemplar of virtuous sentiment and behaviour which
will act as the regulator of St. Leon's own moral conduct. In one significant sense, then,
it is Marguerite-and not the Philosopher's Stone or the elixir vitae-who functions as St.
Leon's first "gift." Like the two others he will receive later in life, this gift is conferred
upon him by an elderly man who only bestows his present after extracting a promise from
the recipient. Marguerite is thus given to St. Leon on one '"condition"': '"break off your
present modes of life,'" the Marquis tells St. Leon, and '"separate yourself from your
connections'" (84). In essence, what the Marquis requires of St. Leon amounts to a
divorce of the self for the young aristocrat, for it is only through his "connections"-the
social conventions coded into his relationships with his peers-that he assumes any sense
of selfhood at all.

Initially, St. Leon experiences great salutary benefits from marriage and rural
retirement. Indeed, he constructs the pleasures of domestic affection as the one panacea
for all of life's inevitable disappointments and tribulations, lavishing praise on the joys of
private life: "To judge from my own experience in this situation," writes St. Leon of his
marriage with Marguerite, "I should say that nature has atoned for all the disasters and
miseries she so copiously and incessantly pours upon her sons, by this one gift, the
transcendent enjoyment and nameless delights which, wherever the heart is pure and the
soul is refined, wait on the attachment of two persons of opposite sexes" (85). Residing
at St. Leon's paternal estate, the couple lives in relative retirement, enjoying literary
pursuits, outdoor activities, and occasional travel. St. Leon constructs a picture of
marital complementarity that develops out of both solitude and shared experience. Of
their marital bliss, he recalls that
ours was a sober and dignified happiness, and its very sobriety served to
give it additional voluptuousness. We had each our separate pursuits,
whether for the cultivation of our minds, or the promotion of our mutual
interests. Separation gave us respectability in each other's eyes, while it
prepared us to enter with fresh ardour into society and conversation.7 (85)
However, despite the personal satisfactions he experiences in the retirement and
tranquility of the domestic realm, St. Leon still yearns for the social validation afforded
by public life. Domestic enjoyments, as delightfully satisfying as they are for St. Leon on
one level, are not enough to grant a complete sense of fulfillment in himself as a person
or as a man of rank. Thus, he still yearns for the public recognition and acclaim of his
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peers, an acclaim and recognition which he can only achieve within the social spaces of
urban courtly life. While Marguerite has "all the simplicity of genuine taste" (88),
"deriving] her happiness from the tone of her own mind, and [standing] in no need of the
gaping admiration and stupid wonder of others to make her feel herself happy" (88), St.
Leon's personal fulfillment and very sense of identity rely on the codes of social
exchange in the public "theatre" of life. As he laments to his reader, "I retained the
original vice of my mind. The gestures of worship and the voice of applause were
necessary to me. I did not suffice to myself. I was not satisfied with the tranquil and
inglorious fruition of genuine pleasures, forgetting the vain and anxious tumult of the
world, and forgotten by those who figured on its theatre" (88).
While the "theatre" of public life may be "vain and anxious," St. Leon is still
destructively drawn to it, despite his better intentions and the measure of happiness he
experiences in rural retirement with Marguerite. Still drawn to the "theatre of glory," and
still in desperate need of the "gestures of worship and the voice of applause" that validate
his own sense of self-worth and consolidate his own sense of selfhood, St. Leon is
tormented by his inability to "suffice to [himjself." Clearly gesturing to his wife's
implicit function as his moral regulator, St. Leon laments that not even Marguerite,
despite her superiority of sentiment in these matters, was able to "root[] out this disease
of [his] mind" (88). Indeed, as Crump has argued, the sequestered and secluded nature of
the domestic realm actually exacerbates St. Leon's desire for public life by withholding
opportunities for the social recognition he so desperately craves: "In rural retirement [St.
Leon] is debarred from participation in the economy of symbolic exchange with his peers
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in which his concepts of prestige have currency as real value [....] The domestic,
individualizing world of [] marriage threatens St. Leon's sense of self because it isolates
him from that social continuum in which he had an assigned and an assured place" (399).
Initially, St. Leon is able to satiate his desire for public recognition through
ostentatious displays of wealth that signify the superiority and power of his social
position. He maintains a large retinue of servants and surrounds himself with all the
accoutrements of luxury (88). St. Leon's tenuous hold on his social ambition, however, is
broken when at the age of 32 he travels to Paris with his nine-year-old son, Charles, for
the express purpose of settling him into university. St. Leon's commitment to domestic
seclusion had been reinforced four years earlier when, upon visiting his father-in-law on
his deathbed in Paris, he had been warned yet again by the Marquis against being '"drawn
aside by ambition'" or '"dazzled by the glitter of idle pomp and decoration'" (93). '"Live
in the midst of your family,"' the Marquis admonished on the occasion, and '"cultivate
domestic affection'" (93). Struck by these "last advices" of his father-in-law, St. Leon
had then "small inclination to enter into any species of society" and promptly left Paris
immediately following the Marquis's decease (93). Without the spectre of the Marquis,
however-and without the guiding judgment of Marguerite, who, feeling a "repugnance"
to life in the metropolis, had declined to accompany him (92)-St. Leon quickly surrenders
to the same corrupting vices of courtly life that had seduced him years prior.
Having lived for the past ten years a life of "contemplation and letters" (94), St.
Leon is awestruck by the activity and energy of urban life and its myriad opportunities for
ostentatious social interaction. Recalls St. Leon, "I was like a man who had suffered long
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calamity in a famished vessel or a town besieged, and is immediately after introduced into
the midst of luxury, to a table loaded with the most costly dainties" (94). Seduced by the
charms of urban life-the "dainties" of social intercourse that had so long been denied him
in his domestic married life-St. Leon is quickly drawn back into the "destructive vortex"
of the gaming table. Significantly, his fevered embrace of gambling only increases upon
his realization that success at the gaming table will allow him to sustain an extravagant
lifestyle that had long ago outstripped his financial means to support it. St. Leon's
behaviour at this point in the text is no doubt informed by the irrationality that
characterizes all addictive behaviour. His reflections, however, also display a keen
awareness of the fundamental role ostentatious displays of social rank play in his sense of
identity and self worth, and of his inability to continue such displays without some
fortification of his finances. As Scheuermann aptly recognizes, "part of St. Leon's need
for wealth stems from his self-image as an aristocrat; he feels that without his material
resources he would not receive the public gestures of acknowledgment which are so
necessary to him" (Novels of William Godwin 146). After a significant win at the gaming
table, St. Leon surrenders to his "fatal and irresistible" need for social extravagance (95),
and decides upon gambling as the only way to finance the pomp and glitter of a public
lifestyle that is so central to his very identity (97-98).
St. Leon's gambling relapse corresponds with an increasing alienation from his
family, as he withdraws from the affections of his son, Charles, and from open
communication with Marguerite. When Marguerite unexpectedly arrives in Paris, St.
Leon is forced to choose between a night of gambling and an evening spent in domestic
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tranquillity with his family. It is significant that Marguerite's presence serves not to
dampen her husband's passion for gambling, but rather to inflame it. As St. Leon tells
the reader, "instead of being weaned, by the presence of this admirable woman, from my
passion for gaming, it became stronger than ever" (107). Indeed, while about to embrace
his wife, and upon the entrance of his son into the room, St. Leon betrays the extent of his
alienationfromthe domestic order which he seems to perceive as both threatening and
stifling: "The arms of my wife, that were about to embrace me, suddenly became to me a
nest of scorpions," laments St. Leon. "I could as soon have rested and enjoyed myself
upon the top of Vesuvius, when it flamed" (107).
It is difficult to determine the exact reason for St. Leon's hostile response in this
scene, why he so violently repudiates the charms of domestic life he claims so much to
value. While he is no doubt largely motivated by the impulses of addiction at this point,
his response is also suggestive of a latent discontent with a domesticity he finds stifling
and which denies him access to the public "theatre of glory" he so craves. Thus,
Marguerite's arms become a "nest of scorpions" that threatens to trap, immobilize, and
ultimately destroy him. As perceived by St. Leon, gambling is the vehicle by which he
will be able to sustain the extravagance of a public life organized around the social
signifiers of courtly culture and aristocratic identity. Marguerite's presence in Paris thus
becomes an impediment both to St. Leon's gambling activities and to his larger goal of
sustaining this public image. Marguerite (and the domesticity she so powerfully
represents) threatens St. Leon's consolidation of his public identity, and he thus comes to
regard her embraces as a kind of symbolic death-a "nest of scorpions," or a burning
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volcano, which he must escape. Indeed, in a metaphor foreshadowing a later episode in
his tragic history, St. Leon is relieved when he is finally able to withdraw himself from
Marguerite's presence and "escape[] the inquisition of her eye" (109).
St. Leon's fall from aristocratic prosperity is swift, as he loses his entire fortune in
a twenty-four-hour gambling spree and subsequently descends into a debilitating
depression. Reduced to beggary, Marguerite orchestrates the family's retirement into
"virtuous obscurity"-in this case, a humble cottage in rural Switzerland (112).
Marguerite gracefully accepts the family's loss of fortune and status, to the point where
she indulges in a Wordsworthian language of celebration regarding the moral and
spiritual benefits of a humble rustic life. For Marguerite, rural retirement, divorced from
the "artificial tastes, and idle and visionary pursuits" of sophisticated urban or courtly life,
is more closely aligned with the "genuine principles of [human] nature" (123), and she
entreats St. Leon to take solace in domestic affections and in the moral benefits of their
reduced station in life.8
St. Leon, however, feels too acutely the debasement of his impoverished state, and
he struggles to reconcile himself to his lowly station. His loss of fortune and rank strikes
at the very foundations upon which his sense of identity and selfhood rests, and he thus
recognizes the gravity of his "fall": "I had been formed, by every accident of my life, to
the love of splendour," he declares. "High heroic feats, and not the tranquillity of rural
retirement [... ] had been the food of my imagination, ever since the faculty of
imagination was unfolded in my mind" (120). As St. Leon remarks later in his narrative,
he had been "brought up from [] infancy in the opinion that fame was the first of all
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Godwin, however, constructs Marguerite's emotional response to their sudden
impoverishment as symptomatic of her greater strength of character, and her virtuous
superiority in this instance throws into relief St. Leon's personal weaknesses. In the
Enquirer, Godwin had cautioned against an excessive reliance on luxury, arguing that
care should be taken in the education of the young not to encourage an adverse
dependence on certain "gratifications" in life. "The man of true courage," contends
Godwin, "is he who, when duty and public good demand it, can chearfully dispense with
innumerable gratifications. The coward is he who, wedded to particular indulgences and
a certain mode of life, is not able so much as to think with equanimity of the being
deprived of them" (Enquirer 248). "Genuine virtue," such as that displayed by
Marguerite,
teaches us to look upon events, not absolutely with indifference, but at
least with tranquillity. It instructs us to enjoy the benefits which we have,
and prepares us for what is to follow. It smiles upon us in the midst of
poverty and adverse circumstances. It enables us to collect and combine
the comforts which a just observer may extract from the most untoward
situation, and to be content. (Enquirer 249)
Marguerite-whose emotional response is surely emblematic of the "genuine virtue"
which allows one to experience tranquillity in the face of misfortune-is juxtaposed with
the "cowardly" St. Leon and his unhealthy reliance on "indulgence" and a "certain mode
of life," a reliance that is in itself suggestive of a weak sense of personal autonomy.
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St. Leon's "bitterness of soul" (125) is only interrupted by a storm that destroys
his Swiss cottage and devastates the region of Switzerland in which he and his family
were residing. Forced off their land by Swiss authorities, St. Leon and his family travel to
Constance, Germany. Although initially cheated of the money from the sale of their
humble Swiss estate, the family, after a brief but severe spell of poverty, eventually settles
in another cottage on Lake Constance. Although his family's misfortunes in the wake of
the storm initially engender in St. Leon an appreciation for the consolations of domestic
affection, he finds himself unable to sustain a more positive outlook on his situation in
life. As he recalls, "the virtue I had so recently adopted was a strenuous effort. I rather
resolved to be happy, than could strictly be said to be happy [....] [V]anity and
ostentation were habits wrought into my soul, and might be said to form part of its
essence" (135). St. Leon's need for wealth and fame still consumes him, and he comes to
regard his attempts at finding happiness in his humble existence as contrary to the natural
state of his soul.
Despite St. Leon's latent dissatisfaction with his state in life, he does manage to
achieve a measure of "peace and tranquillity" while residing for six years with his family
in the cottage on Lake Constance (155). However, this six-year moratorium on
discontent comes to an abrupt end with the arrival of the stranger bearing the magna
opera of the Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae. Calling himself Francesco
Zampieri, the stranger arrives at St. Leon's cottage in late summer, and his
presence-coupled with the seductive gifts he offers-reignites in St. Leon his repressed
desire for wealth and "fame." Moreover, the arrival of the stranger serves to reveal the
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responds to St. Leon's initial refusal with "ineffable contempt":
'Feeble and effeminate mortal! You are neither a knight nor a Frenchman!
Or rather, having been both, you have forgotten in inglorious obscurity
every thing worthy of either! Was ever gallant action achieved by him who
was incapable of separating himself from a woman? [....] In vain might
honour, worth, and immortal renown proffer their favours to him who has
made himself the basest of all sublunary things-the puppet of a woman,
the plaything of her pleasure, wasting an inglorious life in the
gratifications of her wishes and the performance of her commands!' (157)
Zampieri attacks St. Leon on multiple levels: lacking the reckless valour needed for
'"gallant action,'" he is marked as a failure relative to the aristocratic codes of behaviour
governing the courtly tradition of sixteenth-century France. Furthermore, by aligning
himself so completely with Marguerite that she becomes "a part of [him]self," St. Leon
has allowed himself to be subsumed by a domestic order that should only
complement-but never overwhelm-him. The inevitable result, argues the stranger, of a
man unable to '"separat[e] himself from a woman'" is a '"puppet,"' a "'plajrthing'"
emasculated by the feminine sphere. Such a man can never achieve greatness, and is
instead destined to live out life in '"inglorious obscurity.'" Zampieri is unequivocal in
his attack on St. Leon's manhood, but he also appeals to the younger man's social vanity
by holding out a hope of "redemption" for himself and for his children, who become, in
both Zampieri's and St. Leon's eyes, not much more than future representations of St.
Leon's image. As the stranger tells St. Leon, '"you are degraded from the rank you once
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held among mankind; your children are destined to live in the inglorious condition of
peasants. This day you might have redeemed all your misfortunes, and raised yourself to
a station more illustrious than that to which you were born'" (158).
It is this last speech of the stranger that perhaps plays the central role in seducing
St. Leon into accepting Zampieri's offer, for St. Leon's masculine identity-and, indeed,
his very sense of self-is inextricably bound up with the outward signifiers of wealth and
social rank. Being able to transcend the '"inglorious obscurity'" of his lowly station, and
once again assume an elevated public image, would indeed be a kind of "redemption" for
St. Leon, as he has experienced his fall from aristocratic prosperity as a "degradation" of
not only his body, but also his spirit. St. Leon immediately senses the relevance of the
stranger's words to his own character. "The stranger touched upon the first and foremost
passions of my soul," he writes, "passions the operation of which had long been
suspended, but which were by no means extinguished in my bosom" (157).
St. Leon rightly recognizes that the appeal of the stranger's offer rests in his own
addiction to "fame" and the "theatre of glory," an addiction cultivated in adolescence
through the lessons taught by his mother, and nurtured by an adulthood spent conforming
to the social codes of chivalric culture: "The youthful passions of my soul, which my
early years had written there in characters so deep, were by no means effaced. I could not
contemplate the splendour of rank with an impartial eye. I could not think of the
alternative of distinction or obscurity for my children with indifference" (160).
St. Leon's conception of his character is strikingly suggestive of the image of the
palimpsest, which, although it may be inscribed many times over, never loses the "marks"
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of its original script. Indeed, the early lessons of St. Leon's childhood had instilled in
him a deep desire for "fame"-public glory and social acclaim-and these "youthful
passions" had made such an indelible impression on his "soul" (were "written there in
characters so deep") that they became the fundamental foundations in the construction of
his selfhood, to the extent that, without "fame," he was nothing-he ceased to exist in any
meaningful way. His years with Marguerite, years in which she had attempted to instill in
her husband an appreciation of domestic retirement removed from the public eye, might
have tempered or even "suspended" these "foremost passions," but they in no way
"effaced" them. Marguerite's lessons were simply "written over" those primary lessons
of his childhood, which serve as the original and most fundamental text of St. Leon's
existence.
The stranger is a skilled reader of that text, easily manipulating the "first and
foremost passions of [St. Leon's] soul." Indeed, it is Zampieri's acute perception of that
text-those "first and foremost passions"-that allows him to bring St. Leon under his
sway. A dependence on wealth and luxury, for Godwin, was not only the sign of a weak
and "cowardly" character; it also threatened a man's autonomy. "The weakness which
too many are subject to in regard to the goods of fortune," argued Godwin in the
Enquirer, "puts them to a certain degree in every man's power" (249). A man
"inordinately sensible to the presence or absence of the accommodations and luxuries of
life" is easily enslaved by another: "This man is not his own master [....] He is truly a
slave. Any man, possessing the command of a certain portion of the goods of life, may
order him this way or that at his pleasure" {Enquirer 249).
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With his unlimited "command" of the "goods of life"-money and
longevity-Zampieri is ideally poised to act as St. Leon's "master," subjugating him to
forbidden knowledge and alienating secrets. It is therefore ironic that St. Leon ultimately
comes to appreciate the stranger's offer as the means through which he can reestablish not
only his social rank, but also his personal autonomy and masculine authority. "Shall I
shut upon myself the gate of knowledge and information?" he asks himself, pondering the
stranger's offer of disclosure and echoing the very language used to attack him and his
masculinity. "Is it not the part of a feeble and effeminate mind to refuse instruction,
because he is not at liberty to communicate that instruction to another-to a wife?" (159).
The stranger's gift thus becomes a sort of moral "instruction," a "gate of knowledge"
through which St. Leon must courageously pass in order to redeem himself and his family
from their fallen state. Like Caleb Williams, St. Leon is motivated by an urgent need to
gain access to forbidden knowledge, knowledge which carries within it the threat of his
own destruction.
In succumbing to the stranger's manipulation, St. Leon thus betrays his deep sense
of shame at his perceived emasculation. "The figure I made in my own eyes was mean; I
was impatient of my degradation; I believed that I had shown myself uxorious and
effeminate, at a time that must have roused in me the spirit of a man, if there had been a
spark of manly spirit latent in my breast" (166). In St. Leon's eyes, he has lost his
masculine authority, that "spark of manly spirit" so essential to the chivalric tradition.
While poverty and obscurity have unmanned him by robbing him of the great signifiers of
wealth and rank that formed the foundation for his conception of masculine identity,
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domestic retirement has similarly emasculated him by denying him the separate sphere of
interaction necessary for successful manhood. St. Leon, so immersed in the private
sphere that it has become the "whole of [his] existence," perceives his gendered identity
as under threat. He justifies his anxiety by clinging to the ideology of separate spheres
that will come to characterize later nineteenth-century conceptions of gender.9 Reflecting
on the "singular and unprecedented confidence" he shares with Marguerite (166), St.
Leon laments that

•

other men have their secrets: nor do they find their domestic tranquillity
broken by that circumstance. The merchant does not call his wife into
consultation upon his ventures; the statesman does not unfold to her his
policy and his projects; the warrior does not take her advice upon the plan
of his campaign; the poet does not concert with her his flights and his
episodes. To other men the domestic scene is the relaxation of their cares;
when they enter it, they dismiss the business of the day, and call another
cause. I only have concentrated in it the whole of my existence. By this
means I have extinguished in myself the true energy of the human
character. A man can never be respectable in the eyes of the world or in
his own, except so far as he stands by himself and is truly independent. He
may have friends; he may have domestic connections; but he must not in
these connections lose his individuality. Nothing truly great was ever
achieved, that was not executed or planned in solitary seclusion. (166-67)
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In St. Leon's conception of this notion of separate spheres, a man should maintain
a healthy distance between his public activities and his private enjoyments, moving in and
out of the domestic "scene" easily, often, and at will. Within this model of interaction,
masculine autonomy is never threatened, never jeopardized by the domestic sphere. The
circumstances of St. Leon's fall from prosperity, however, have produced in his eyes an
unnatural order of things, a perverse living arrangement in which an unbroken domestic
"tranquillity" of six years has denied him any opportunities for masculine self-expression
in the public sphere. With no money and no social connections to fortify his relationship
with public life, St. Leon has only his interactions with Marguerite and his children with
which to define himself, and the result, in his eyes, is that the "whole of [his] existence"
has become "concentrated" in the domestic order. St. Leon may yearn to "stand[] by
himself and be "truly independent," but there is a definite irony to these desires. On her
deathbed, St. Leon's mother had stressed the importance of "singleness and selfdependence" with no apparent awareness of how her idealization of social rank conflicted
with true independence of thought or character (60). St. Leon laments his loss of
individuality while being similarly blind to the fact that his desperate need for wealth and
"fame" have always precluded himfromachieving any true measure of independence.
The stranger's gift ultimately offers St. Leon much more than simple immortality
and unlimited wealth. The Philosopher's Stone will of course give St. Leon the financial
resources to re-establish his "fame"-in the form of allowing him to reassume his
"rightful" rank in society-and this fame will no doubt allow St. Leon to recuperate his
sense of self within the courtly tradition he so values. St. Leon's identity, however, as we

Ill
have witnessed, is largely informed by his sense of masculine authority, and it is precisely
this authority which he so desperately desires to regain. This is evidenced by the
stranger's keen tactics of manipulation in identifying and attacking St. Leon's biggest
point of weakness-his latent sense of degradation and emasculation. The greatest "gift"
of the stranger, therefore, may not be the Philosopher's Stone or the elixir vitae at all, but
the very "condition" upon which these two "gifts" are bequeathed-that is, the code of
silence that St. Leon must maintain between himself and his wife regarding all that the
stranger shares with him. As St. Leon correctly suspects, the stranger's gift and its
accompanying "condition" will divorce him from the "singular and unprecedented" trust
he shares with Marguerite. Paradoxically, however, it seems that it is just this kind of
divorce that he so craves; only by removing himself from the confines of a domestic bond
that he feels has subsumed his "true energy" can he reassert his masculine autonomy and
achieve greatness. Accepting the underlying condition of the stranger's gift gives St.
Leon a very tangible and convenient vehicle through which to effect a "divorce" from
Marguerite that is both symbolic and material.
St. Leon's feelings of emasculation are perhaps aggravated by Marguerite's
assumption of characteristics and behaviours conventionally associated with the
masculine. When first introduced to the reader, Marguerite is the picture of stereotypical
femininity: she is mild in disposition and gentle and delicate in frame, with an "extreme
juvenility of form" and a step that is "airy and light" (81). Despite her obvious feminine
qualities, however, even at this early point, Marguerite displays a "strength of body and
vigour of mind" that is reflected in her "bold" intellect and "firm" carriage (81). This
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strength of character comes to reveal itself in St. Leon's narrative, as Marguerite's
responses to misfortune are increasingly masculinized. Indeed, upon the loss of the
family fortune, Marguerite assumes, in addition to her maternal role, the typically
masculine position of head and protector of the family. "She determined for the present
to be both a father and a mother to her children" (115), and she later serves as an essential
"steward" to St. Leon when he is emotionally incapacitated to the point of being unable to
manage his own estate (122).
Moreover, Marguerite's masculinization in the text occurs as a function of her
husband's feminization. When St. Leon is cheated of the money from the sale of his
Swiss cottage, and forced to earn a subsistence living as a manual labourer, he feels
himself unmanned by his inability to withstand his misfortune: "My heart died within
me," he recalls. "I did not return after the fatigues of the day [...] to a night of repose. I
became a very woman when I looked forward, and endeavoured to picture to myself the
future situation of my family. I watered my pillow with my tears" (142). Significantly,
during these moments of emotional excess, it is Marguerite who must apply the guiding
hand of comfort. "[She] would sometimes overhear me; and with the gentlest suggestions
of her admirable mind would endeavour to soothe my thoughts to peace" (142).
St. Leon's misfortunes have thus placed him in a series of domestic arrangements
that have compromised his sense of masculine authority. He therefore constructs his
acceptance of the stranger's gift as a testament of his own masculine autonomy in the face
of a domestic existence he now perceives as emasculating and as a threat to his selfactualization. After his sudden entrance into a new-found wealth that is never adequately
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explained to Marguerite or his children, St. Leon embarks on a tour of German cities with
his beloved son, Charles, but he quickly suffers an estrangement with Charles after he
refuses to disclose the nature and cause of his sudden wealth. Significantly, St. Leon's
sense of masculine identity, reinvigorated by his willingness to deny Marguerite entrance
into the realm of his alchemical secrets, is further consolidated by what he now perceives
as his strength in maintaining the stranger's confidence, regardless of the personal costs
to himself or his family. St. Leon's sense of masculine autonomy thus becomes a
perverse, and ultimately tragic, function of his willingness to withstand the misfortunes
brought on by the Philosopher's Stone. As he reflects after his break with Charles,
I held it to be base and cowardly to surrender gifts so invaluable, upon so
insufficient an experiment [....] I had but just entered the vast field that
was opened to me. It was of the nature of all great undertakings to be
attended with difficulties and obstacles in the commencement, to present a
face calculated to discourage the man that is infirm of purpose. But it
became my descent, my character and pretensions, to show myself serene
in the midst of storms. (219)
Note how St. Leon casts his stubborn refusal to relinquish use of the Philosopher's Stone
as indicative of a manliness perfectly in tune with the chivalric ideals of reckless bravery
and perseverance. Using language evocative of the battlefield, St. Leon perceives himself
as a determined warrior entering into the "vast field" of an "experiment" that will prove
his authority, once and for all. Only by remaining committed to his "experiment"-and
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therefore loyal to the stranger and his gifts-can St. Leon validate his identity as both an
aristocrat and a man.
Charles's material departure from the family mirrors St. Leon's symbolic break
with the familial ties and domestic affections that had so long enveloped him. Indeed,
immediately after accepting the stranger's disclosure, St. Leon had begun to sense the
extent to which his "experiment" had "introduced a permanent difference and separation
between [him] and [his] family" (194). This "separation" is most extreme with
Marguerite: "we no longer lived together as we had done," remarks St. Leon. "There was
no more opening of the heart between us, no more infantine guilelessness and sincerity,
no more of that unapprehensive exposure of every thought of the soul" (201). After
Charles's departure, St. Leon attempts to integrate, once again, into the folds of the
domestic order, most notably by placing himself back under the moral control of
Marguerite. '"I am come to you,'" he cries, upon first seeing her after his German tour,
"'a repenting prodigal. Take me and mould me at your pleasure! [....] I resign myself
into your hands! [....] Be my director; do with me as you please!'" (223-24). Although
he is careful to guard his alchemical secrets, St. Leon nevertheless declares to Marguerite
that, '"in all things else,'" she may "govern [him] despotically!'" (224). His attempts at
re-entering the domestic order, however, are ultimately unsuccessful: St. Leon is now, in
Marguerite's eyes, marked as an outsider to the family, a shadowy presence whose very
unknowability threatens the domestic order. As St. Leon later comes to realize,
Marguerite "regarded [him] as ambiguous, mysterious, and impenetrable, qualities from
which the frankness of her nature spontaneously revolted" (257).
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"An Equivocal Character"
After St. Leon returns to Constance, he is detained on suspicion of murdering the
stranger and only escapes prison by bribing a money-hungry jailor. From this point on in
the text, St. Leon's adventures come to illustrate what is perhaps the ultimate paradox of
his tragic history: the very wealth which should have theoretically affirmed his public
image and consolidated his troubled sense of identity actually causes him to lose both of
these things. As we have seen, St. Leon was driven, from childhood, by ambition, a thirst
for "fame" and the "theatre of glory" that could only be satisfied in the public spaces of
social life. It is this tragic flaw that alienates him from what should have been a life of
unadulterated domestic affection with Marguerite. Moreover, it is this flaw that
motivates him to accept the gifts offered by the stranger, despite (or because of) the fact
that his acceptance will forever divorce him from the domestic order he should cherish
above all else. In this sense, St. Leon chooses "fame" and public life over domestic and
familial ties in a bid to both consolidate his weak sense of identity and demonstrate his
masculine autonomy. However, this choice paradoxically initiates what is perhaps the
most overt and compelling narrative of lost identity in the text-the literal erasure of St.
Leon's name.
St. Leon begins his experiment with the belief that it will allow him to resume his
rightful "place" in chivalric courtly life. As Kate Ferguson Ellis has pointed out, St. Leon
is a "firm believer in the transformative power of money" (162), and we witness how his
faith in the power of gold structures his visions of the future. Immediately upon receiving
the gift of the Philosopher's Stone, St. Leon begins to actively plot his return to the life of
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honour and privilege he had lost seven years earlier. He fantasizes about returning to his
"native soil," repurchasing the "property of [his] ancestors," and witnessing the members
of his family rise to positions of eminence within the French court (190-91). His
daughters will marry into the highest ranks of France's nobility, thus solidifying the
position of the St. Leon name within the French aristocracy (191). In much the same way
as his mother had done with him, St. Leon reserves his greatest hopes for his son,
Charles, who in St. Leon's fantasies will "burst with sudden splendour upon his
countrymen, and prove in the field his noble blood and generous strain" (191). St. Leon's
visions ultimately run to the hyperbolic, as he begins to imagine himself as the financial
saviour of his "adored country" in its time of need (189), "replenish[ing] with [his]
treasures the empty coffers of France" (191). In St. Leon's fantasies of self-actualization,
"the exile should return from his seven years' banishment in triumph and splendour"
(190).
The reality of St. Leon's experience, however, is that he is unable to achieve any
kind of meaningful reintegration into society due to the aura of suspicion and mystery that
immediately begins to haunt him upon his acceptance of the Philosopher's Stone. St.
Leon's trouble in Constance stems from his inability, when questioned by the authorities,
to give a '"clear and satisfactory account'" of both his wealth and of his relationship with
the mysterious stranger (235). St. Leon initially seems to recognize the necessity of
maintaining some measure of public transparency regarding his sudden wealth, as
evidenced by the fact that he attempts to justify to his family his sudden prosperity as the
result of a legacy left to him by the stranger. As St. Leon states at the time, "I was
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compelled to account for appearances" (194). This notion of "accounting" for, or
providing an "account" of, circumstances regarding his sudden acquisition of wealth
continually resurfaces in St. Leon's narrative, as he becomes increasingly unable to offer
the sort of "account" that might dispel some of the ignoble mystery that surrounds him
and which prevents him from honourably reintegrating into society.
The theme of forbidden knowledge, so prevalent in Caleb Williams, thus
resurfaces in St. Leon. Unable to provide a full and transparent disclosure of all that he
knows regarding both his and Falkland's histories-having only an "imperfect and
mutilated story to tell" (411)-Caleb finds himself haunted by the equivocal nature of his
existence. Like Caleb, St. Leon is ensnared within the confines of a dark secret, a story
he cannot tell, and he experiences complete social alienation as he is driven from place to
place by rumour and scandal.
When St. Leon attempts to curry favour for himself and Charles from Gaspar de
Coligny, a young French aristocrat residing at the Dresden court, he is forced to face the
disheartening reality that his current circumstances could never yield an honourable
explanation. '"At a loss to account'" for what he sees as this '"second revolution in [his]
fortune,'" Coligny emphasizes to St. Leon the necessity of providing an honourable
explanation for what seems to be inexplicable (204). '"You have not sufficiently
considered the account we all owe to one another,'" Coligny tells St. Leon, '"and the
clearness of proceeding we are obliged to maintain, not only to our own hearts, but in the
face of the world'" (204). Unable to provide this '"clear account'" of his '"second
revolution'" in fortune, St. Leon ultimately realizes that he is banished to an ignominious
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existence, and that his name and public image-once his greatest boons in life-are now
surrounded by mystery, speculation, and the taint of possible dishonour. Thus, the
Philosopher's Stone, which was to act as the magical elixir for the regeneration of all
aspects of his selfhood, ironically becomes the vehicle through which he loses even more
of his social and personal identity. As St. Leon tells the reader, "I had rejoiced in the
bequests of the stranger, because I regarded them as the means of restoring me to
splendour, and replacing my children in the situation to which they were entitled by their
birth. Was that which I had regarded as the instrument of their glory, to become the
medium of their ignominy and disgrace?" (205).
Indeed, it is this aura of ignoble mystery that haunts St. Leon's wandering
footsteps for the remainder of his narrative, and becomes the greatest impediment to his
successful reintegration into society. While St. Leon recognizes that wherever he travels
he is a "stranger, one universally unknown" (370), it is the corrupt bashaw of Hungary
who more aptly characterizes the enigmatic nature of St. Leon's position: as he tell St.
Leon, '"you are a man of darkness, and every thing that relates to you is enveloped in
mystery'" (378). For St. Leon, it ultimately becomes clear that, instead of achieving an
honourable place in the "theatre of glory," he is banished to a life of ignominious
obscurity: "Mystery was the great and unconquerable bane of my situation, and from the
poisonous influence of mystery, the most regular system of government was not
competent to protect me" (381). Just as Falkland ultimately comes to recognize himself
as the "fool of fame" (215), and "reputation" as a false "idol" the worship of which has
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destroyed him (171-72), St. Leon gradually comes to appreciate the destructive nature of
his gifts and the tragic consequences of his passion for fame and public acclaim.
After escaping prison in Constance, St. Leon settles himself and his family in
Italy, just outside of Pisa. There, he lives an isolated and modest existence, but again his
unfamiliarity to the local residents, coupled with his indiscreet participation in "chemistry
and the operations of natural magic" (266), soon raises the suspicions of his superstitious
Italian neighbours. After a mob kills his dog, destroys his home, and murders a loyal
servant, St. Leon once again is forced to flee with his family, this time to Barcelona,
where the long-suffering Marguerite-that "lovely victim of my indiscretions," as St. Leon
characterizes her (264}-succumbs to illness. With Marguerite's death, St. Leon loses one
of his last ties to the domestic order, and he immediately goes about divesting himself of
his remaining familial connections-repurchasing his paternal estate in France and settling
his daughters there under the guardianship of a female mentor, Mariana Chabot.
What is perhaps most striking about this period in St. Leon's history, however, is
that his removal to Italy initiates an overt loss of his public self, as measured by the
family name he had so earnestly desired to preserve in all of its honour and glory. Indeed,
while in Italy, St. Leon takes the name of "Monsieur Boismorand" (273), and this
assumed identity is only the first of a long series of pseudonyms he uses to evade
suspicion and escape into anonymity. After the death of Marguerite, he adopts the name
and persona of a "monsieur Valmier, the guardian of the orphan heiresses of St Leon"
(301). Ironically, contrary to his fantasies, it is as Monsieur Valmier-and not as
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himself-that St. Leon repurchases his paternal property on the banks of the Garonne, and
it is as Valmier that he makes the domestic arrangements with Madame Chabot.
After his release from the prison of the Spanish Inquisition, St. Leon travels to
Hungary, where he adopts yet another identity as "sieur de Chatillon" (366), the wealthy,
young (for he has by this point in the novel ingested the elixir vitae and returned to a
youthful age in appearance), and mysterious benefactor of the Hungarian people. Again,
as with his fantasy regarding the repurchasing of his paternal estate, it is tragically ironic
that St. Leon's dream of serving as a financial saviour to a country in need (a fantasy he
expressed regarding France) is only finally fulfilled by assuming an identity other than his
own. Moreover, after his release from Bethlem Gabor's prison, and upon his reunion
with his estranged son Charles, St. Leon veils his true identity (as well as the false one he
had assumed upon his entrance into Hungary) under yet another pseudonym-"Henry
D'Aubigny," a young Frenchmen unjustly imprisoned by Gabor (414). In this respect, St.
Leon is like Caleb, who is also forced to "submit to the otherwise unmanly expedient of
passing by a different name" (410-11), and who similarly disguises his identity through a
number of alternative personas.
The text does not draw the reader's attention to this process of identity loss.
Indeed, we are only told of these various name changes through oddly passive
constructions delivered in an offhand manner: "Monsieur Boismorand, such was the
name I had assumed upon my entrance into Italy," St. Leon tells the reader (273); after
Marguerite's death, he writes of how he "passed [himjself for monsieur Valmier" while
resettling his daughters under the care of Madame Chabot (301). Likewise, after his
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initial entrance into Hungary, the sieur de Chatillon "was the name [he] at this time
assumed" (366). Despite the awkwardly passive manner in which these shifts in identity
are revealed to the reader, they are highly significant, for they speak to the ultimate
paradox of St. Leon's experience with the Philosopher's Stone: that which should have
reconsolidated St. Leon's sense of identity and public image, in the form of fortifying his
financial situation and allowing him to reassume his elevated rank in society, actually
causes him to lose both of these things-in this case, in the most obvious form of his
family name. In this sense, St. Leon does not just lose his family and his moral bearings
through his supernatural "experiment." He quite literally loses a fundamental element of
his selfhood-his identity as symbolized by his aristocratic name. St. Leon does not
meditate on this loss. Indeed, he seems to regard such name changes as a necessary
reality of his woeful situation. But, for a man so committed to the preservation of his
family honour and so driven to cultivate his public image and "fame"-both for himself
and for his progeny-such sacrifices of external identity must have been acutely felt.
In addition to adopting various pseudonyms along his travels, St. Leon, after his
escape from the Spanish Inquisitors and their planned Auto da Fe, visits his daughters
incognito by assuming the costume and habits of a traveling Armenian merchant. Like
Caleb, whose disguises also involve the adoption of "othered" identities (in Caleb's case,
those of a Jew and an Irish beggar), St. Leon assumes the position of a cultural outsider in
his first significant human encounter after his escape. That St. Leon makes this visit
disguised as an Eastern "other" speaks to his complete alienation both from the domestic
order which his daughters inhabit and from the social and political structures of western
Europe. When first settling his daughters on his estate in France, St. Leon had
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emphasized to them that their parting was a final one and that "they should speak and
think of [him] as dead" (303). It is during this visit, however, that St. Leon fulfills his
earlier injunction and quite literally "writes" the narrative of his own death.
In his role as Armenian merchant-and "friend" of the "late" St. Leon-he informs
his daughters of their father's death two years prior. St. Leon's tale serves a pragmatic
function in allowing him to clear up unfavorable rumours regarding the family patriarch
and honourably bestow on his daughters his entire estate. On another level, however, his
narrative also enables him to indulge his vanity by witnessing the effects which the news
of his demise produces on his two daughters. Indeed, St. Leon goes even further than
simply narrating the details of his own death. He manipulates his daughter Louisa's
sensibilities by recounting the intimate details of her childhood experiences in such a way
as to produce heightened emotional response. He describes his actions to the reader:
From time to time I reminded her of particulars that it was scarcely
possible any one but her father should know; I conjured up past scenes; I
made all the revolutions of her youth pass successively in review before
her; I touched all the pulses of her soul. Sometimes she was fixed in mute
astonishment at the exactness of my information, and was ready to do me
homage as some aerial genius, who condescended to clothe himself in this
earthly figure; at other times astonishment was swallowed up in feeling,
her soul dissolved in tenderness, and she appeared ready to faint into my
arms. (357)
"Urged by an irresistible impulse to practise [...] upon the feelings of her virtuous mind"
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(356), St. Leon shapes his daughter's affections in a display that gratifies his vanity. Just
as he is a conjurer of the alchemical arts, St. Leon becomes in this scene a magician of the
past, an "aerial genius" "conjur[ing] up past scenes" in order to witness the effect on his
daughter's sensibilities. In this way, St. Leon is able to satisfy a vain need to witness his
daughter's grief for a father she believes is dead, and this manipulation of emotion
proves, at least initially, to be quite fulfilling: "It is scarcely possible to depict the
pleasurable sensations I drew from these intercourses [....] I felt sometimes as if I could
have wasted ages in this sort of gratification" (357).
St. Leon's game, however, is a dangerous one, and vanity, initially appeased, soon
grows dissatisfied as the passage of time tempers his daughters' emotional responses. As
he confesses to the reader, "it happens to few men to witness the manner in which the
story of their own deaths is received. If it did, I believe we all of us have enough of
vanity and personal feeling, however sincere a grief might show itself in the demeanour
of survivors, to find it falling short of our appetites and demand" (359). Although his
daughters grieve him with an appropriate measure of "decorum and sensibility," St. Leon
nevertheless finds it an "unpleasing reflection [...] thus to have occasion to gauge their
love, and to say, This is the exact measure of their affection" (359). St. Leon's
disappointed vanity perhaps speaks to his anxiety over the larger implications of his
"death," in that this symbolic demise represents the actual demise of his social
identity-his ambitions, fame, and public self. In this sense, his "death" functions as
another symbol of the literal demise of his public identity, as he sacrifices not just his
name in this case, but his very earthly existence.
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St. Leon's "death" in this scene can thus be read as the culminating act in the
"social death" which he has been experiencing since his acceptance of the stranger's gifts.
As numerous critics of the novel have pointed out, St. Leon's immortality alienates him
from the most fundamental experience of humanity-death-and this alienation renders him
unable to forge and sustain meaningful connections with friends and family, This leads to
a kind of "social death," as Collings puts it (863). Like both Caleb and Fleetwood, St.
Leon yearns for the comforts of friendship (367), but he repeatedly finds that his
forbidden knowledge precludes him from enjoying the benefits of meaningful sociality.
After his estrangement from the Denison family, Caleb ponders the extent of his
alienation from society-"how completely I was cut off from the whole human species"
(408). "Solitude, separation, banishment! These are words often in the mouths of human
beings," laments Caleb. "But few men except myself have felt the full latitude of their
meaning" (408). It becomes clear that Godwin intended to portray in St. Leon one of
those "few men" who experiences the "full latitude" of total social alienation. Moreover,
while St. Leon's "social death" produces acute feelings of despair and loneliness, it also
jeopardizes the very foundations of his sense of self. Organized around the social
narratives of wealth, rank, and public "fame," St. Leon's very selfhood is profoundly
threatened by the sort of "social death" he experiences. Whereas he had dreamed in his
youth of playing a starring role in the "theatre of glory," he is now relegated to the
position of "mere spectator of the busy scenes that passed around [him]" (304).
While visiting his mother's tomb, just prior to his final meeting with his
daughters, St. Leon is overcome by the gravity of his failures in the light of his mother's
deathbed command to cultivate public honour and glory:
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Why, oh why, as it had been with my great forefathers, was it not a
moment of exultation to me, when I thus feelingly saluted the shade of a
parent! He that exults in such an hour, must feel that he has illustrated his
birth, and honoured his progenitors. I had done nothing of this: I was an
exile on the face of the earth, had acquired no trophies, and accumulated
no fame. I had none to honour, none even to know me; I had no family, I
had no friend! These bitter recollections started up in array before me, and
cut me to the heart. The spirit of my mother frowned upon her son; and I
returned along the path by which I came, disgraced and disconsolate.
(351)
As an exile, with no "trophies" or "fame," and having proven himself an unworthy
successor to his ancestors' glory and aristocratic heritage, St. Leon is completely without
the reference points around which he had always organized his sense of identity. Without
these signifiers of the Symbolic Order-name, rank, "fame," a publicly recognized place in
society-St. Leon experiences a literal "Lack"-an emptiness of the self that increasingly
renders him a spectral figure. His emptiness, however, had always formed a latent part of
his existence, as his weak sense of self had left him unable from his earliest youth to
cultivate any clear sense of his identity independent of the codes underpinning his social
position as aristocratic knight.
Indeed, when later reflecting on his first encounters with the stranger, St. Leon
represents his younger self as a hollow figure in need of new life. When the stranger
tempted me with his "gifts," writes St. Leon, it was as if "he breathed into me the restless

sentiment of ambition" (335). Although one can surely argue that the stranger merely
stoked a fire that was always smoldering beneath the surface of St. Leon's humble
domesticity, the metaphor of animation is striking, for it speaks to the way in which the
stranger grants an empty St. Leon new life, a new earthly existence founded on the
possibilities of wealth and fame. The image of the stranger as giver of new life becomes
increasingly complicated as St. Leon's tragic story unfolds and his new-found identity is
gradually subsumed within the narratives of the stranger's history. St. Leon despairs that
his tragic experiences increasingly seem to evoke those of the stranger. Indeed, the
"dark" and "ambiguous" nature of his existence already mirrors the shroud of mystery
which enveloped Zampieri. St. Leon ultimately comes to regard himself as a sort of
"double" for the stranger, his own identity and sense of self completely subsumed within
the stranger's previous existence: "I understood continually more and more of the
mysterious and unuttered history, of the stranger who died in the summer-house of the
lake of Constance," laments St. Leon. "I found that I was only acting over again what he
had experienced before me" (335). Rather than allowing him to refine his sense of
individual worth through public honour and social acclaim, the "gifts" of the stranger
instead relegate him to a base communal existence of shared suffering.
The image of St. Leon as double to the stranger prefigures the more significant
narrative of the doppelgdnger which unfolds in the last chapters of St. Leon's history. In
the final pages of the text, St. Leon writes of his unlikely reunion with his long-estranged
son, Charles, a reunion which reinvigorates him with a new mission in life. Released
from yet another period of lengthy confinement at the hands of a cruel tormenter who

127
misunderstands his true nature and motives, St. Leon resolves to adopt a new selfeffacing role as the "unknown benefactor" of his son (413): "I instantly resolved to devote
myself to [Charles's] service, and to place all my enjoyment in the contemplation of his
happiness, and the secret consciousness of promoting it" (413). St. Leon sees his new
resolution as completely selfless relative to his earlier fantasy of self-aggrandizement as
the "saviour" of Hungary. "Here I pursued no delusive meteor of fame," argues St. Leon.
"The very essence of my project lay in its obscurity" (415). It is significant that for St.
Leon such "obscurity" now seems to come quite easily, as if the taint of "mystery"
enveloping him has erased any semblance of genuine identity. As he laments, "I
considered my own existence as blasted; and I could therefore find nothing better than to
forget myself in my son" (413).
Although St. Leon regards his self-effacement as an entirely selfless act-"I would
forget and trample upon every personal concern, and be the victim and the sacrifice, if
need were, of the happiness of my child" (413)-the language surrounding his declarations
suggests a more complicated personal investment in his resolution to act as the "unknown
benefactor" to his son. He seems to regard himself as an inevitable cipher in this
resolution-vowing to "forget" his own identity in that of Charles, and constructing his
own selfhood as the potential "sacrifice" to his son's-but he cannot of course remain a
vacuum: he must replace his "sacrificed" self with something else, and that something
else quickly becomes the identity of his son. Tellingly, St. Leon decides to "lay aside the
name of Chatillon," and assume the new persona of Henry D'Aubigny, even before he is
apprised of Charles's animosity towards Chatillon, the "rich stranger of Buda" (413).
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Such an act suggests a deliberate attempt at self-fashioning purely for the sake of creating
a new identity. Moreover, even as he takes on the external persona of D'Aubigny, St.
Leon is vowing to "forget [him]self in [his] son," a turn of phrase which suggests a larger
process of immersing himself in the identity and subjectivity of Charles. Indeed, in the
final chapters of his narrative, St. Leon becomes, in both a literal and a symbolic sense,
Charles's double, his doppelgdnger, a role which allows the embattled and world-weary
alchemist to live vicariously through his son and which furnishes him with the
opportunity for moral redemption.
The image of the doppelgdnger immediately emerges in the text after St. Leon's
reunion with Charles. After he is taken into the folds of his son's military encampment,
St. Leon is given clothes "from the stock of [his] son," and the clothes, coupled with the
uncanny similarity of their physical features, causes many in the camp to comment on the
"striking resemblance" between Charles and the new arrival (414). As St. Leon himself
tells the reader, "the coincidence of our features was so great, that, had we passed through
a strange place in each other's company, I should infallibly have been regarded as his
younger brother" (414). After "Henry D'Aubigny" represents himself as a young knight
on a quest to rid Hungary of the Turks, Charles declares that a "powerful sympathy"
unites them, in that they are both Frenchmen and "soldier[s] of fortune" (414). '"Our
fortunes [] have been in a considerable degree similar,'" observes Charles (416). The
similarity of their situations, combined with the "fraternal resemblance" noticed by even
the most "inattentive spectator" (416), produces a powerful bond of communion between
the two. "We were in a manner inseparable," effuses St. Leon (416).
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Although St. Leon is seen in the light of a younger "brother" to Charles, in reality,
their relationship is more paternal than fraternal, Charles-the son-acting as the fatherfigure to the younger and more "vulnerable" D'Aubigny: Acting as his '"better genius'"
and '"Mentor"' (416), Charles offers St. Leon both guidance and protection, "initiat[ing]
[him] in the science of war" and "plac[ing] [him] immediately by his side" when facing
potential danger (416). Such a paternal bond reverses the biological patterns of their
relationship, so that Charles assumes the mantle of his father's role while St. Leon adopts
the identity of Charles. (One may recall that it was one of St. Leon's earliest fantasies,
immediately after acquiring the Philosopher's Stone, to act as the "instructor of
[Charles's] youth, and his pattern in feats of war" (191).) In a passage of striking irony,
Charles laments his existence as an isolated "exile," completely oblivious to the fact that
his experience and lament so strongly mirror the reality of his father's fate: '"I am alone
in the world. I have no father, no mother, and no brethren. I am an exile from my own
country, and cut off for ever from those of my own lineage and blood,'" he cries to St.
Leon (417).
If St. Leon is like the son in this relationship, he is also very much the father, as
evidenced by the intertextual similarities between St. Leon and Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein. In particular, the chase sequence described at the end of St. Leon's
narrative prefigures the well-known pursuit of the Creature by Dr. Frankenstein in his
daughter's novel. In that classic gothic tale, published nineteen years after St. Leon,
Frankenstein pursues his Creature across the arctic landscape, intent on destroying the
"filthy daemon to whom [he] had given life" (103). As the "creator and source" of a
"new species" (82), Frankenstein is the generative force responsible for the existence of
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the Creature, and he thus assumes, in many critical readings of the novel, a parental (both
maternal and paternal) role in relation to his monstrous "son."
Moreover, in addition to acting as Frankenstein's progeny, the Creature also
functions as the Doctor's doppelgdnger, a motif that harks back to Godwin's exploration
of this theme in St. Leon. Like Frankenstein, who resolves to "trace the steps" of his
elusive "son" and "double" by "follow[ing] the windings of the Rhone" (224-25), St.
Leon hunts his son Charles, "pursu[ing] his steps" as his chase is similarly structured
"along the course" of a major river, the Danube (440). Likewise, while Frankenstein
"ever followed in [the Creature's] track" (225), St. Leon is "continually in [the] track" of
Charles, but is unable to "overtake" him (440). As the tormented (and tormenting)
doppelgdnger of Charles, St. Leon frantically pursues the son who functions as both a
father to him and as his uncanny double. As the tortured, hunted wanderer, Charles again
mirrors the position of his father, who has been hounded from state to state and who has
never attained peace since his "exile" began.
'"You haunt my steps,'" Charles accuses St. Leon when he is finally reunited with
his hated rival at the end of the novel (445), and this statement aptly evokes the spectral
nature of St. Leon's position in his own text. The doppelgdnger motif which unfolds in
the final chapters of the text symbolizes St. Leon's desire to "lose" himself-his own
identity and subjective experience-in his son. "I cannot describe how my soul yearned
towards this my only son," he declares to the reader upon being reunited with Charles
(412), and the rest of his history details the attempts of a father "eager to dive into [the]
soul" of his son (438). Of course, St. Leon's tragic history has made him all too aware of
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the possibility of "forgetting" oneself in the identity, or "soul," of another. In the final
pages of his story, he laments that his experiences have forced him to become an
"equivocal character, assuming different names, and wandering over the world with
different pretences" (447). None of these names, however, or these pretences, yield St.
Leon what he most craves-fame, honour, and both public and moral approbation. Indeed,
his "equivocal" character has granted him nothing but dishonour, infamy, and
persecution.
It is therefore ironic that the "equivocal" nature of his existence proves to be both
his tragic flaw and his saving grace. St. Leon's "equivocal" character is rooted in a
childhood mis-education emphasizing the "public" at the expense of the private self, and
his consequent need for public validation renders him particularly vulnerable to the
seductive allure of the Philosopher's Stone. However, in an ironic reversal, St. Leon's
weak sense of identity is perhaps precisely what allows him to "lose" himself in his
son-to "dive into his soul" and achieve a sort of moral redemption by living vicariously
through Charles's honourable public image, his moral rectitude, and his domestic
happiness.
Through Charles, St. Leon is thus able to construct a new "self'-a more
honourable and noble self, one who succeeds where St. Leon has failed. It is thus quite
fitting that the text ends with a salute to the "hero" of the tale-Charles, who in St. Leon's
estimation is "as near the climax of dignity and virtue as the frailty of our nature will
admit" (449). While St. Leon seemingly consoles himself with the fact that he is the
"hero's father" (449), this consolation perhaps functions as nothing more than a red
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herring: his symbolic communion with Charles has granted him both moral redemption
and-more significantly-the chance to reinscribe himself back into his own history as the
true "hero" of his tale.

133
Forming Her to His Mind: Fleetwood's Authorship of Consumption
In Caleb Williams, Caleb reflects on his authorial project as a form of masochism.
After recounting a number of his initial misfortunes, the young man admits that
consolation, through pain, was a primary object in choosing to record his history. "One
of the motives which induced me to the penning of this narrative was to console myself in
my insupportable distress," writes Caleb. "I derive a melancholy pleasure from dwelling
upon the circumstances which imperceptibly paved the way to my ruin" (200).
Godwin revisits this trope in his 1805 novel, Fleetwood: or, The New Man of
Feeling. There are a number of moments in that text when Casimir Fleetwood, the
narrator and autobiographical subject of the narrative, constructs his authorship as a
masochistic act. "The proper topic of the narrative I am writing is the record of my
errors," he asserts at the opening of his memoir, and, "to write it, is the act of my
penitence and humiliation" (59). Later, after narrating a particularly painful section
detailing the sexual debaucheries of younger days spent at the Parisian court, he contrasts
the catharsis often achieved by writing with the pain engendered by his own composition:
There are some kinds of writing in which the mind willingly engages, in
which, while we hold the pen in our hand, we seem to unburden the
sentiments of our soul, and our habitual feelings cause us to pour out on
the paper a prompt and unstudied eloquence. Here, on the contrary, I have
held myself to my task with difficulty, and often with my utmost effort I
have scarcely written down a page a day on the ungrateful subject.
(115-16)
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Fleetwood's masochistic conception of his authorship is representative of the novel's
larger discursive concern with pain and the image of the feeling body. Steven Bruhm, for
example, in one of the few critical readings of the text, has explored the novel's anxious
concern with the epistemological reliability of guilt that inscribes (or, in terms of the
thematic development of the novel's plot, fails to inscribe) itself on the feeling body
through torture. Indeed, a certain theme of sadism also pervades the text, in that
Fleetwood's position as masochistic writer is also inextricably bound up with the sadistic
tendencies of his authorship, his narration of his life story.
Most early reviews of Godwin's novel highlighted the rather vexing nature of a
narrative in which the misanthropic narrator seems mired in self-absorbed introspection
which does not, strictly speaking, further the development of the plot. As Sir Walter
Scott complained in an 1805 review of the novel, it is only in the third volume that
"something of a regular story commences," the preceding two volumes consisting of little
more than "laboured extravagance of sentiment [...] attached to [] ordinary occurrences"
(Graham 259). Although autobiography, by definition, is preoccupied with the narration
of the self, Fleetwood's memoirs seem to display an almost pathological self-absorption.
In his subtitle to the novel, Godwin calls Fleetwood the "New Man of Feeling," and
sensibility, as we will see, is central to the narcissism that comes to inform his character.
Rousseau may have regarded the solitude and isolation of country life as fundamental to
the development of Emile as the ideal "natural" man, but Godwin seems to offer in this
novel a cautionary tale depicting the dangers of excessive solitude in youth.
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Indeed, social isolation is the foundation for Fleetwood's childhood "miseducation." Secluded from society, and denied the harmonizing benefits of interactions
with peers, Fleetwood experiences a perversion of the sensibility that so strongly marks
his character. In chapter one, we saw how Falkland's dangerous brand of inverted
sensibility led to a moral degeneration in his character that destroyed his potential for
benevolence. In Fleetwood, we encounter an even more dramatic pattern of inverted
sensibility, as the protagonist's emotional sensitivity is perverted into a form of feeling at
odds with the philanthropic vision of sensibility described by Godwin in the Enquirer.
As we will see, Fleetwood's sensibility ultimately manifests itself in a particular kind of
self-absorption that alienates him from society and turns him into a misanthrope.
In particular, this chapter charts how Fleetwood's earliest constructions of
identity, and the masculine sense of self these constructions helped to consolidate, arose
out of a destructive authorial impulse that ultimately channelled his larger misanthropic
tendencies into a more focussed misogyny. Fleetwood's obsessive self-narration-his
neurotic focus on the development and operation of his own mind and the process of his
own identity construction-renders everything and everyone in his narrative subordinate to
the demands of his own subjectivity. As we will soon see, a displacement occurs in
Fleetwood's psychological development, whereby his youthful imaginative colonization
of a feminized natural world initiates larger patterns of consumption and control in his
adult relationships with women. Fleetwood's construction of himself as masochistic
author, therefore, is ironically appropriate, for the metaphor is both the expression of the
sadistic tendencies informing the text and a description of the means by which this sadism
is enacted.
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"Castles in the Air"
As the novel's subtitle indicates, Fleetwood is the "New Man of Feeling," an
appellation that signals Godwin's reliance on, as well as his significant departures from,
popular eighteenth-century cultural and literary conventions of sensibility. In their
introduction to the Broadview edition of the novel, Gary Handwerk and A. A. Markley
describe the text as a "new experiment in fiction" (9), and most critics of the novel, both
contemporary and modern, have similarly emphasized the anomalous nature of the
narrative, specifically its radical reformulation of the sentimental tradition. In 1805, the
Critical Review claimed to be "at a loss to conceive why a man, who turns misanthrope
from disappointment, who is most savage in jealousy without caring to ascertain the
cause of it, can be called the New Man of Feeling, unless in absolute contradistinction to
the old" (Graham 257). Similarly, Scott, in reviewing the novel for the Edinburgh
Review, rejected Godwin's positioning of his hero as a man of sentiment, asserting that "a
man who is transported with rage, with despair, with anger, and all the furious impulses
of passion, upon the most common occurrences of life, is not a man of sentiment, but a
madman" (Graham 259). "Far from sympathizing with his feelings," argues Scott, "we
are only surprised at his having the liberty of indulging them beyond the precincts of
Bedlam" (Graham 259).
For B.J. Tysdahl, the novel's originality lies in this radical rejection of the
conventional association between sensibility and philanthropy. As Tysdahl points out,
the traditional eighteenth-century novel of sensibility assumed the benevolent nature of
humanity and put forth a psychological model in which the cultivation of heightened
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emotional response fosters increased moral virtue and philanthropic feeling in a suffering
protagonist (100-06). Sensibility was thus constructed as a process which would make
one a better person, but, as we see in Fleetwood, this theoretical yoking of emotional
sensitivity with moral sentiment and behaviour is directly challenged. Indeed, in
Fleetwood we encounter a man whose heightened emotional awareness renders him a
self-proclaimed misanthropist ill-suited for both domestic and public life.
Godwin's depiction of Fleetwood's childhood is influenced by the Rousseauvian
celebration of country life as the ideal space for the development of "natural" man. In
Emile, Rousseau praises the salutary benefits of rural life by highlighting the degenerate
effects of urban existence. Man's physical health, argues the philosopher, suffers from
the unsanitary conditions of the city, and his moral and spiritual development are
similarly threatened by the overcrowding and corruption inherent in this urban space:
Men are not made to be crowded together in ant-hills, but scattered over
the earth to till it. The more they are massed together, the more corrupt
they become. Disease and vice are the sure results of over-crowded cities.
Of all creatures man is least fitted to live in herds. Huddled together like
sheep, men would very soon die. Man's breath is fatal to his fellows. This
is literally as well as figuratively true. {Emile 26)
"Men are devoured by our towns," Rousseau continues. "In a few generations the race
dies out or becomes degenerate; it needs renewal, and it is always renewed from the
country" {Emile 26).
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While rural space functions as an antidote to the"foul air of [] crowded cities"
(Emile 26), it is preferable that natural man should never need this antidote at all, that he
should, from the outset, be raised and educated far from the corrupting influences of the
city. In the country, the child can be isolated from the enslaving effects of social
institutions, and can be taught complete independence and self-sufficiency. He will be
"educated for himself alone," asserts Rousseau (Emile 9), and will "live[] for himself as
a complete "unit," a self-sustaining "whole" (Emile 7). Rousseau's emphasis on the
complete self-sufficiency of natural man implies a certain estrangement from society and
peers. Of course, Emile is not completely isolated: he has a tutor who plays the dual roles
of teacher and friend, and his education is structured around a series of encounters with
other individuals, like the gardener (Emile 62-63) and the conjuror (Emile 135-38). In
reality, however, Emile's "friendship" with the tutor is not the experience of genuine
social interaction with a true peer, but a scripted series of highly structured pedagogical
exchanges, and his few encounters with other individuals are similarly controlled by the
tutor. As Rousseau himself admits, the rough and simple nature of a village environment
is ideal for the education of natural man, as the tutor "will have much more control over
the things he wishes to show the child" (Emile 59). In Rousseau's educational model,
therefore, the student is socially isolated through geography as well as pedagogy: the
geographic seclusion of country life allows the tutor to control his student's interactions
to the point that unmediated social exchange becomes all but impossible.
For Godwin, the lessons learned from early, regular, and unscripted social
exchanges with peers are central to the development of morality and virtue. As he argued
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in the Enquirer, virtue and benevolent behaviour are the direct results of a developed
sensibility that allows one to sympathize with another's emotional responses and alleviate
his or her suffering through "the practice of minute attentions" (Enquirer 334). It is thus
imperative that children, from a young age, be exposed to a wide range of social
interactions with their peers in order to stimulate the development of the feelings. "The
social affections are the chief awakeners of man," he argues in the Enquirer (56-57),
declaring a preference for public education over private on the basis that "there can be
little true society, where the disparity of disposition is so great as between a boy and his
preceptor" (Enquirer 58).
Children who are raised in isolation-or, alternatively, children who interact almost
exclusively with a Rousseauvian tutor-are therefore denied opportunities to forge the peer
relationships necessary for successful socialization. "There is no motive more powerful
in its operations upon the human mind, than that which originates in sympathy," declares
Godwin.
A child must labour under peculiar disadvantages, who is turned loose
among a multitude of other children, and left to make his way as he can,
with no one strongly to interest himself about his joys or his sorrows, and
no one eminently concerned as to whether he makes any improvement or
not. In this unanimating situation, alone in the midst of a crowd, there is
great danger that he should become sullen and selfish. Knowing nothing
of his species, but from the austerity of discipline or the shock of
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contention, he must be expected to acquire a desperate sort of firmness and
inflexibility. (Enquirer 56)
This description evokes the situation of Fleetwood, who enters Oxford a "sullen
and selfish" youth after sixteen years of social and geographic isolation. As I argued in
chapter one, Godwin was quite uneasy with certain aspects of Rousseau's pedagogical
model, and we find in Fleetwood an example of his resistance. For Rousseau, childhood
isolation was fundamental to the development of natural man. In this novel, however,
Godwin offers a story that foregrounds the central role early socialization plays in the
development of the virtuous and benevolent subject. Raised in the rugged seclusion of
North Wales, Fleetwood has no peers and few social connections, and he enters Oxford
with no real experience of fellowship. His father is very loving, "tender and indulgent"
(53), but ultimately unavailable to his son on any deep emotional level. Existing in a
perpetual state of grief for Fleetwood's dead mother, and "enamoured of solitude," his
father passes "whole days and nights in study and contemplation" (53). In this respect, he
is like Audley Mandeville, the paternal figure in Godwin's next novel, who also
withdraws socially and emotionally after experiencing the death of the woman he loves.
Fleetwood takes after his father in being a "lover of the sublime and romantic
features of nature" (53), and his immersion in these scenes cultivates an emotional
energy, an intellectual and psychological "wildness" (53), that signals his heightened
capacity for emotional response. Fleetwood's sensibility is perverted, however, by the
isolation of his childhood. As I argued in chapter one, Godwin firmly places sensibility
within a social context. In Godwin's terms, sensibility is best understood as an

interactive relationship between the feeling subject and society-an emotional response
activated by exposure to another's feelings, a response which then manifests itself in
outward extensions of philanthropic behaviour (Enquirer 326-36). Sensibility, therefore,
is only healthy for the subject (and beneficial for society) as long as it functions within
this milieu of interpersonal exchange; sensibility without this element of social
reciprocity devolves into a perverted form of feeling. With no companions save an
emotionally absent father, a dog, and a tutor for whom he feels little affection and no
respect, Fleetwood cannot engage in the reciprocity needed to properly shape his
developing sensibility. The proper pattern of sensibility is therefore reversed:
Fleetwood's acute feeling is channeled inwards and feeds his "intellectual luxuries" (59).
In Fleetwood, sensibility renders the feeling subject negligent, rather than
solicitous, of others, and turns him into a misanthrope with little potential for
benevolence. In the opening pages of the novel, Fleetwood acknowledges that his selfabsorption may lead the reader to deem him "insensible to the miseries of man" (59). On
the contrary, argues Fleetwood, "nothing was squalid, loathsome, and disgusting in my
eyes, where it was possible for me to useful" (59). Indeed, he dwells in great length on
his "beneficence and charities" (59). "I never shrank from the presence of calamity," he
declares. "From the liberal allowance with which my father supplied me, I relieved its
wants" (59). He insists that "the generous sympathy which animated [his] charitable
deeds was pure" (60). "In every act of benevolence," argues Fleetwood, "it was the love
of another, and not of myself, that prompted my deed" (60). "I experienced a
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disinterested joy in human relief and human happiness, independently of the question
whether I had been concerned in producing it," he writes (60).
These sentiments are undercut, however, through the very language in which
Fleetwood disavows his self-interest. There is a "very subtle and complicated association
in human feelings," he admits (60). The prospect of his own "gratification" may not
initially motivate him to perform philanthropic acts, but the later recollection of those acts
certainly gratifies his vanity: "When the season of retrospect arrived, I exulted in my own
benevolence, from the divine consciousness that, while I had been most busily engaged in
the task, my own gratification was forgotten" (60). Moreover, he recognizes that these
later "exultations" shaped his future behaviour: "There is no doubt [] that the honourable
character I exhibited on these occasions prompted me the more joyfully to seek their
repetition. Humanity and self-complacency were distinct causes of my beneficence; but
the latter was not less powerful than the former in nourishing it into a habit" (60).
Although he refers to it as an "execrable doctrine," he nevertheless acknowledges the
principle that "our best actions are only more subtle methods by which self-love seeks its
gratification" (60).
This principle of self-love informs Fleetwood's dramatic rescue of William, the
shepherd boy who almost drowns trying to save a lamb that had fallen off a mountain
ridge into the river. While self-interest does not ostensibly influence Fleetwood's
behaviour during the scene of the rescue, it takes centre stage immediately after. The
peasants are "tumultuous in their expressions of gratitude, " Fleetwood tells the reader
(63), which motivates him to regard himself as their "patron and a preserver" (64).
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Indeed, the happiness of the peasant family delights him not for its own sake, but for its
effect on his vanity: "When I observed the degree of content which prevailed among
them, when I witnessed the effusions of their honest esteem and affection, my heart
whispered me, "This would not have existed but for me!'" (64). We see here Fleetwood's
self-absorbed preoccupation with his own self-image. His heightened emotional response
may drive him to perform courageous or benevolent acts, but these acts are only valued
for their ability to sustain Fleetwood's narcissism.
In her examination of the novel, Mona Scheuermann considers the causal
relationship between sensibility, misanthropy, and Fleetwood's formative years. Like a
number of other critics, Scheuermann contends that Fleetwood offers a portrait of a man
irrevocably flawed by a childhood spent in excessive solitude, a childhood that "lacked a
pattern of adequate social intercourse" ("Study of Mind" 19). As a result of this social
deprivation, argues Scheuermann, Fleetwood is mired in a narcissistic self-absorption that
renders him literally unable to make "a total human connection with anyone" ("Study of
Mind" 20). Fleetwood's misanthropy, however, stems not so much from an inability to
make interpersonal connections with the social world around him; rather, it is the precise
nature of the connections that he must, inevitably, forge with his social environment that
produces such conflict and dissatisfaction with humanity. More precisely, it is
Fleetwood's initial response to a physically absent, yet all too real, social world, coupled
with his imaginative consumption of a natural environment all too present in its
overpowering sublimity, that formulates his primal connection with society and humanity.

In the first chapter of the novel, Fleetwood meditates in great detail on the natural
beauty and sublime scenery of the childhood home he shares with his aged father in
Merionethshire, North Wales. This extended description significantly associates the
sublimity of Merionethshire with creative freedom and increased sensibility. As
Fleetwood recalls,
I had few companions. The very situation which gave us a full enjoyment
of the beauties of nature, inevitably narrowed both the extent and variety
of our intercourse with our own species. My earliest years were spent
among mountains and precipices, amidst the roaring of the ocean and the
dashing of waterfalls. A constant familiarity with these objects gave a
wildness to my ideas, and an uncommon seriousness to my temper. (53)
The rugged beauty of North Wales cultivates a similar mental "wildness" in young
Fleetwood, as well as a keen awareness of the imaginative inspiration offered by the
"grand and savage objects around [him]" (55). Fleetwood's sensitivity to the world of
nature evokes the poetic philosophy of William Wordsworth, and a number of critics
have pointed to Wordsworth's influence on the man who was once a great influence on
Wordsworth.
For Gary Kelly, Fleetwood's Wordsworthian undertones situate the novel within
the larger framework of Romantic ideology, and demonstrate Godwin's "transition to
Romanticism" from his earlier jacobinism (English Jacobin Novel 240). Tysdahl goes
even further in foregrounding the extent of the poet's influence on the text, arguing that
the first chapters of Fleetwood read like a "prose imitation of Wordsworth" (117).

Indeed, like Fleetwood, the Wordsworthian Poet is a "New Man of Feeling": "All good
poetry," argued Wordsworth in his 1802 Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, "is the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings," and good poetry-"to which any value can be
attached"-can only be produced by a man "possessed of more than usual organic
sensibility" (358). Good poetry, for Wordsworth, is thus the product of a unique
sensibility coupled with the process of reflection-the Poet must have "thought long and
deeply" about his emotional responses (358). "Our continued influxes of feeling are
modified and directed by our thoughts," argues Wordsworth, "which are indeed the
representation of all our past feelings" (358).
With his acute emotional sensitivity and unique capacity for feeling, Fleetwood is
very much this Wordsworthian Man of Feeling. Like Wordsworth's Poet, Fleetwood's
imagination is both inspired by, and structured around, his interactions with the natural
world, a paradigm that situates the novel within a discursive framework associating
Romanticism with nature. As Anne K. Mellor has argued, however, the representation of
nature in what she calls "canonical" Romantic texts (those major poetic works by the
"Big Six"-William Blake, Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lord Byron, Percy
Bysshe Shelley, and John Keats) "masks a sexual politics" that is both misogynist and
self-serving:
Nature is usually gendered feminine by these six Romantic poets who
adopt the traditional cultural metaphors of Mother Earth, Dame Nature,
Lady Bountiful. But by identifying nature as the external objective world
which the self-conscious subject must penetrate, possess and interpret
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[...] these poets often go further than previous poets in denying to Nature
her own authority. (21)
By feminizing nature, canonical Romanticism thus constructs a model of subjectivity
organized around the binary opposition of I and Other, where the male subject can only
assert his power at the expense of a female Other so often troped as Nature. This
paradigm, argues Mellor, forms the basis of an ideological discourse she calls "masculine
Romanticism." As we shall see later, Fleetwood, as a Wordsworthian Man of Feeling, is
implicated in a discourse of "masculine Romanticism" that strives to control, possess, and
appropriate feminine nature.
Although Fleetwood will eventually construct himself as the master of his natural
surroundings, his appreciation of the Welsh scenery around his childhood home is
initially troubled by the psychological anxieties that aesthetic theory associates with the
sublime. As Edmund Burke theorized in his 1757 treatise, A Philosophical Enquiry into
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, one's experience of the sublime is,
by necessity, bound up with the sensations of "pain" and "danger" and "operates in a
manner analogous to terror" (58): "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of
pain and danger; that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about
terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime;
that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling"
(58). Furthermore, this "terror" is a direct result of the fear that is engendered when one
encounters the unfamiliar and the unknown, the "obscure": "To make any thing very
terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any
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danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes"
(Philosophical Enquiry 99). Implicit in Burke's theorization of the sublime is the
potential threat to the self aroused when one encounters such terror-inspiring sublimity.
Such scenes "excite the ideas of pain and danger," and we consequently fear for our
safety in the midst of such natural spaces.
For Burke, this threat of self-annihilation is defused by the subject's eventual
appreciation of the sublime as the ultimate manifestation of divine power. For Immanuel
Kant, the fear of the sublime is also defused, but not through recognizing the existence of
the deity responsible for such scenes, as in the Burkean sublime. Rather, Kant places the
sublime in a subordinate position to the perceiving subject, who possesses the power to
intellectually transcend the sublime scenes of nature. For Kant, the power of the sublime
is ultimately located in the "forces of the soul":
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piled
up the vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all
their violence of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track
[...] and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in
comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all
the more attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, because
they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover
within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to
measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature. (91)
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The "immeasurableness of nature" may throw into relief "our own limitation" in
comparison, but, through the intellectual act of reflecting on nature in all its sublimity, we
discover "in our rational faculty" the potential greatness of our own minds, a greatness
that gives us a "pre-eminence over nature even in its immeasurability" (Kant 91-92).
Nature is thus subordinate to the powers of the rational mind: "In this way," argues Kant,
"external nature is not aesthetically judged as sublime in so far as it arouses fear, but
rather because it summons our power [...] to regard its might [...] as exercising over us
and our personality no such rude dominion that we should bow down before it" (92).
Nature is therefore deemed sublime "merely because it elevates the imagination to
a presentation of those cases in which the mind can come to feel the sublimity of its own
vocation even over nature" (Kant 92). In Kant's formulation of the sublime, the subject is
thus transcendent over the natural world. The sublime scenes of nature function only to
throw into relief the greater sublimity of the human mind, a sublimity which is reflected
in the intellectual processes of the rational man who engages in thoughtful consideration
of the scenes around him. As we shall see, the Kantian sublime-with its emphasis on the
subject's intellectual mastery of the external world-forms the basis of Fleetwood's
specific engagements with nature.
Empowered by the sublimity of his childhood scenes, as well as anxiously aware
of the overpowering grandeur of such scenes that threatens to extinguish the viewer's
sense of existential significance, Fleetwood strives to exert a dominance over the scenery
surrounding his North Wales home. He seeks to absorb such scenery in its entirety and
endeavours to see even beyond its scope-in short, he tries to overcome the terror brought
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on by the Burkean notion of the obscure sublime: "There was no neighbouring summit
that I did not ascend, anxious to see what mountains, valleys, rivers, and cities were
placed beyond," Fleetwood declares (54). Fleetwood differs from his aged father, who is
also a "lover of nature" (54), but one who passively witnesses it from a respectful
distance and within established boundaries: his father, Fleetwood tells the reader,
typically "mounted his horse for a tranquil excursion, and kept along the road which was
sedulously formed for the use of travellers" (54-55). In contrast, Fleetwood engages with
the natural world much more actively. In fact, Fleetwood's encounters with nature take
on the tone of aggressive colonization evocative of male sexual violence enacted on a
passive and virginal female environment: he "descended the most frightful declivities,
and often penetrated into recesses which had perhaps never before felt the presence of a
human creature" (55).
Fleetwood's developing sense of manhood is staged against, and simultaneously
cultivated by, the background of nature, but he juxtaposes his aggressive exploits with his
passive appreciation of his sublime surroundings: "Every thing, however, was not
exertion in the rambles I describe. I loitered by the side of the river, and drank in at
leisure the beauties that surrounded me" (55). Fleetwood constructs his pleasure in
passive terms-he "loitered" and enjoyed nature "at leisure"-but such passivity is undercut
by the consumptive metaphor he employs-he "drank in [...] the beauties that
surrounded" him. Again, Fleetwood's language of consumption evokes the
Wordsworthian Man of Feeling, who also experiences nature as something to be
consumed, an object to be incorporated within his own subjectivity. Indeed,
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Wordsworth's "spots of time" are envisioned in the Five-Book Prelude of 1804 as
moments which provide "nourishment" for the Poet's later imaginative acts:
There are in our existence spots of time
Which with distinct pre-eminence retain
A fructifying virtue, whence, depressed
By trivial occupations and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
(Especially the imaginative power)
Are nourished and invisibly repaired. (5. 280-86)
Likewise, in the later Thirteen-Book Prelude of 1806-07, Wordsworth continues this
construction of the Poet as a man "feeding" on the "outward face" of nature:
A meditation rose in me that night
Upon the lonely Mountain when the scene
Had pass'd away, and it appear'd to me
The perfect image of a mighty Mind,
Of one that feeds upon infinity. (13.66-70)
Mellor has pointed out that Wordsworth, in his role as a "masculine" Romanticist,
ultimately "replaces (feminine) nature with the productions of the (masculine)
imagination" (20). The "mighty Mind" of the Man of Feeling, in other words, "feeds"
upon the sublime offerings of Nature to the point that they are incorporated within the
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very subjectivity of the Poet. The "domination" of a female nature, a domination
manifested in the "awful and sublime," is thus defused and appropriated by the "mighty
Mind" of the masculine subject who recasts nature's sublimity as only the "Counterpart"
of the "glorious faculty" of his own "higher mind[]" (Prelude [1806-07] 13.76-90).
Fleetwood develops his own consumptive metaphors, describing how his
complete consumption of nature's external scenes allowed him to internalize such scenes
to the point that he becomes insensible to them:
I acquired a habit of being absent in mind from the scene which was
before my senses. I devoured at first with greedy appetite the objects
which presented themselves; but by perseverance they faded on my eye
and my ear, and I sunk into a sweet insensibility to the impressions of
external nature. The state thus produced was sometimes that which we
perhaps most exactly understand by the term reverie, when the mind has
neither action nor distinct ideas, but is swallowed up in a living death,
which, at the same time that it is indolent and inert, is not destitute of a
certain voluptuousness. (56)
While Fleetwood is initially quite stimulated by the natural scenes around him,
"devour[ing]" them with a "greedy appetite," his hunger is eventually satiated, and he
becomes "insensible" to an "external nature" which has been drained of its usefulness.
Fleetwood uses the oxymoron "living death" to describe the paradox of his psychological
position: his sensual awareness of the external scenes of nature is dead, his mind having
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consumed all that it needs of this outward stimuli to sustain its "reverie," but this
"reverie" is very much alive in its "certain voluptuousness."
"At other seasons," Fleetwood tells the reader, the "certain voluptuousness" of
this "reverie" gives way to something "more busy" and "definite" (56), that is, a
propensity for narrative, an inclination towards the creative act that results in a visionary
authorship of his own fate and identity. "I was engaged in imaginary scenes, constructed
visionary plans, and found all nature subservient to my command. I had a wife or
children, was the occupier of palaces, or the ruler of nations" (56). (Note, also, how the
domestic and quotidian in Fleetwood's "imaginary scenes"-the "wife or children" he
obtains-fall easily into the same imaginative space as larger and more recognizably
despotic forms of worldly power. These youthful fantasies foreshadow the gravity of
Fleetwood's later domestic tyranny.) This imaginative narration, this construction of
"visionary plans," gives Fleetwood an inflated sense of his own importance in the world.
More significantly, however, Fleetwood comes away from these reveries with an illusory
perception of authorial control over the narrative course of his life.1
One might argue that this sense of authorial control existed for Fleetwood solely
within the mind of the imagination and did not therefore influence the way in which he
engaged with the reality of his actual life. After all, he characterizes his youthful
imaginative indulgence as nothing more than the "idle and frivolous task of constructing
castles in the air" (56). The more reflective Fleetwood, however, describes this task as
one which was "frequently indulged" and which planted the seeds of his later
misanthropy. "The tendency," he argues,
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of this species of dreaming, when frequently indulged, is to inspire a
certain propensity to despotism, and to render him who admits it impatient
of opposition, and prepared to feel every cross accident, as a usurpation
upon his rights, and a blot upon his greatness. This effect of my early
habits I fully experienced, and it determined the colour of my riper years.
(56)
As Fleetwood describes it, "this species of dreaming" involves engaging with the natural
world in all of its sublime grandeur and systematically consuming, "drinking in"or
"devouring," the external scenes of nature so as to contain the sublime and render it, in
Burkean terms, less "obscure." This consumption of nature manifests itself in a
conscious withdrawal from the "scene which was before [his] senses" (56), a process
whereby the scenes of nature are not only interiorized by Fleetwood, but also become
dispensable and unnecessary to his "reverie." In this sense, the oxymoron "living
death"-which Fleetwood employs to describe the paradox of his mind while
contemplating nature-applies just as well to the natural scenes which bring about this
conflicting state in young Fleetwood. As Fleetwood asserts, nature is always there, alive,
"before [his] senses" (56); indeed, it is only "by perseverance" that he can will it to
"fade" on his "eye" and "ear" (56). But his insensibility to those natural scenes around
him renders them dead to him, and this metaphorical "death" of nature is, significantly,
necessary for Fleetwood's imaginative "reverie."
Fleetwood does not explicitly associate this indulgence in "reverie" with the
narrative myth-making-the construction of "castles in the air"-that occurs "at other

seasons." However, the close association of both psychological processes suggests an
interdependent relationship between the consumption of natural space and Fleetwood's
subsequent narrative indulgence. For the adult Fleetwood, such narrative indulgence
cultivated "a propensity to despotism" in his young self that left him unable to weather
the inevitable conflicts and disappointments that inform social and domestic life.
However, we can see how this "propensity" first takes its root in a consumptive
relationship with the natural world which then manifests itself in Fleetwood's despotic
construction of "castles in the air."
In Fleetwood's perception, his colonization of nature is complete: contained
through psychological internalization, the potentially unruly elements of the natural
sublime (unruly, as Burke would argue, in their "obscurity" or unknowability) are
brought under Fleetwood's controlling hand, which then writes its own narratives on the
sensory impressions provided him. In his narrative visions, Fleetwood had gloried in the
fact that he "found all nature subservient to [his] command" (56), and this sense of
subservience ultimately also applies to Fleetwood's conception of the very real world of
nature around him. Indeed, it is precisely his sense of nature's submissive "voice" that
contributes to his appreciation of its worth. Within nature, he declares, "life is every
where," and the "solitary wanderer" experiences the breath of the cattle and the speech of
the clouds, winds, and streams (54). But that "speech," however, is "dumb," the
"eloquence" of nature "unobtrusive," and the "gentle" and "kindly violence" of the
natural world can only subdue the willing (54).
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It is thus significant that Fleetwood places "cities" at the very end of the list of
entities he visually absorbs when scaling a "neighbouring summit" (54), for it speaks to
the distinct contrast between his conception of nature and his emotional response to urban
space, society, and social life:
I gazed upon the populous haunts of men as objects that pleasingly
diversified my landscape; but without the desire to behold them in nearer
view. I had a presentiment that the crowded streets and the noisy mart
contained larger materials for constituting my pain than pleasure. The
jarring sensations of men, their loud contentions, their gross pursuits, their
crafty delusions, their boisterous mirth, were objects which, even in idea,
my mind shrunk from with horror. (54)
Burke had theorized that "absolute and entire solitude, that is, the total and perpetual
exclusion from all society, is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived"
(Philosophical Enquiry 68), but Fleetwood reverses this contention and equates pain with
the world of sociality. He shrinks from any direct experience with social space,
experience that would require him to engage with the carnivalesque nature of human
interaction-its unpredictability, mutability, and deception. Where the natural world is
"subservient to [his] command," the social world, as Fleetwood seems all too aware, will
not extend the same favour. Instead, the city, which comes to symbolize the society and
sociality from which Fleetwood is gratefully excluded at this point in his life, is the site of
overwhelming sensory impressions and stimuli that refuse to be contained or internalized
into submission.
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Given this anxious response to social space, we can see how Fleetwood's
misanthropy thus stemsfroman early realization that he will not be able to exert the same
autonomous control over the social world of human interaction as he ostensibly does over
the natural environment he deems so passively receptive to his desires. Through nature,
Fleetwood is able to shape his own subjectivity and indulge in an inflated sense of his
worth and importance as a human being. Nature provides him with the raw materials to
consolidate a sense of his own masculine identity in a context of almost complete
isolation from his peers. Society-the "populous haunts of men" which horrify Fleetwood
with their noise, deception, and insistent desires contrary to his own-threatens both his
inflated ego and ultimately his very sense of self.
Indeed, his apostrophe against the city is immediately followed by a simile that
emphasizes Fleetwood's frailty in the face of conflict: "I was a spoiled child. I had been
little used to contradiction, and felt like a tender flower of the garden, which the blast of
the east wind nips, and impresses with the tokens of a sure decay" (54). Significantly,
urban space, contemplated from afar, affords Fleetwood a mild pleasure, perhaps because
the imaginative vision of the "noisy mart" throws into relief his perceived control of his
natural surroundings. The juxtaposition of urban life with nature is significant, for it
foreshadows the impending moment when Fleetwood will be compelled to enter into
social space. Upon entering Oxford, Fleetwood is, at sixteen years of age, forced to
engage with a social world that is not, like nature, "subservient to [his] command."
Fleetwood must confront a world that exists outside of his autonomous control, a world
informed by a capricious unpredictability. He initially seems lost in a world that refuses
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to offer itself up for easy consumption and narrative inscription. However, as we will
soon see, Fleetwood's response to sociality is not to submit to the realities of this social
world but, rather, to impose similar strategies of narrative control on the interpersonal
connections he must inevitably forge.
"The Theatre of Life"
From the outset, Fleetwood's entrance into social space at Oxford signals his loss
of agency. Although he "felt no strong propensity" to university, he "submitted to it" as a
thing against which "it would be useless to object" (65). As Fleetwood rightly realizes,
university life represents the impending encroachment of outside social forces on the
relatively self-contained and self-directed nature of his childhood world. In North Wales,
he had "lived in an ideal world of [his] own creation;" but this world had only been
achieved by actively cultivating an identity as "solitary savage" and "shunning" a social
world perceived as incapable of affording any kind of imaginative satisfaction (70).
Indeed, Fleetwood employs a familiar Romantic analogy to describe the psychological
tenor of a mind solely in tune with the forces of nature: "The strings of my mind, so to
express it, were tuned to too delicate and sensitive a pitch: it was an Eolian harp, upon
which the winds of heaven might 'discourse excellent music'; but the touch of a human
hand could draw from it nothing but discord and dissonance" (70).
As we have witnessed, however, this salubrious union of mind and nature was in
reality more evocative of a colonizing relationship in which the young Fleetwood
consumes the sublime scenes around him as the raw materials upon which he can
narratively inscribe his own desires. Accordingly, once he is ensconced within university

158
life at Oxford, it is precisely these sublime images of a youthfully fertile and feminized
nature he misses most-the "grand, the romantic, the pregnant, the surprising, and the
stupendous, as they display themselves in North Wales" (70). In contrast, the natural
scenery of Oxfordshire, personified by Fleetwood as an image of feminine senility-a
"toothless and palsied beldame" (70)-inspires only contempt in young Fleetwood for its
failure to offer up similar imaginative possibilities for shaping his inner visions of
identity. Furthermore, Fleetwood's ego suffers from the intrusion of autonomous beings
into his carefully manipulated and protected world: the "gownmen"-with their erratic
elbows, speech, and laughter-threaten both the tranquillity and the very stability of
Fleetwood's mind (71). "The cherished visions of my former years were broken and
scattered in a thousand fragments," laments Fleetwood in an image that conveys a keen
sense of shattered subjectivity (71).
Faced with the destruction of an identity built upon "cherished visions" that were
now, in the face of society and its intrusions, "scattered in a thousand fragments,"
Fleetwood "surrenders" to the social discourse and codes of the "gownmen" (71). He
characterizes his response in passive terms, but his strategy of "surrender" functions as an
active process of clinical and conscious observation. Like a scientist or anthropologist
surveying the behaviour of creatures unknown to him, Fleetwood adopts a pose of
studious contemplation towards the behaviour of his university peers:
I was prompted to observe these animals, so different from any that had
been before presented to my view, to study their motives, their
propensities, and their tempers, the passions of their souls, and the
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occupations of their intellect. To do this effectually, it was necessary that I
should become familiar with many, and intimate with a few. I entered
myself an associate of their midnight orgies, and selected one young
person for a friend, who kindly undertook my introduction into the world.
(72)
Note how Fleetwood dehumanizes his fellow students as "animals," constructing them as
subservient objects "presented to [his] view" and offered up for his scientific observation
and ultimate consumption. Ironically, Fleetwood soon finds upon extensive observation
that his "new associates were of the same species as [himself]" (72), a realization that
significantly underscores his lack of awareness, at least initially, regarding the
interdependent nature of observation and emulation. He confesses surprise at "how soon
[he] became like to the persons [he] had so lately wondered at and despised" (72), but his
subsequent remarks reveal the way in which he has consciously entered into, internalized,
and then performed the behavioural codes structuring social interaction at Oxford. "I hid
the qualms and apprehensiveness of my nature under a 'swashing and a martial outside'"
(73).
In his youth, Fleetwood had defused the threatening potential of the natural
scenery around him through a process of internalization and ultimate consumption. At
Oxford, he structures his social interactions around a similar consumptive model: through
clinical observation and then through a performative emulation, he internalizes the
behavioural codes of his social peers. Fleetwood is thus able to defuse his social
anxiety-the "qualms and apprehensiveness" engendered through social interaction-by
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consciously absorbing those around him and putting into service the performative
narratives structuring his social interactions with others. It is especially significant that
Fleetwood describes the nature of his social performativity at Oxford through a reference
to Shakespeare's As You Like It, for the "swashing and a martial outside" with which
Fleetwood cloaks himself speaks to the way in which such performativity offers up rich
opportunities for the narrative self-fashioning of identity. Fleetwood's youthful
consumption of nature proved fertile ground for the visionary myth-making that would
both consolidate his identity and plant the seeds of his future misanthropy. Likewise, his
consumptive approach to social life-where the performative narratives underpinning
social intercourse are available for conscious manipulation-allows him to author his own
vision of identity-to piece together the "thousand fragments" of an ego shattered by the
intrusion of social forces beyond his control.
Fleetwood's education in these matters continues once he leaves Oxford and
embarks on his first "real world" experiences while on the Parisian leg of his Grand Tour.
His observations on the Paris court are underpinned by a series of theatrical metaphors
that emphasize the inherent performance of identity in a community predicated on
inconstancy and the mutability of desire. Upon arriving in Paris, Fleetwood connects
with an old acquaintance from Oxford, Sir Charles Gleed, who is remembered by
Fleetwood as both a social and intellectual failure. Noting that Sir Charles Gleed "was
received upon a very different footing at Paris, from what he had been at Oxford" (95),
Fleetwood asserts that the very artifice of polite society seems to provide both the
opportunity and the means by which a dullard like Gleed assumes an "artificial character"

161
and "plays his part upon the theatre of life" (95). In Paris, Gleed "performed the part of
an elegant" (95), and his performance of this role in the "theatre" of the Parisian court
admits of no discrepancy between the assumed role of elegant and his prior, more
"authentic," position as failed wit. Indeed, as Fleetwood tells his readers, Gleed was
"generally admitted as a man of breeding, amusement, and fashion. No one laughed at,
and almost every one courted him" (95).
Fleetwood's commentary on Gleed's improved social fortunes attests to his
growing perception of how public identity and internal subjectivity are contingent on a
proper manipulation of one's social world. Gleed is so successful in his role of elegant,
plays that part so well-"to the great satisfaction of the spectators" (95)-precisely because
the successful performance of that role has invested him with the inner confidence
necessary for the performance. Social life in Paris provides one with various
narratives-perhaps "scripts," if one wants to pursue the theatrical metaphor-that must be
first recognized and then mastered; properly mastered, these narratives will then allow
one to craft a public persona specific to one's desires and needs, a persona that will
consequently impose an order and structure on the incoherence of internal experience.
Parisian society thus lends itself particularly well to the sort of authorial mapping
of the external world that Fleetwood has come to rely on since his introduction to social
life at Oxford. In Paris, Fleetwood encounters a society structured around the
conventional roles associated with the debauchery of court life, and his time in the capital
thus provides him with rich opportunities for the precise sort of self-fashioning that had
informed his imaginative life since childhood. Moreover, the very codified nature of

162
these social narratives-their explicit expression in easily recognizable
stereotypes-provides Fleetwood with the illusion of easy mastery over a mutable and
unpredictable social environment. He thus determines, almost casually, to adopt the
licentious and fashionable role of "un homme a bonnes fortunes''' (100). Fleetwood
significantly connects his inclination towards this sort of social performance with his
earlier Oxford tendencies to "model" himself in accordance with the external pressures of
peer approval: "driven from a sort of necessity to live upon the applauses of others" (99)
and adopt an "artificial personage, formed after a wretched and contemptible model" (73),
he "carried" the "habit" from Oxford into Parisian life.
Fleetwood's Parisian performance seems to differ from his earlier Oxford one,
however, in the sense of personal empowerment it seems to engender. Unlike the latter
performance, which stemmed from apprehension and fear of "ridicule" (73), and was the
result of "necessity" rather than choice, Fleetwood's adoption of the un homme a bonnes
fortunes role is informed by an agency that speaks to a greater sense of confidence in how
one may master the social world around him: "I soon made my choice, and determined
that I also would be un homme a bonnes fortunes" (100). Indeed, Fleetwood's
meditation on the improved social fortunes of Sir Charles Gleed attests to the potentially
generative way in which even a dullard like Gleed, within a Parisian context, can
successfully negotiate narratives of identity.
In choosing to become un homme a bonnes fortunes-and in consciously
structuring his social intercourse through the conventions of this subject
position-Fleetwood thus participates in one of numerous narratives on offer for
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consumption. For Fleetwood, this narrative seems to carry within it the promise of
ultimate authorial control over his social experience; it will return him to that prelapsarian
"world of [his] own creation" (29) where he found "all nature subservient to [his]
command" (19). The imaginative consumption of Fleetwood's youth had been blighted
by a university experience that initiated him into the realities of an external world beyond
the reach of his imaginative desire. In Paris, however, we see Fleetwood attempting to
tame his social environment in much the same way as he had consumed the natural
scenery of his boyhood home. Through the conscious performance of identity, and the
necessary manipulations of social experience that such performance requires, Fleetwood
enjoys the illusion of authorial control over his life. Such control is always an illusion,
however, and underestimates the autonomous nature of personal relationships that resist
our attempts to shape them according to our narrative expectations or desires.
Nevertheless, for Fleetwood, the possibility of asserting the same sort of authorial agency
over his adult existence as he had over the "cherished visions" of his youth proves too
tempting to resist. He subsequently embarks on a performance of identity that requires
him to overpower the autonomy of the characters who people his chosen narratives.
We see this most compellingly in Fleetwood's relationships with the two women
he encounters during his pursuit of the un homme a bonnes fortunes role. Elton Edward
Smith and Esther Greenwell Smith have commented on the narrative "oddity" of these
two affairs, in that they are recounted by Fleetwood "without employing a single word of
dialogue" (102). As we will see, however, this omission is symptomatic of Fleetwood's
larger effacement of the voice and autonomy of his female love object. Significantly,
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Fleetwood's chosen persona is fundamentally structured around the staging of desire
between the sexes, and such a choice strikingly underscores the specifically misogynistic
tenor of Fleetwood's misanthropic consumption of those around him.2 Handwerk and
Markley have rightly recognized that "it is particularly toward women that Fleetwood
directs the venom that he feels for human frailties" (Introduction to Fleetwood 21)?
We can, moreover, read these "human frailties" in more precise terms-as
women's refusal of passive inscription within Fleetwood's narrative self-fashioning. The
clearest example of this occurs with Fleetwood's first Parisian mistress, the Marchioness,
a beautiful yet cruelly manipulative woman, who was, as Fleetwood terms her, a "finished
coquette" (100). Fleetwood begins his description of the Marchioness by highlighting her
capricious control over her seemingly endless succession of lovers. While such a
characterization of his chosen love object suggests an independence of character not
easily tamed, Fleetwood initially portrays their relationship in terms strongly suggestive
of his ultimate control over her body and mind.
In colonizing the natural landscape of his youth-in "descending] the most
frightful declivities, and often penetrating] into recesses which had perhaps never before
felt the presence of a human creature" (55)-Fleetwood had couched his "conquest" of
nature in decidedly sexualized language. In the description he gives of hisfirstsexual
encounter with the Marchioness, he similarly yokes the bucolic scenes of nature to images
of sexual possession. "I might delineate," writes Fleetwood, "the ravishing sweetness of
the weather on the day which first gave me possession of her person, the delightful
excursion we made on the water, the elegantly furnished cottage that received us" (101).
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Fleetwood cuts his narrative delineation of this scene short on the grounds of modesty: he
"write[s] no book that shall tend to nourish the pruriency of the debauched, or that shall
excite one painful emotion, one instant of debate, in the bosom of the virtuous and the
chaste" (102). Despite its brevity, however, the scene nevertheless displays Fleetwood's
authorial scripting of a narrative that relies upon the pliant submission of the woman who
offers up "possession of her person" on both a sexual and literary level.
The defining characteristic of the Marchioness, however, is the "customary
wildness" of her inconstant behaviour and affection (103). As such, the submissive
posture she occasionally assumes (if one credits Fleetwood's scripting of such scenes)
only serves to foreground her adept manipulation of the ritualized narratives underpinning
desire and seduction within the Parisian court. Indeed, the Marchioness asserts an
unpredictable autonomy even as she seemingly fulfills Fleetwood's desires: as Fleetwood
laments, she "tormented me with her flights and uncertainty, both before and after the
completing my wishes. In the first of these periods I thought myself ten times at the
summit of my desires, when again I was, in the most unexpected manner, baffled and
thrown back by her caprices and frolics" (102). Paradoxically, the emotional turbulence
engendered by the Marchioness's inconstancy only serves to bind him more strongly to
her in an almost manic attempt to possess her in body and mind. It is, in particular, a
psychological colonization of the Marchioness which he seems to desire most, for he
laments that her mind, which "greatly resembled in its constitution the sleek and slippery
form of the eel" (102), continually evades his attempts to contain it. "It was never at rest,
and, when I thought I possessed it most securely, it escaped me with the rapidity of

lightning. No strength could detain it; no stratagem could hold it; no sobriety and
seriousness of expostulation could fix it to any consistency of system" (102-03).
Fleetwood's first romantic entanglement is thus structured around his failure to
consume a love object that insistently eludes his control. Moreover, it is precisely the
futility of this pursuit that feeds Fleetwood's obsessive quest to possess the Marchioness.
As he admits,
one thing that contributed, perhaps more than all the rest, to make this
woman of so much importance to me, was the perpetual occupation she
afforded to my thoughts. Abroad or at home, in company or alone, she for
ever engaged my attention, and kept my soul in a tumult, sometimes,
though rarely, of pleasure, frequently of apprehension, alarm, jealousy,
displeasure, and condemnation. (105).
Significantly, the Marchioness's value for Fleetwood lies primarily in the stimulus she
provides for his intellectual processes-she is "food" for the mind, so to speaik. In this
sense, his emotional connection with the Marchioness echoes his childhood relationship
with nature in that excessive emotional response is productive of an intellectual fertility
predicated on the consumptive internalization of that which inspires his sensibility. But,
where nature had lain "subservient" to his intellectual demands, the Marchioness, as the
"sleek and glossy coated eel" (110), denies Fleetwood a sense of physical ownership over
her body (as evident in her infidelity) and, perhaps more frustratingly for Fleetwood,
knowledge and control over the psychological workings of her mind. Quite simply, the
Marchioness is better at the game of performance than Fleetwood, subtly manipulating
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him through a continuous series of affected and stylized exchanges that underscore the
utter failure of Fleetwood's desperate attempts to colonize her mind and shape her desires
and behaviour.
From the Marchioness, Fleetwood moves easily into another adulterous
relationship that logically seeks to address the failures of the first. Responding to
heartache as "people of fashion in Paris were accustomed to do" (110), he substitutes one
mistress for another. "Led by a sentiment to which [he] was unconscious" (110), he
selects the Countess de B-, a choice solely made on his perception of her emotional
transparency. In contrast to the Marchioness, the Countess
appeared to be wholly destitute of art [....] Her heart shone in her visage
[....] Hers was 'the sleepy eye, that spoke the melting soul.' Her cheek
was full, her skin transparent; the least thought of pleasure or of passion
suffused her countenance with a blush. The Countess had no atom of the
restlessness of her rival; a sort of voluptuous indolence continually
attended her. (110)
The cold sterility of the Marchioness's stylized affections gives way, in this second
mistress, to an overabundance of feeling and emotion that satiates Fleetwood's sensual
and intellectual hunger. In the Countess, there is much for Fleetwood to feast on: the very
language with which he describes her-the fullness of her cheek, the suffusion of her face
with the blush of overflowing emotion, the lazy state of her body and mind-speaks to an
overwhelming sense of voluptuous sensibility that operates without any active restraint on
her part. Indeed, the tenor of the Countess's mind is completely given over to the forces
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of emotion, and such languid sensibility is divorced from the more "masculine"
intellectual capacities. In Fleetwood's eyes, "she appeared born only to feel; to reflect, to
consider, to anticipate, to receive and concoct the elements of instruction, were offices in
which she seemed incapable to exist" (110). She "resign[ed] herself wholly to her
feelings" (110), and her intellect, perhaps consequently, "was of narrow dimensions"
(111).
The Countess thus embodies the stereotypical vision of feminine sensibility in the
extreme, and Fleetwood recognizes that
according to the ideas many men entertain of the fair sex, it was
impossible for any one, in the particulars above described, to be more
exactly qualified for a mistress or a wife, than this fascinating woman.
There was no danger that she should become the rival of her lover in any
man-like pursuits, or that with troublesome curiosity she should intrude
herself into his occupations of learning, of gain, or of ambition. (112)
Fleetwood is careful to distance himself from such misogynistic preferences ("many men"
entertain such notions of women, but not necessarily he). However, it is clear that he is
explicitly drawn to the Countess's emotional availability and implicitly applauds the
intellectual "indolence" that fosters her transparency of feeling and open demonstrations
of affection and loyalty. As he asserts, "it was impossible for a tenderer mistress to exist;
she gave herself up to her lover, and treated him as if he were father, mother, fortune,
reputation, and life to her, in one. She placed no restraint on herself" (110-11).
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The Marchioness had seemingly promised Fleetwood "possession of her person,"
only to ultimately deny him such possession on sexual and psychological levels. The
Countess, however, unlike her predecessor, offers up legitimate access to her inner
emotional life, surrendering, "up to her lover," her body and mind. Her appeal, for a
misogynist like Fleetwood so intent on the psychological consumption of the women in
his life, rests in the transparent and pliant nature of her being. To the extent that the
corporeal markers of the Countess's excessive sensibility inscribe themselves on her
body, Fleetwood is able to "see" into the desires of her mind: her "melting soul" is
simultaneously veiled and revealed through her "sleepy eye."
In clarifying the intellectual weaknesses of the Countess, Fleetwood had voiced
his misogyny through a well-worn conflation of femininity with a racist vision of the
exoticized Eastern "other." Having "all the attributes that belong exclusively to the
female sex," the Countess in Fleetwood's view "was rather an Asiatic sultana, in her rum
of mind, than a native of our western world" (112). Such a metaphor, evoking, as it
necessarily must, the structures of power associated with imperial domination, speaks
vividly to the colonizing desires of Fleetwood's consumptive tendencies.
The Countess's emotional availability carries within it the promise of ultimate
possession. The perception of such possession facilitates on Fleetwood's part the
processes of narrative inscription, whereby the Countess is "written upon" with the
narratives of his own desires and identity. Fleetwood's characterization of the Countess
as an Asiatic sultana is an example of such narrative inscription and a powerful metaphor
for how the feminine colonized Other is rendered subservient to the dominating desires of
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an imperial "master."4 Just as the colonizer will inscribe his own desires and narratives
onto the colonized, we witness Fleetwood engaging in a similar process whereby the
autonomous identity of the Countess is subsumed within his own construction of self. In
describing the delicate emotional state of a youth that experienced no "contradiction,"
Fleetwood had compared himself to "a tender flower of the garden, which the blast of the
east wind nips, and impresses with the tokens of a sure decay" (54). Later in his
narrative, he significantly delineates the emotional vulnerability of the Countess through
strikingly similar language: she "reminded her admirer of the most delicate flower of the
parterre, which the first attack of a rude and chilling blast immediately withers" (111).
While the Countess's emotions are transparent and her affections excessive, they
are also, as Fleetwood eventually realizes, indiscriminate and inconstant. As Fleetwood
admits, the "passion of the Countess was rather an abstract propensity, than the
preference of an individual" (112). He finds the Countess's inconstancy especially
frustrating, since her emotional availability had suggested a complete surrender to his
authorial impulses. She "was so simple, so intelligible, it seemed as if nothing could
happen with her that might not exactly be foreseen" (114). Faced with yet another
mistress who escapes his control, Fleetwood dispenses with the Countess and any
narrative value she may hold in his memoirs. He hints at "long and severe calamities"
later suffered by the Countess (113), but, as she is no longer part of his story as an
extension of his being and identity, he is quick to cut short any delineation of her future
history. "This," he asserts, "does not belong to my history" (113).
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"Form Her to Your Mind"
Fleetwood flees Paris in the wake of his disappointing romantic entanglements
and travels to Switzerland, where he is warmly received by his father's long-time friend,
Monsieur Ruffigny, and informed of his father's recent death. The two travel to what is
now Fleetwood's estate in Merionethshire. Fleetwood's narrative is then interrupted by a
lengthy, ten-chapter interpolation in which Ruffigny details his own history and
relationship to Fleetwood's family.5 Ruffigny's story brings the reader well into volume
two of the novel, where Fleetwood and Ruffigny, after spending some months in
Merionethshire, travel to London. While in London, the two quarrel over what Ruffigny
feels is Fleetwood's return to the sexual immoralities that had informed his time in Paris,
a quarrel that results in Fleetwood's redemptive vow to forever renounce the "vices of a
libertine" (215).
Although no longer a libertine, Fleetwood ultimately becomes, through further
"education and travels," a "confirmed misanthropist" (215). The next five chapters of the
novel detail the further development of Fleetwood's misanthropy in the ensuing stages of
his life and its blighting effect on his personal happiness. We have seen how Fleetwood's
compulsive need to map his own identity and desires on to the social world around him
resulted in two compelling, yet failed, attempts to consume the autonomous subjectivity
of the women in his life. Fleetwood had often described his internalization of external
objects and people through the analogy of excessive consumption: as a child, he "drank
in" and "devoured," "with greedy appetite," the sublime scenes of nature (55-56); as a
young man in Paris, he envisioned his romantic and sexual relationships in terms of a
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proprietary absorption of women's bodies and minds. Such language evokes a
metaphoric sense of Fleetwood's misanthropy as a process of (un)successful "feeding" on
the people and scenes around him. Indeed, this metaphor continually resurfaces in
Fleetwood's delineation of the "education and travels" leading up to his middle age.
Failing to find salutary "nourishment" for his misanthropy in a variety of endeavours, he
constructs himself as a diseased invalid mired in "long fits of languor and depression"
and desperately in need of "nourishment" (219).
He joins a "club of authors," hoping to find in the "society of men of genius" the
"food for thought" of intellectual stimulation (219). However, he finds the stimulation
afforded by this club to be less than satisfying, declaring, "it might have answered to the
confections which amuse the palate at the end of a feast, but it could never appease the
appetite of him, who feels an uneasy and aching void within, and is in hot chase for the
boon of content" (2230. Travel abroad similarly fails to fill the "uneasy and aching void
within," as does his career as a Member of Parliament. (This latter endeavour, however,
in which Fleetwood appealed to the "plain, coarse manners" of his constituents through
affected imitations of their behaviour, speech, and humour (24), demonstrates that he had
not lost his old awareness of the conscious self-creation of identity.) Indeed, denied the
stimuli which might fill the "aching void within," lacking a love object that might feed
the consumptive turn of his psyche, Fleetwood feels himself the victim of an "ennui
which devoured [him]" (228).
The "aching void within" could be filled, Fleetwood feels, by a "friend" who
could prove that he does not "stand alone in the world" (229). "This must be a friend,"
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writes Fleetwood, "who is to me as another self, who joys in all my joys, and grieves in
all my sorrows, not with a joy or grief that looks like compliment, not with a sympathy
that changes into smiles when I am no longer present, though my head continues bent to
the earth with anguish" (229-30). Fleetwood dismisses the potential sadism implicit in
his demands for a friend who will suffer as he suffers, claiming that he takes no "pleasure
in his distress, simply considered" (231). It is clear, however, that Fleetwood's
conception of true friendship is predicated on the sadistic destruction of another
creature's independent capacities for emotion and thought. Acting "as another self," this
friend must, "by long habit," make Fleetwood "a part of himself," taking no pleasure or
pain in activities or thoughts of which Fleetwood is not also a "partaker" (230).
"Something of this sort," he asserts, "seemed essential to my happiness" (231). Indeed, it
is only through the consumption of another's identity through its sympathetic diffusion
into his own that Fleetwood is able to overcome the debilitating sense of being alone in
the "active and crowded scene" of social life (232).
Unable to find this "friend," however, Fleetwood spends more than twenty years
in this debilitating state of ennui, which "grew upon [him] perpetually from year to year"
(233). It is only with the entrance of the Macneil family-and, in particular, his future
wife, Mary-into his life and narrative that Fleetwood finds any relief from this devouring
ennui. It is significant that Fleetwood's initial desire to make the family's acquaintance
stems from the narrative interest sparked in him by Mrs. Macneil's scandalous history, a
history that reads like the plot of a quintessential gothic novel: a foreign villain-"old,
deformed, avaricious, and profligate" (234), indeed a "repulsive baboon" (235)-seduces
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and then holds captive a young, motherless heroine in a "dismantled and unwholesome"
Italian castle; she is only rescued when a "true knight errant," a friend of the young
woman's father, manages to "besiege" the castle and return her to the safe bosom of
England and family (235).6 Mrs. Macneil's history is particularly amenable to the
imposition of a gothic narrative model, so it should come as no surprise to the reader that
Fleetwood, driven by his own compulsive need to script the lives of women, feels "an
uncommon desire to visit the family" (237).
From the outset, Fleetwood is driven by a selfish conviction of what the family
can give him, rather than what his acquaintance may offer the family. In his letter of
introduction to Macneil, he admits to being '"a very weak creature,'" with '"habits and
temper'" no doubt in conflict with Macneil's own (241). Nevertheless, he feels justified
in demanding that he not be refused '"the sight of a happy family!'" (242). '"I ask only
for a transient and momentary pleasure,'" he writes Macneil. '"I ask only for something
to stock my memory with-the recollection of which I may call up from time to time, and
with the image of which I may gild my solitude!'" (242). Macneil and his family only
matter to Fleetwood to the extent that they can provide him with the raw materials for his
own psychological processes: they will become '"something to stock [his] memory
with,'" the '"recollection"' that he may '"call up from time to time,'" perhaps when the
overpowering ennui threatens to devour him.
This becomes even more apparent when Fleetwood mentions Mary, his future
wife and the youngest of Macneil's three daughters. An avid botanist, Mary provides
Fleetwood with his "chief pleasure" in attending the family (247), and his physical
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description of her strongly evokes his portrayal of the Countess de B-:
Mary had a complexion which, in point of fairness and transparency, could
not be excelled: her blood absolutely spoke in her cheeks; the soft white of
her hands and neck looked as if they would have melted away beneath
your touch; her eyes were so animated, and her whole physiognomy so
sensitive, that it was scarcely possible to believe that a thought could pass
in her heart, which might not be read in her face. (246)
Fleetwood had appreciated the Countess for the "heart [that] shone in her visage," and for
the "transparent" skin that revealed the "blush" of every "pleasure" or "passion" (110).
Mary is similarly valued by Fleetwood for an emotional transparency that lays open to the
gaze her every thought and feeling. Indeed, Mary seems so emotionally open and
amenable to outside forces that Fleetwood almost doubts her material existence: "beneath
your touch," he marvels, she might "melt[] away" (246).
Initially drawn to the Macneils by the narrative richness of the family's history,
Fleetwood later finds in Mary a potential conduit for his own self-creation, the elusive
"friend" who will, at least in his own mind, sacrifice her autonomous existence and yield
to his inscribing hand. It is quite ironic that Fleetwood, who is usually the one striving
for narrative control over his life and the identities of those around him, submits so freely
to Macneil's overt manipulation of his thoughts and feelings on marriage. Indeed, the
friendship between the two men quickly organizes itself around Macneil's various
performative manipulations. "In that vein of playful good-humour which he delighted to
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indulge," Macneil easily assumes the mantle of a Catholic priest or a physician, urging
Fleetwood towards a '"conversion"' or a '"cure"' (248).
Accordingly, Fleetwood unburdens himself to Macneil, laying "before him the
secret grief that preyed upon [his] heart" (247). In response to Fleetwood's confession of
misanthropy, Macneil adopts the hypothetical role of author, '"composing a little novel or
tale in illustration,'" in which Fleetwood, as his chosen protagonist, is shipwrecked,
stranded on a desert island with only one miserable companion, and, as a result of these
misfortunes, converted to philanthropy (249-50). The ease with which Macneil assumes
this hypothetical authorial role regarding Fleetwood's history speaks to the very real way
in which he actively re-shapes the younger man's opinions on marriage and orchestrates
the future trajectory of his life.
In advising Fleetwood on what type of woman would be most suitable as his
bride, Macneil emphasizes the necessity of choosing one who will be easily "formed" by
her husband:
'If you marry, Fleetwood, choose a girl whom no disappointments have
soured, and no misfortunes have bent to the earth [ . . . . ] If your habits are
somewhat rooted and obstinate, take care that there is no responsive
stiffness in her to jar and shock with. Let her be all pliancy,
accommodation, and good humour. Form her to your mind; educate her
yourself. By thus grafting a young shoot upon your venerable trunk, you
will obtain, as it were, a new hold upon life. You will be another creature;
new views, new desires, new thoughts, will rise within you [ . . . . ] you
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will feel as alert as a boy, and as free and rapid in your conceptions as a
stripling.' (254).
The language and imagery here are almost parasitical. Fleetwood should choose a young
woman '"whom no disappointments have soured"'-essentially, a woman with no history,
no narrative past that might interfere with Fleetwood's imposition of his own authorial
desires. He should '"form her to [his] mind,'" author her according to his needs, and she
should be '"all pliancy,'" open to his every controlling manoeuver and inscriptive gesture.
He is the '"rooted"' and '"venerable"' trunk, which will be given renewed life and
energy-transformed into a '"stripling'"-through his consumption of her youth and
vitality. Macneil's description of the ideal marriage partner strikingly evokes the
imaginative processes of Fleetwood's youth, in which he satisfied his imaginative needs
by devouring the autonomous scenes of nature.
Indeed, Macneil's metaphor, and the advice couched within it, convinces
Fleetwood precisely because it reinforces the consumptive tendencies of his disposition:
he needs to shape his love object according to his own desires, he wants to '"form her to
[his] mind'" and to the narratives he has chosen for her. It is therefore quite fitting that
Fleetwood imposes on Mary the same figurative analogy used to script the subjectivity of
both himself and the Countess de B-: Mary's "delight was in flowers," he remarks, "and
she seemed like one of the beauties of her own parterre, soft, and smooth, and brilliant,
and fragrant, and unsullied" (259).
Fleetwood's attraction to the gothic exploitation of Mrs. Macneil's past
foreshadows his later affinity for Mary as a distressed heroine in need of his protection.
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After her entire family, en route to Italy, is killed in a shipwreck, Mary becomes a tragic
figure to Fleetwood. His emotional response, however, is not limited to the pity and
compassion her plight would naturally seem to inspire in a hopeful suitor and family
friend. Instead, Fleetwood's attentions derive, at least in part, from a self-interested
awareness of the pleasures afforded him through her distress. "Her desolate situation
rendered her tenfold more interesting" to Fleetwood, and he "now felt, for the first time in
[his] life, how delightful a task it is to console distress, when the sufferer is a woman,
beautiful and young" (267).
The sadism suggested by Fleetwood's emotional response to Mary's distress is
further reinforced by his reaction to the financial ruin she suffers as a result of the
shipwreck's destruction of the necessary legal documents needed to claim her inheritance.
Had Mary entered into their marriage a "distinguished heiress," she would have been,
Fleetwood admits, an "independent being" and, as such, would have "commanded from
[him] a certain deference and homage" (275). As an heiress, Mary had a claim to a
"certain submission" from Fleetwood (275), and this submission compromises his ability
to construct a coherent and confident presentation of himself. In the presence of Mary as
heiress, his "thoughts moved slow," and his "tongue was apt to falter" (275). As an
impoverished orphan, however, a "mere pensionary on [his] bounty" (275), she sacrifices
this claim to independence.
Fleetwood is quick-even anxious-to declare that he "did not value her less" in her
"pennyless" state (275), and this is quite true (for he actually values her more), but the
value he ascribes to Mary stems not from any intrinsic qualities possessed by her as an

independent being separate from him. Rather, she is valued for the emotional response
she generates-the feelings of "pity," "tenderness," and "humanity" she arouses in him
through her dejected, impoverished state (275)-and for the way this emotional response
invests his mind with imaginative energy and strength: "When I visited her portionless,
my mind moved freer; I breathed a thinner and more elastic atmosphere; my tongue
assumed a tone of greater confidence; and, at the same time that I felt for her the deepest
compassion and the most entire sympathy, my speech became more eloquent, and I
caught myself talking with the condescension of a superior" (275-76).
Fleetwood's perverted brand of sensibility contributes to the consolidation of his
masculine authority, and his masculine authority-and the sense of self cultivated by this
authority-increases as a direct function of Mary's despair and misfortune. He indulges in
sympathetic consolation not so much to relieve Mary's anguish, as to satisfy his own
narcissism. Indeed, as a heroine beset by tragedy (and not unlike her mother in this
regard), Mary "became every hour more interesting" to him (277). She serves as the
instrument for his own self-creation, providing him with suitable tragic narratives and
inspiring the appropriate forms of emotional response. In a long speech to Fleetwood,
Mary seems to display a subconscious awareness of the consumptive tendencies lurking
within her future husband. While promising a respectful subservience to his greater years
and wisdom, she nevertheless declares that he will have, in her, '"a wife, and not a
passive machine,'" a woman who will not '"sink [her] being and individuality in [his]'"
(281). The process of consumption, however, has already begun, and it is thus quite
fitting that the speech ends with Mary's contemplation of her own death by drowning.
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Fleetwood's burning need for a "friend, who is to me as another self" (229) is
seemingly satisfied through his marriage to Mary. As we have seen, however, this
fantasy of ideal companionship is predicated on a sadistic destruction of the autonomous
existence of the friend who must be subsumed into Fleetwood's own subjective space and
"formed" to his "mind." Indeed, the process of "forming" Mary to the needs and desires
of his own mind begins soon after their marriage. Fleetwood spends their first evening as
a married couple at Merionethshire regaling Mary with the "stories of [his] boyish
exploits and sorrows" (291). Upon giving her a tour of the house the following day, he is
overwhelmed with the need to tell her of the "ravishing associations" inspired by a
particular closet (292). The first conflict of their marriage, in fact, results from Mary's
appropriation of this closet for herself, an act which not only denies Fleetwood sole
access to the closet in the future, but also-and perhaps more importantly-preempts his
self-indulgent narration of past imaginative acts.
One of the most compelling examples of Fleetwood's overt manipulation of
Mary's subjectivity occurs during a mutual reading of John Fletcher's 1624 play, A Wife
for a Month.1 Fleetwood proposes the reading, which he later calls an "experiment"
(299), and, at least initially, he is quite pleased with the synchronicity of his and Mary's
intellectual and emotional responses to the play:
Mary seemed to enter strongly into the feelings of the poet; we admired
equally the high and generous sentiments of the tragedy [....] She agreed
with me that no poet of ancient or modern times, as far as her acquaintance
with them extended, was able, like the writer before us, to paint with all
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that body and retinue of circumstances which give life to a picture, a free,
heroic, and gallant spirit. We especially commended his style [...].
(298-99; emphases added)
Fleetwood, convinced of the superiority of his own intellectual tastes, is "delighted" that
Mary's interpretations of the play so closely correspond to his own, and he seems to take
an almost irrational satisfaction in the degree of similitude that almost erases the
boundary between Self and Other and robs them of their respective voices: "We
communicate with instantaneous flashes, in one glance of the eye, and have no need of
words" (299).
However, at a particularly intense point in the play-just as the male protagonist's
confidence is at its peak8 (surely an allegory for Fleetwood's own righteous selfassurance)-this similitude is shattered. Fleetwood and Mary are interrupted by a servant
announcing the arrival of a young peasant boy with whom Mary had previously arranged
a botanical excursion. In proposing the mutual reading, Fleetwood had consciously
constructed an experiment whereby he would be able to shape his wife's emotional and
intellectual responses, "forming" them to the tastes and sentiments of his own mind. The
interruption-and, more importantly, Mary's enthusiastic response to an intellectual
endeavour outside of Fleetwood's interests and direct control-destroys the illusion of her
complete pliancy to his will. Significantly, the play, which had just been constructed by
Fleetwood as the site of their psychological and emotional union, is now, as Mary tells
Fleetwood, "'your beloved Fletcher'" (301; emphasis added). Moreover, it is fitting that
Mary's act of autonomous self-assertion here-namely, her enthusiasm for
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botany-involves something that Fleetwood cannot, or will not, share: despite receiving
"with pleasure the early lessons of Mary in botany," he "could never shape [his] mind to
the office of herborisation," it being "too pinched or minute an object for the tastes [he]
had formed" (300-01).
Mary's self-assertion threatens Fleetwood's sense of masculine authority, his
perception of control over a passive and easily consumable love object. Despite his anger
at Mary over her perceived disloyalty to him and his interests, he constructs a fantasy of
reunion in which he promises to '"never have a taste, a pursuit, a gratification, but what is
hers'" (302). He recoils at the emasculation suggested by this submissive pose, however,
declaring that he '"cannot be content to be reduced to nothing'": '"I must have an
existence, a pursuit, a system of my own; and not be a mere puppy, dangling at her heels,
and taught to fetch and carry, as she gives the word'" (303).
Fleetwood is of course blind to the irony behind these statements, in that the
subordinate state he disavows for himself is precisely the one he hoped to impose on
Mary. Indeed, oblivious to the reality of his "experiment" in reading, he even goes on to
lecture the reader on the necessity of recognizing the distinct existence of husband and
wife: "Human beings, who enter into the engagements of domestic life, should remember,
that however man and wife may in interests and affections be one, yet no interests and
affections can prevent them from being in many respects distinct" (303). Similarly, in
insisting that Mary attend an assembly in Barmouth and dance with the "young and
handsome Mr. Matthews" (307), a man anxiously regarded by Fleetwood as a potential
rival, he appears to adopt a masochistic pose. "To witness this petty prostitution of my

wife," he declares, "was a penance I enjoined myself, for having so undeservedly
mortified her and insulted her" (307). The masochistic turn of Fleetwood's sentiments,
however, soon reveals itself as a dominating act of surveillance and control, with
Fleetwood watching over Mary "with the same sleepless anxiety with which a miser
watches over his treasure" (310).
The analogy used here is evocative of the way in which Mary is commodified in
the process of being "formed" to Fleetwood's "mind." As a commodity, as the object
available for Fleetwood's manipulation and consumption, Mary is in danger of being
"used up," depleted. Indeed, the physical and mental deterioration of Mary shortly after
her marriage is highly suggestive of a consumptive process that has depleted her vital
resources. Two months into their marriage, Fleetwood perceives a "sensible change" in
Mary's health and behaviour: "Her appetite left her; her nights were sleepless; she
became languid and meagre" (318). Her "pallid countenance" might betray the odd
smile, but it was the smile of a "winter's day, when the sun sends forth a sickly beam,
amidst watery and congregated clouds" (318). What is most significant about Mary's
degeneration, the symptoms of which connote a tubercular wasting away, is Fleetwood's
reaction to it. He is convinced that his "unkindness" is to blame for Mary's illness (318),
and "the more she fell away from the healthful sleekness of a beautiful woman, the more
she appeared to [him] like an angel" (319). Fleetwood's appreciation of Mary seems to
increase as a direct function of her weakening body, in much the same way as his regard
for her had grown upon learning of her orphan status and financial impoverishment. In
her dejected, languid state, Mary is easily contained by Fleetwood's controlling hand.
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Ironically, however, her physical illness is also attended by a mental degeneration which
threatens this containment. Her inexplicable manic shifts in mood are troubling enough
to Fleetwood (320), but what truly disturbs him are the nocturnal "escapes" she makes
from the house to converse with the spirits of her dead parents upon the seashore. These
escapes-in which Mary "steals" from her marriage bed in the dead of night-can perhaps
be read as physical acts of defiance against the consuming demands of her marriage.
Realizing the gravity of the situation, Fleetwood plans a removal to Bath, which
brings about a marked improvement in Mary's physical and psychological health.
Fleetwood "detests" Bath (325), seeing it as the epitome of everything he cannot control,
everything he had found threatening since childhood-the mutability and inconstancy of
fashionable society. For Mary, however, a return to society and social life has a
powerfully rejuvenating effect, to the point where Fleetwood is consumed by a "sickly
apprehension" of her reawakened vitality (325). It is perhaps this "sickly" and vulnerable
state that allows Fleetwood to be so easily manipulated by Gifford, one of two younger
relatives whom he invites to Bath for an extended visit. Although Gifford's physical
appearance evokes in Fleetwood a vague sense of uneasiness-"his general physiognomy,"
Fleetwood tells the reader, "conveyed the idea of something obscure and problematical,
which [he] was at a loss to expound" (337)-Gifford quickly insinuates himself into
Fleetwood's subjective space. "He talked like an oracle," Fleetwood remarks of Gifford,
"and I soon learned to place a great dependence upon his judgment" (337). "I could not
refrain from sometimes opening my soul to him on the most sacred of all subjects," he
continues (342).

185
Indeed, it is remarkable how quickly Fleetwood is disempowered after first
meeting Gifford, how easily Gifford is able to rob him of any sense of authority or control
over his own life. Gifford ultimately assumes the controlling authorial hand in shaping
events and, more importantly, the interpretations of those events to his own advantage. In
direct contrast to the way in which Fleetwood has normally scripted and shaped the
narratives of his own life-and the narratives of the lives of those around him-his
relationship with Gifford renders him the passive recipient of an authorial scripting not
his own. Indeed, Fleetwood experiences a disrupted sense of gender, in that he becomes
mired in the gothic conventions that so attracted him to the female members of the
Macneil family. He becomes, in a sense, the gothic heroine victimized by a foreign,
"dark" villain who transgresses his domestic space and attempts to "possess [him]
entirely" (338).
After ingratiating himself into Fleetwood's home and confidence, Gifford stages a
complex series of events and decisive interpretative moments that reveals the novel's
indebtedness to Shakespeare's Othello on the levels of both theme and plot. Just as Iago
slowly, but methodically, poisons Othello's mind against the innocent Desdemona over
the course of several acts, Gifford, as "treacherous adviser" and confidant (341),
systematically convinces Fleetwood of Mary's adulterous relationship with Kenrick,
Fleetwood's other young relative and Gifford's own half-brother. Gifford's orchestration
of the woman's warning near the Upper Rooms at Bath, his recounting of Mary and
Kenrick's behaviour towards each other at a Bath assembly, and his conspicuous
placement of the love letter and miniature of Kenrick meant for Louisa Scarborough in

186
Mary's dressing room-all of these machinations speak to the way in which he is able to
author his own narrative of adultery and disloyalty, a narrative which he then imposes on
Fleetwood as the "truth."
Indeed, in recounting the "indiscretions" of Mary and Kenrick at the Bath
assembly, Gifford (un?)wittingly foregrounds the deceptive power of narrative to forge
new, and possibly false, versions of reality. After relating his "most artful tale" (351), he
tells Fleetwood to
'forget for ever the conversation of this evening! It ought never to have
existed. You have obliged me to repeat trifles the most frivolous and
contemptible. I have sacrificed every thing to the faithful performance of
my task. Yet, in spite of all the pains I have taken to bring these trifles
down to their true level, I can see that you misconstrue every thing.
Things make so different a figure, when brought regularly together in a
narrative, from what they made as they actually passed.'
(351; emphasis added)
Gifford's skill is in this precise kind of authorship, this keen ability to bring '"regularly
together in a narrative'" of adultery events and behaviour that were innocent as '"they
actually passed.'" And, just as Gifford's skilful authorship is proving successful in
bringing about its desired aims, Fleetwood's own authorial powers, his ability to shape
and control the narratives of his own identity and the identities of those around him, are at
their weakest. Fleetwood falls prey to Gifford's manipulation of narrative and language,
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his careful deployment of "half words" and "broken sentences" (371), and the
imaginative sensibility that had proved so intellectually fruitful for Fleetwood as a child is
now regarded as a deviance that manifests itself in a "sick imagination" that torments him
in its manic speculations (348).
Fleetwood is thus rendered helpless in the face of Gifford's superior authorial
powers. He subsequently becomes the passive site for the inscription of Gifford's own
lust for wealth and power. Upon witnessing a secret meeting between Maty and Kenrick
(a meeting carefully orchestrated by Gifford), Fleetwood surrenders unequivocally to the
younger man's controlling hand. Indeed, on the journey over to the Continent which
Fleetwood immediately embarks upon after the final breach with his wife, he is almost
infantilized in his complete physical and emotional dependency on Gifford:
It is impossible for words to express any thing so wretched as the state of
my mind during the whole of this journey [ . . . . ] Nothing could be more
exemplary than the attention I received from Gifford during the whole of
this period. He never left me; he never ceased from studying the means of
restoring me; the meanest offices were not repulsive to his kindness and
zeal. I am certain that, in this extremity, I owed the preservation of my life
to his care. (382)
Fleetwood is aware that his psychological breakdown, the "disorder" or "distemper" of
his "mind" (383-84), has left him dangerously vulnerable, and he even seems, at certain
points, anxiously aware of the ominous "ascendency" Gifford had claimed over him, an
"ascendency" he could not seem to "easily shake off' (384). Nevertheless, Fleetwood is
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so completely contained within Gifford's inscribing hand that he even allows the younger
man to compose, in Fleetwood's own name, a letter directing his business agent to
financially disown Mary. To this letter, Fleetwood simply "annexed" his signature (382),
as if he were no longer a separate and independent being, but a colonized state only
granted an identity through its relationship to a more significant colonizer.
By this point, it is clear that Fleetwood has lost any definite sense of his own
identity, something which speaks to the consumptive nature of his relationship with
Gifford. As Fleetwood eventually realizes, Gifford had, from the outset of their
acquaintance, intended to "possess [him] entirely" (338), and this goal could only be
realized through a consumptive process similar to the one which had characterized
Fleetwood's relationship with Mary. In this sense, Gifford's forging of Fleetwood's hand
is simply a synecdoche for the larger displacement of identity that occurs between the two
men. Indeed, Gifford wants quite literally to replace Fleetwood in the social order by
assuming the mantle of the Fleetwood name and estate, and this desire necessitates not
only the colonization of Fleetwood's mind, but the destruction of his very existence. The
evocative imagery associated with consumption-as both a metaphorical process and a
physical ailment that robs one of vital energy-returns to haunt Fleetwood's body, just as it
had marked Mary's: "The distempered activity under which I [had] suffered, was now
gone," laments Fleetwood. "I became jaundiced, body and soul. My blood loiteringly
crept through palsied veins" (385).
It is particularly significant that Gifford controls Fleetwood through the
interception and destruction of his letters, for it foregrounds the central role that
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authorship-or, more precisely, failed authorship-plays in Fleetwood's eventual physical
and mental collapse, the ultimate crisis of self that he experiences. Fleetwood does
indeed compose letters to Mary and Kenrick, but these are intercepted by Gifford, an act
which not only keeps Fleetwood ignorant of Gifford's treachery but, perhaps more
importantly, robs him of any narrative opportunity to shape the events unfolding in his
life. Fleetwood, accustomed to exercising the authority and power of the author in
scripting his own life, is now unable to exercise the same sort of authorial agency. While
he is told by Gifford that his initial frenzied letters to Mary and Kenrick were never
received (intercepted by Gifford with "apparent propriety" (384)), he is blind to the fact
that his later letter to Mary, granting her an annuity of a thousand pounds, was similarly
intercepted (400). Likewise, he is oblivious to the reality that letters from Mary, Kenrick,
and Lord Scarborough are consistently kept from him (400).
Scarborough, upon disclosing the true extent of Gifford's treachery, remarks to
Fleetwood, '"you have been a close prisoner in the keeping of the villain, who was
proceeding with rapid, yet deliberate steps, to thrust you out from the scene of the world,
and to reap the inheritance of your estates'" (400-01; emphasis added). Indeed, Gifford's
modus operandi largely revolves around this process of keeping Fleetwood '"from the
scene of the world,'" robbing him of the means and opportunity for self-expression and
communication. In doing so, Gifford keeps Fleetwood not so much from the '"scene of
the world'" as from the scene of Fleetwood's own world, the scenes most central to his
life-the dissolution of his marriage, the reality of his wife's distress, the birth of his child,
the legal use of his name.
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Fleetwood is rendered impotent in shaping the narratives of his own life. This is
perhaps most compellingly observed in the adultery prosecution against Mary and
Kenrick, legal proceedings in which Fleetwood assumes an oddly passive and awkward
position, resigning the entire matter over to Gifford, who then (mis)informs Fleetwood of
legal events as they unfold. Fleetwood's latent anxiety regarding the lack of agency and
control over his life seems to register in the "furious impatience" (383) and "vehement
emotion" (388) with which he receives any written communication. The literary
inscriptions of others perhaps signify for Fleetwood their successful authorship, and may
foreground his own loss of authorial power.
The crisis of these authorial anxieties occurs with Fleetwood's orchestration of the
"banquet" celebrating the anniversary of his marriage. In July, Fleetwood is alone in
Florence, Italy (Gifford being in England), and it is here that he orchestrates an elaborate
spectacle that functions on both a masochistic and sadistic level. "Resolved to solemnise
a strange and frantic festival on [his] wedding-day," Fleetwood visits a "celebrated
modeller in wax" and commissions the construction of life-size wax figures of both Mary
and Kenrick-Mary from a miniature portrait in Fleetwood's possession and Kenrick from
a magazine image of a "terrible and monstrous figure of a fiend" (386). He dresses both
figures in the appropriate attire; constructs a stylized scene, complete with a barrel organ
for musical entertainment, a cradle, and a chest of child-bed linen; and "caused a supper
of cold meats to be prepared" (386-87). Fleetwood's construction of the scene is
remarkable for its careful attention to detail, regardless of the expense incurred. As
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Fleetwood remarks, "never had madness, in any age or country, so voluptuous a banquet"
(387).
Fleetwood is the literal "author" of this scene; it is generated from the imaginative
energy (insanity) of his mind, and he scripts the tableau in much the same way as he
would author a dramatic or literary scene-establishing the mood and controlling every
detail of plot, setting, and character. Indeed, notice how even those details for which
Fleetwood cannot claim sole creative responsibility are presented in such a way as to
foreground his agency: "/ caused a supper of cold meats to be prepared" he writes, in an
awkward mixture of the passive and active voices. Robbed of any real ability to script the
scenes or narratives of his life, Fleetwood, in his latent frustration and rage over the
emasculated and impotent position in which he finds himself, resorts to illusion, crafting,
from the "ground up," a tableau completely within his narrative control.
Significantly, he attempts to exert narrative power over precisely those people and
events which he feels have robbed him of his authority. (He is at this point still ignorant
of Gifford's villainy.) Mary, in particular, had seemed to promise Fleetwood, in her
emotional transparency and malleable nature, a unique opportunity for exerting his
narrative authority. Spurred on by Macneil, who encouraged his courtship of Mary by
implying that she would serve well as the means for his self-rejuvenation, Fleetwood had
seen in his future wife an easily consumable love object, a woman whose subjectivity
could be "formed" and shaped in the service of his own self-construction. That Mary had
failed him in this regard-her supposed infidelity the final proof that Fleetwood had been
unable to contain her, just as he had been unable to contain his two Parisian mistresses-is
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particularly traumatic for Fleetwood's sense of masculine authority and self. It is
therefore not surprising that he directs his most explicit inscriptive manoeuvres towards
Mary, putting "provisions on her plate" and "invit[ing] her to eat" (387).
Art imitates life, however; even in this scripted and seemingly controlled scene,
"Mary" does not stay bound to Fleetwood's narrative hand:
I looked wildly, and with glassy eyes, all round the room; I gazed at the
figure of Mary; I thought it was, and it was not, Mary [....] I saw her
move-if I live, I saw it. She turned her eyes this way and that; she grinned
and chattered at me. I looked from her to the other figure; that grinned and
chattered too. Instantly a full and proper madness seized me; I grinned and
chattered, in turn, to the figures before me. (387).
Fleetwood's construction of an inanimate Mary had perhaps betrayed his subconscious
desire for a similarly "inanimate" wife, a wife unable to resist his authorial inscriptions.
In perceiving that his "Mary" had assumed an animation, a voice, he had not intended to
grant her, Fleetwood experiences again, on a symbolic level, the trauma of failed
authorship. This trauma brings about a madness that signifies not just an insanity of
behaviour, but a clear break in the ego: "I no longer distinctly knew where I was, or could
distinguish fiction from reality" (387). Fleetwood is no longer even certain of himself at
the very basic level of existence: "I saw her move-if I live, I saw it" (387). Of course, he
did not see it, and this then begs the reader to ponder the central question of Fleetwood's
identity in this scene.
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What this scene specifically foregrounds is Fleetwood's lack of identity-the
absence at the center of his being-and the complex process of consumption that he has
engaged in since childhood. As a solitary child raised amidst the feminized scenes of
nature, Fleetwood had constructed "castles in the air" out of the raw materials presented
by the natural scenery around him, consuming them (and, metaphorically at least,
destroying them) in his attempts to script visionary fantasies around which he built a
sense of masculine identity. In his later years in Paris, and in his marriage to Mary, his
consumptive power over a feminized nature was displaced onto a series of female love
objects who seemingly promised him the same sort of consumptive power and authorial
control he had exercised over the natural scenes of his youth. The monstrous,
"chattering" Mary in this scene is thus symptomatic of Fleetwood's failed consumption of
not just Mary, but all the women in his life. In his rage and despair, Fleetwood's
metaphorical attempts at consumption and destruction become quite literal:
I dashed the organ into a thousand fragments. I rent the child-bed linen,
and tore it with my teeth. I dragged the clothes which Mary had worn,
from off the figure that represented her, and rent them into long strips and
shreds. I struck the figures vehemently with the chairs and other furniture
of the room, till they were broken to pieces. (388).
Tysdahl points to the "cannibalism" of this scene (124), and Bruhm has
highlighted how the sadistic intention of this spectacle (i.e., Fleetwood's desire to torture
"Mary" through verbal and physical abuse) devolves into an exercise in masochism,
whereby Fleetwood becomes the tortured body. "In effect," argues Bruhm, "the effigy
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scene enacts a series of bodily displacements: the effigy first replaces Mary's body, but it
is then replaced by Fleetwood's. He becomes the victim in the torture he has executed"
(37). Despite this movement from torturer to victim, however, a strong sense of sadism
still pervades the scene, for this displacement of bodies and identities is predicated on the
necessary effacement of Mary's subjectivity (specifically, her very real identity as victim
in both this enacted scene and in the reality of the novel) to make room for Fleetwood's.
Indeed, as Bruhm recognizes, Fleetwood "claims a monopoly of victimization that centers
pain solely in himself and obliterates the object with which he had claimed an identity"
(37).
It is with this scene of crisis that the novel seems to come full circle. From this
point, Fleetwood's memoirs proceed quickly and terminate rather abruptly: we are told of
Gifford's failed assassination attempt (391-92); are apprized, via Scarborough's extended
autobiographical narration, of the detailed course of Gifford's treachery (396-416); and
hear of Gifford's execution, as well as Kenrick and Louisa Scarborough's marriage (423);
all in the final pages of the novel. Incredibly, we also hear of the unlikely reunion of
Fleetwood and Mary (421-23). In general, the condensed and rather abrupt conclusion to
the text proves unsatisfying for the reader, especially with regard to Fleetwood and
Mary's reconciliation. We may feel optimistic about Fleetwood's ultimate redemptive
potential; he has after all suffered in both a physical and psychological sense, and has
weathered, apparently successfully, the trauma of the banquet scene and the crisis of self
which it represented. The text, however, is conspicuously silent on this issue. While we
hear of Scarborough as the "most indulgent of grandsires" (423), we hear nothing of the
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later state of Fleetwood and Mary's marriage, nor of Fleetwood's later conduct as a
husband. Fleetwood may have been punished, but we do not hear whether he has been
reformed.
Indeed, if we return to some of Fleetwood's initial remarks at the beginning of his
memoir-which of course, in the chronology of his life, occur after his reconciliation with
Mary-we may have cause to doubt any reformation on his part. Fleetwood's narrative is
a retrospective one, and as such should theoretically be informed by the moral instruction
he has received as a result of the events he will recount in the ensuing chapters of the text.
What we find, however, is a Fleetwood who adopts a certain authorial position, namely,
that of the masochist who scripts his authorship as the "act of [his] penitence and
humiliation" (59). Fleetwood is the suffering body here, and thus enacts the same
manoeuver at the beginning of his memoirs (when he should, theoretically, be "older" and
"wiser" for the misfortunes he has endured, cured of his consumptive and destructive
tendencies towards women and in particular Mary) as he did during the crisis of the
banquet scene. As we saw in that scene, Fleetwood's construction of himself as victim
was contingent upon a necessary destruction of Mary's subjectivity, a "displacement," as
Bruhm calls it, of both Mary's body and her position as victim in the torturer-victim
relationship. Ironically, a similar destruction or displacement occurs at the beginning of
Fleetwood's memoirs, in that he scripts himself as the suffering body, the tortured author
who inflicts pain on himself with every word he writes. In appropriating this role for
himself, Fleetwood assumes Mary's position in the text, displacing her as the true victim
of the narrative, the one who truly suffers at his hands. Fleetwood's cycle of
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consumption is therefore complete, as Mary has indeed been "formed" to his body, mind,
and narrative.
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Chained Up in Silence: Language and Alienation in Mandeville
When Godwin published Mandeville in 1817, it had been twelve years since his
last novel, Fleetwood, and it would be thirteen years before he would publish another.1
For B.J. Tysdahl, "Mandeville is the last novel from [Godwin's] pen which impresses by
its originality" (126). Indeed, the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley praised the novel as one of
the philosopher's finest. While St. Leon and Fleetwood were "moulded, with somewhat
inferior distinctness," Mandeville possessed for Shelley an "interest and importance" that
put it on a par with what he considered as Godwin's greatest novelistic achievement,
Caleb Williams (Graham 357-58). The interest of the tale, writes Shelley in a review of
the novel published in Leigh Hunt's Examiner, catches the reader like a "wind which
tears up the deepest waters of the ocean of mind" (Graham 359).2 For George Woodcock,
Mandeville is remarkable if only for the impressive sense of melancholy thait informs the
book, a "misanthropic gloom whose consistency of texture is alone impressive" ("Notes"
693).
Indeed, we have in Mandeville, as in Fleetwood, another tormented misanthrope, a
man who, by virtue of an unhealthy childhood and later social disappointments in
adolescence, is unable to join in satisfying fellowship with family and friends. As both
Marion Omar Farouk and Pamela Clemit have pointed out, the novel engages with the
related issues of history and psychology and how both combine to produce character. As
Clemit has argued, partly what makes Mandeville so compelling is the way in which the
novel registers Godwin's increasing skepticism of the powers of rationality to overcome
the damaging effects of historical and political trauma {Godwinian Novel 96). In
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Mandeville, our protagonist's misanthropy rapidly takes the form of an unsettling
emotional instability which eventually devolves into madness, a delusional paranoia that,
in Mona Scheuermann's terms, produces the "most total alienation possible" ("Study of
Mind" 29). As Scheuermann argues, Mandeville's alienation "is the most complete of
any of the Godwin heroes, and in the course of his study of the roots and the effects of
that alienation Godwin created his most intensely focused psychological study" ("Study
of Mind" 29).
The roots of Mandeville's alienation, as I shall argue in this chapter, stem from a
childhood mis-education grounded in isolation, melancholy, and paranoia. In particular,
the melancholic tone of formative years spent in the company of an emotionally broken
and reclusive uncle, coupled with the overwhelming effects of a tutor's hyperbolic
lessons in humility, operate to produce an environment that requires constant repression
on Mandeville's part. This repression takes its most notable form in the suppression of
voice that ultimately consumes Mandeville's character. Having internalized the
imperatives of silence and restraint from childhood, Mandeville is incapable of
effectively articulating his inner thoughts and emotions. His linguistic failures
consequently marginalize him, and his melancholic isolation ultimately degenerates into
paranoid madness as he moves into adulthood. Mandeville's only connective link to
humanity rests in his relationship with his sister, Henrietta, for it is only through her that
he is able to compensate for his own failures in self expression. As madness takes greater
hold over his mind, however, Mandeville demands of Henrietta a complete identification,
an effacement of self that displaces his own subjectivity and speaks to larger crises in
identity.
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"Shut Up in the Chamber of My Thoughts"
In Political Justice, Godwin argues that character is purely a product of external
social influences, that forces of society-history, politics, culture, and education-operate
on the young mind to shape temperament, intellectual aptitude, and morality. "The
actions and dispositions of mankind," asserts Godwin, "are the offspring of circumstances
and events, and not of any original determination that they bring into the world" (Vol. 1
of Political Justice 26). This theory of development is clearly evident in Mandeville. For
Farouk, the important role that history plays in the development of the novel's plot and
themes supports Godwin's vision of character as something shaped by historical events:
"Godwin saw that human character originates in the special features of the times, and
created his novel Mandeville according to this conception" (111). Similarly, Clemit
argues that, in the novel, Godwin "explores the disabling pressures of politics and history
on the individual psyche" (Godwinian Novel 101). Indeed, in detailing the events of the
seventeenth-century English Civil War, Mandeville is much more of an overtly historical
and political text than Godwin's previous novel, Fleetwood, which, while set in the first
half of the eighteenth century, is largely a domestic tale that never engages with the larger
contours of history with any detailed specificity. In this sense, Mandeville marks a return
to Godwin's earlier experiment in historical fiction, the 1799 St. Leon.
Despite the obvious historical context for the novel, however, Mandeville is, like
St. Leon and Fleetwood before it, essentially a psychological study, a tale of one man's
emotional and intellectual disintegration, a disintegration that occurs against a backdrop
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of larger historical and cultural traumas. Significantly, the seeds for this later
disintegration are planted in childhood, in that Mandeville's formative years are spent in a
melancholic environment that blights his development into a well-adjusted adult. We
may recall Godwin's argument, in Volume 1 ofPoliticalJustice, that "the characters of
men are determined in all their most essential circumstances by education" (45); we
might also remember his conception of education as a "comprehensive" process involving
"every incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of
reflections" (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 45).
In both St. Leon and Fleetwood, we saw how the heroes' later misanthropy
developed from specific failures in this early childhood "education." Likewise, in
Mandeville, the narrator draws a direct connection between the educative experiences of
his youthful years and the later tragedy of his life, between the melancholic isolation and
paranoia of his childhood and his ultimate development into a misanthrope who will
never find peace or happiness in society or social relationships. In the 1797 Enquirer,
Godwin emphasized the desirability of early socialization in the education of the young.
"The child should early begin in some degree to live in the world, that is, with his
species," argues Godwin (143). "He should neither be bred apart from the world, nor in
ignorance of what passes in the world. He should be accustomed to behold the faces of
his species. He should know something of the story of their passions, their singularities,
and even of their vices" (143). In both Fleetwood and Mandeville, Godwin constructs
protagonists who are denied this type of early interaction with society, protagonists who
are " bred apart from the world" and are ignorant of their "species," and both novels
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ultimately document the deleterious effects of such social isolation on the developing
psyche.
There are numerous echoes of Fleetwood in the opening chapters of Mandeville,
and it is significant that both protagonists experience many of the same blighting
environmental influences. Orphaned at the age of three, his parents massacred in the
1641 Irish rebellion, Mandeville is escorted by a Protestant clergyman named Hilkiah
Bradford from Dublin to his uncle's estate in Derbyshire, England. He spends the next
nine years at the estate, in the guardianship of his uncle and under the tutelage of
Bradford. Like Fleetwood's ancestral home in Merionethshire, North Wales, Mandeville
House is isolated both geographically and socially. Nestled atop a rocky cliff overlooking
the English Channel, the estate is surrounded by an "immense extent of barren heath,"
with the "nearest market-town [] at a distance of seventeen miles" (24). Visitors are
virtually unknown at the House, and Mandeville's only social connections, like
Fleetwood's, are with a tutor, whose companionship proves dissatisfying and even
deleterious to his pupil, and a distant, withdrawn paternal figure. Although his
withdrawal and dejection are by far the more extreme, Audley Mandeville is similar to
Fleetwood's father in that he has been broken by a loss in love, and his heartbreak,
combined with a sensible nature that exacerbated-and was exacerbated by-the effects of
this heartbreak, renders him unfit as either a mentor or a companion to his young nephew.
For both Fleetwood and Mandeville, the social and geographical isolation of their
childhood years, combined, perhaps, with a latent sensibility that renders them acutely
sensitive to the effects and possibilities of this isolation, lends itself to solitary habits and

aimless wanderings which are productive of reverie and mythmaking. Ironically, the
"barren heath" is fertile ground for both "rambles" and fantasy. For "a wanderer like
myself," Mandeville declares, "the desolateness of the scene, the wideness of its extent,
and even the monotonous uniformity of its character, favourable to meditation and
endless reverie, did not fail to be the source to me of many cherished and darling
sensations" (24-25). He is "formed [] early to a habit of reverie" in which "visionary
scenes" occupy his thoughts (44). An appreciation of the solitary natural spaces around
them inspires, in both Fleetwood and Mandeville, an urge towards creativity. Unlike
Fleetwood, however, whose immersion within the sublime grandeur of his childhood
home cultivates a visionary mythmaking that gives him a sense of omnipotence and
authority, Mandeville is prone to a melancholic reverie structured around visions of pain,
despair, and death.
As we saw in the last chapter, Fleetwood found much to inspire the self in the
rugged beauty and awesome sublimity of North Wales. For Mandeville, however, the
geographical and social isolation of his uncle's estate is compounded by the "eminently
insalubrious" state of its natural surroundings (24). As Mandeville tells the reader,
"various portions of bog and marshy ground" surround Mandeville House, enveloping its
inhabitants in an "endless succession of vapours" or "steams" which threaten "healthful
animal life" (24). The distinction between day and night, moreover, is confounded by
"thick fogs and mists" that plunge the estate and its occupants into a perpetual and no
doubt metaphorical darkness (24). Throughout Mandeville's description of the House,
there is the strong implication that the "insalubrious" influence of the landscape and its
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climate cultivates both physical and mental disease in those who dwell in or near it.
Perhaps consequently, then, Mandeville is drawn to the melancholic images of the
violence and sterility of nature:
I delighted to wander; but I was not delighted with objects of cheerfulness.
It will already have been seen, that I was not often intruded on with
impressions of this sort. I loved a hazy day, better than a sunshiny one.
My organs of vision, or the march of my spirits, gave me an aversion to
whatever was dazzling and gaudy. I loved to listen to the pattering of the
rain, the roaring of the waves, and the pelting of the storm. There was I
know not what in the sight of a bare and sullen heath, that afforded me a
much more cherished pleasure, than I could ever find in the view of the
most exuberant fertility, or the richest and most vivid parterre. (44)
Repulsed by beauty and fertility, and attracted to nature in its violent and sterile
manifestations, Mandeville indulges in the construction of "visionary scenes"-images
and narratives that take shape in his mind while roaming over this "bare and sullen
heath." Inspired by the dour and hostile scenes of nature, Mandeville finds himself
nursing violent fantasies, reveries which form themselves into "a perpetual succession of
flight, and pursuit, and anguish, and murder" (44). Moreover, the melancholic turn of
Mandeville's imagination is further inflamed by the horrific barbarities he witnessed as a
child during the Irish rebellion: "I recollected distinctly the expiring bodies I had beheld
along the roadside in my flight, some perishing with hunger and cold, and some writhing
under the mortal wounds and tortures that had been inflicted by their pursuers" (44).

Significantly, the aggressive tone of Mandeville's imaginative reveries also
extends to himself. Whereas Fleetwood's visionary indulgences produced delusions of
grandeur, in which he was "the occupier of palaces, or the ruler of nations" (56),
Mandeville's fantasies are of a more complex and ominous sort, combining both an
inflated perception of his own importance with a crippling sense of persecution.
"Habitually a visionary," he is mired in fantasies in which he is victimized by forces
attempting to thwart his inherent greatness:
My visions were frequently of long duration, and branched out into a
variety of minuter circumstances. In these moods I sometimes imagined
that every thing around me was engaged in a conspiracy against me, that I
was, in some inexplicable way, a captive, whose genuine destiny led to
higher things, but who, like some imperial bird that had fallen into the
hands of lawless men, was shorn of its strongest feathers. (60)
For Fleetwood, consuming the natural scenes around him produced the sense of a
visionary authorship that allowed him to carve out a sense of omnipotence against the
passive backdrop of an acquiescent nature. Imaginative daydreaming amounted to
building "castles in the air" (56), a metaphor that attests to the grandeur of Fleetwood's
visions and the powerful position he plays in them. In these childhood visions,
Fleetwood retains the controlling hand and wields considerable power, and this sense of
authority ultimately comes to pervade his perception of his place in the "real" world as
well. One may recall, for example, the way in which he projects himself as a confident
and fearless colonizer of the North Wales landscape, "descend[ing] the most frightful

declivities, and often penetrating] into recesses which had perhaps never before felt the
presence of a human creature" (55).
In contrast, Mandeville is haunted by a perception of himself as helpless victim,
incapable of exerting any control over his being or destiny. He does of course, like
Fleetwood, suffer from a destructive overabundance of pride. "I was proud," Mandeville
declares, "because I felt my value. I was conscious that my intellectual powers far
exceeded the common rate [....] I felt an inborn pride of soul, which, like an
insurmountable barrier, seemed to cut me off for everfromevery thing mean, despicable
and little" (56). This overweening pride, moreover, lends itself to an ambitious
anticipation of his future achievements: "I felt like one for whom adventures and great
events are reserved, and, as we find it expressed in the common story-books, who is 'to
go out, and seek his fortune'" (53). Despite such expressions of pride and optimism,
however, Mandeville's visionary meditations suggest that more compelling fears of
persecution dominate his inner world. Adventures, great events, and fortune may be
reserved for him, but these rewards are by no means guaranteed, as larger conspiracies
will organize themselves against him, robbing him of these advantages and rendering him
as passive and helpless as a bird in the hands of "lawless men." It is perhaps his acute
belief in the persecutory forces which he perceives to be aligned against him that draws
him so strongly to the narratives and images in the Book of Martyrs. With its gruesome
descriptions of torture, the text has an indelible effect on his young mind, cultivating the
fearful and suspicious turn of his temperament and "producing] a strange confusion and
horror in [his] modes of thinking" (52).
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Mandeville's paranoia ultimately produces the paradox of a young boy who, while
feeling inherently superior in his intellectual and moral capacities, is nevertheless prone
to anxious insecurities regarding his ability to withstand the forces of life, or to exert any
power or authority over his own being. Like Fleetwood, Mandeville is a wanderer, an
explorer of nature; unlike Fleetwood, however, who had the authoritative confidence to
"descend[] the most frightful declivities" and "penetrat[e]" obscure "recesses" (55),
Mandeville, in his wanderings across the "barren heath," resigns himself to the "firm
ground," "avoiding as carefully as might be a deviation into quaggy and treacherous
paths" (24). Whereas Fleetwood courted challenge and potential danger, Mandeville
shrinks from these things, a response suggestive of his insecure need to protect himself
(and his ego) from challenges he feels unable to withstand. What is present in Fleetwood,
but strikingly absent in Mandeville, is the colonizing instinct that is often both a symptom
of, as well as a contributor to, a defined sense of one's authoritative selfhood. Ironically,
for all his pride, Mandeville is not confident, but fearful of persecution, suspicious of
others, and anxiously aware of his helpless and victimized state, at least as he perceives it.
For a number of critics of the novel, Mandeville's later misanthropy and madness
are inextricably bound up with this early failure in establishing a confident selfhood. For
Tysdahl, Mandeville's schizophrenic misanthropy is the result of the "weak hold" he has
on his "identity;" this, argues Tysdahl, is the product of social isolation, the lack of "those
contacts with others that could have given him a definite and secure idea of his own self
(142). Mandeville is isolated socially, and this social alienation no doubt contributes to
his uncertain sense of identity. I would argue, however, that the few social "contacts"
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Mandeville does experience in his youth-namely, his interactions with his uncle and tutor
at Mandeville House-contribute, perhaps more than his isolation does, to the anxious
insecurities and feelings of powerlessness and rage that form the foundation for his later
hatred and fear of humanity. The social dynamics of Mandeville House, structured as
they are around the demands of excessive silence and passivity, on one hand, and the
silencing effects of hyperbolic discourse, on the other, operate to produce an environment
that requires constant repression on Mandeville's part.
The "insalubrious" gloom of the estate's landscape and climate is mirrored in the
melancholy of its master, whose "passive mode of existence" mires him in sadness and
regret over the past. His uncle, Mandeville declares, "loved his sadness, for it had
become a part of himself [....] He found a nameless pleasure in the appendages and
forms of melancholy, so great, that he would as soon have consented to cut off his right
hand, as to part with them. In reality he rather vegetated than lived" (41). Audley has so
internalized a languid passivity into the very fabric of his existence that he has rendered
himself quite incapable of withstanding the realities of life-its mutability, its activity, and
its noise. As such, a sense of restraint and solemnity pervades the House and governs the
behaviour of its occupants. The domestic staff, for example, exhibit a "solemn
countenance, and a slow and measured step" (43).
Although only a boy, Mandeville is also expected to restrain any signs of activity
or life around his uncle. As he describes,
if by any rare accident I came within sight of [my uncle] unexpectedly, I
was instructed to hide myself, to steal away with cautious steps, and to do
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nothing that might excite observation [....] if the restlessness of boyish
years chanced at any time to awake me to a gayer tone, the sight of my
uncle checked my buoyant spirits at once, my countenance fell, and my
thoughts became solemn. (42)
Although Mandeville declares himself to be of a naturally "gloomy and saturnine cast"
(53), it is apparent from descriptions like these that his youthful solemnity was, at least to
some extent, a consciously performed act that required a certain repression of "natural"
tendencies towards gaiety and activity. Indeed, as Scheuermann remarks, "Mandeville's
earliest manifestations of withdrawal and sadness are learned behaviours, inculcated both
by precept and by emulation of his uncle" ("Study of Mind" 24).
Such a performance, moreover, seems to carry within it a certain denial of one's
very existence. Mandeville, after all, must "hide himself," "steal away," and "do nothing
that might excite observation"-all of which implies a conscious removal of one's being
from the realm of acknowledgment. It becomes clear that Mandeville, from a young age,
experiences a certain effacement of his identity, an effacement that demands not only a
restraint of the "buoyant spirits," but a suppression of voice as well. Indeed, it is
particularly significant that the passive solemnity which governs the domestic staff is
specifically registered in their reluctance to speak and the consequent brevity of their
speech: "When you spoke to them, they seemed to hesitate whether they should answer
you; and if the final decision was in your favour, the answer was framed by the most
concise and sententious model" (43-44).
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In the presence of Audley, even Mandeville's verbose tutor, Hilkiah Bradford, is
subject to a self-imposed silencing, in that his "surprising powers of copiousness and
amplification" are consciously limited to perfunctory and concise comments on his
pupil's progress (42-43). Mandeville sees his uncle once a month in formalized and
stilted meetings which "seldom last[] more than two minutes" (42). He is not encouraged
to speak during these meetings, nor does the rigid and controlled nature of the scene
allow for fluid and natural exchange. There are no opportunities at Mandeville House for
true and unmediated expressions of emotion and sentiment. From these experiences,
Mandeville is taught to suppress his voice and efface the very sights and sounds of his
existence.
Within this environment of silence and controlled discourse, Mandeville is also
subject to another force compromising his psychological development. While he
internalizes the imperatives of emotional and verbal restraint from his uncle's example,
he is also paradoxically subject to the dominating effects of the overwhelming ferocity of
Bradford's lengthy discourses on the glories of Protestant martyrdom, the corruption and
heresy of the Catholic Church, and the moral and spiritual necessity of renouncing pride
and self-conceit. Bradford's anti-Papal discourses, in particular, "inflamed his blood, and
made his eye sparkle with primitive and apostolic fury" (46). Indeed, Bradford's
religious fervour on this topic borders on mania, and in the intense energy and
overwhelming verbosity of his speech he seems the very antithesis of everything
Mandeville House represents.
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Moreover, Mandeville's relationship with Bradford is fraught with conflict. "I
scarcely loved Hilkiah," he admits, claiming that the "magisterial tone" and "elaborate
style" of his discourse proved "insupportably galling," especially when applied to his own
character and behaviour (54-55). Despite his resentment on these occasions, however,
Mandeville's relationship with Bradford is more generally informed by extreme feelings
of worshipful dependence: "I was convinced of his integrity; I admired his intellectual
powers; I was lost in astonishment at the greatness of his attainments. I was conscious of
the limited sphere of my own knowledge; I distrusted my judgment; I looked up to him as
an oracle" (54). Fleetwood, as we may recall, also refers to Gifford as an "oracle" (337),
describing, with a certain belated alarm, the "ascendency" which the orchestrator of his
downfall obtains over his judgment and thought processes (384). Similarly, Mandeville
speaks of Bradford in terms of the "ascendency he possessed over [his] mind" (54). As
Mandeville asserts, "he was [...] my oracle and guide, the master of my theories, and the
regulator of my faith" (69).
The connections suggested here between Fleetwood's friendship with the
manipulative Gifford and Mandeville's relationship with his tutor are not misplaced, for
Mandeville, like Fleetwood, finds his own voice and subjectivity subsumed by those of
his "oracle," to similarly tragic results. Bradford, of course, is not the incontestable
villain that Gifford, a man ruled by greed and driven by intentional deceit, proves himself
to be. Indeed, Bradford's motivations are largely honourable, in that he hopes to instill in
his young charge a becoming sense of humility and religious piety. Despite his best
intentions, however, Bradford's pedagogical approach-which seems dominated by
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lengthy and hyperbolic lectures on chosen topics-only serves to further Mandeville's
alienation and misanthropic tendencies, as Bradford himself suspects on his deathbed (6667).
Godwin was particularly sensitive to the fact that the educative process, in his day,
so often involved a certain tendency towards "despotism" on the part of the tutor or
"preceptor." In the Enquirer, he argued that "all education is despotism. It is perhaps
impossible for the young to be conducted without introducing in many cases the tyranny
of implicit obedience. Go there; do that; read; write; rise; lie down; will perhaps for ever
be the language addressed to youth by age" (60). This dangerous tendency can infect
even the best-intentioned educative programmes, but Godwin emphasizes that "private"
education-such as the one experienced by Mandeville-is particularly susceptible to this
type of tyrannous control-or, at least, the student will experience the despotism more
acutely because he suffers alone, without peers. "The most wretched of all slaveries,"
contends Godwin, "is that which I endure alone; the whole weight of which falls upon my
own shoulders, and in which I have no fellow-sufferer to share with me a particle of my
burthen" (Enquirer 60). The social isolation of private education necessarily results in
solitary suffering, and such suffering, argues Godwin, creates antagonism between the
tutor and the pupil, and can lead to despair on the part of the student. Under the "slavery"
of such despotic control, "the mind pusillanimously shrinks. [The student is] left alone
with [his] tyrant, and [is] utterly hopeless and forlorn" (Enquirer 60). The tutor-pupil
relationship modeled by Bradford and Mandeville is a striking portrayal of the
antagonism which can result from the despotism of private education.
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On one level, Mandeville's alienation from Bradford is simply a product of his
excessive pride, of the anger and humiliation produced by Bradford's instructions in
humility. Mandeville's "soul revolt[s] from the ignoble comparison" of himself to a
beggar-boy or a kitchen hand (57), and he bitterly resents having to perform manual
labour (58). On another, more compelling level, however, Mandeville's rage and
resentment seem to be products of the silencing effects of Bradford's overwhelming and
insistent discourse, discourse that, ironically, also inspires his worshipful reverence of his
tutor. "Tickled with the speciousness of his discourse" (56), Bradford "amply [] unrol[s]
the volume of his lessons" (54); he "accompanies] his instructions with a full statement
of the causes and considerations by which they are inforced" (54); he "dwelt upon those
conceptions" (54-55), and never failed to "comment[] with great rigour" (55).
Taught by both his uncle and by his socialization at Mandeville House to repress
the sight and sounds of his existence, Mandeville is furthered silenced by Bradford's
excessive speech. The insistent energy of Bradford's lectures leaves no room for his
pupil's own voice, and, as such, Mandeville feels helplessly passive in the face of
Bradford's overwhelming discourse. Mandeville is thus split between outward
compliance to his tutor and an inner rage he cannot verbally articulate: "I submitted
indeed outwardly, for my nature did not prompt me to scenes of violence; but I retained
the principle of rebellion entire, shut up in the chamber of my thoughts" (59). Internal
rebellion, for Godwin, was too often the unfortunate consequence of private education,
where "control" leads to a "contention of the passions" (Enquirer 61). Godwin
articulates this contention from the perspective of the student: "I feel all the bitterness of
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being obliged unmurmuring to submit the turbulence of my own passions to the
turbulence of the passions of my preceptor [....] [M]y heart pants with indignation
against the injustice, real or imaginary, that I endure" (Enquirer 61).
Such contention, and the internal rebellion it necessarily engenders, contributes to
the development of a spiteful disposition in the pupil. For Mandeville, however,
rebellion is simply the exercise of his own voice, the freedom and ability to articulate,
without fear or restraint, the sentiments or emotions of his mind. Furthermore, it is the
very necessity of repressing this "rebellious" tendency, his voice, that cultivates the rage
and bitterness that form the foundation for his later misanthropy. "I was not indeed a
tumultuous and refractory pupil," Mandeville declares. "I did not give much trouble to
my preceptor; but on that very account these things revolved incessantly in my mind, and
worked themselves more deeply into the substance of my character" (55; emphasis
added). His misanthropy, in other words, is a direct product of his silence, in that the
very act of not articulating his anger furthers the hateful turn of his mind. Indeed, for
Mandeville, an unhealthy mind is the product of repressing the voice:
I said little; but this circumstance only deepened the effect on my mind.
'Give sorrow words', says the great master of the human soul.3 Whatever
sentiment finds its way to the lips, and vents its energies through the
medium of language, by that means finds relief. 'Out of the abundance of
the heart the mouth speaketh'; and we feel satisfied, if we have told, even
to the desert air, but much more in the hearing of an intelligent creature,
the story of our griefs.4 But my silent nature was an ever-living and
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incessant curse to me. My displeasures brooded, and heated, and inflamed
themselves, at the bottom of my soul, and finding no vent, shook so my
single frame of man, like to an earthquake. (59-60)
While Mandeville is insistent that these early experiences are responsible for the
later development of his personality-they "worked themselves [] deeply into the
substance of my character," he argues (55)-he nevertheless considers the possibility of an
inherent misanthropy contaminating his soul. He wonders, for example, if he might be a
"monster, not formed with the feelings of human nature" (44). The description of his
childhood, however, serves to support Godwin's view that external environment, above
all, shapes human character, and we get a clear sense that the combined forces of
Audley's example, the somber imperatives of Mandeville House, and the effects of
Bradford's pedagogy shape Mandeville into the mentally unstable misanthrope he will
ultimately become. In particular, we see how the silencing effects of these three forces
operate on Mandeville's mind to produce a child, and then a young man, who feels unable
to exercise his own voice, who feels silenced by the overwhelming pressures of his social
environment. Unable to express outwardly, in speech, his emotions or thoughts,
Mandeville increasingly turns inward, internalizing the imperative of silence and
perceiving himself as a passive victim of various persecutory forces, a perception which
then structures his imaginative conceptions of himself and his place in the world. As we
will see, Mandeville soon becomes aware of the power inherent in using language, and
using it well. His inability to take an active or effective role in expressing his thoughts or
emotions, his inability to escape being "shut up in the chamber of [his] thoughts" (59),
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will come to symbolize his ultimate failure in life. This failure, furthermore, will be the
most compelling factor in the development of his misanthropy and his eventual mental
disintegration.
"The Interchange of Defiance and Debate"
The potentially deceptive power of language is a central theme in Mandeville.
Bradford's discourse after all is articulate, yet "specious," crafted into "well sounding
periods," yet "vague and indefinite"(56). Indeed, in this sense, Bradford's language
mirrors the geographic murkiness of the land surrounding Mandeville House, with its
"vapours" and "steams," its "thick fogs" which envelop everything within an opaque and
confounding mist (24). The eloquence of his lectures on Mandeville's character masks
the flaws in his reasoning, the lack of clarity in his advice. "If I desired to correct myself
in conformity to its admonitions, I knew not where to begin [....] it furnished me with
no light to direct my course," declares Mandeville (56). Bradford's example serves as an
instructive lesson for his pupil regarding the seductive appeal of eloquent speech, but he
will receive a much more extreme lesson in the deliberate manipulation of language for
deceitful ends. We see this most obviously in the character of Coke Holloway, the
unscrupulous attorney who designs numerous schemes to bring both Audley Mandeville
and his nephew under his sway of influence and to ultimately deprive Mandeville of the
estate entailed on him.
Godwin had made an earlier indictment of lawyers, and of the profession of the
law in general, in his Enquirer essay, ""Of Trades and Professions." In that essay,

Godwin criticizes the law as "necessarily captious and technical, pregnant with petty
subtleties and unmeaning distinctions" (225). "[A lawyer's] great object," contends
Godwin, "is to puzzle and perplex. His chief attention is given to the enquiry, how he
may distort the law so as to suit the cause in which he is engaged" (Enquirer 225).
Lawyers, in Godwin's view, thus operate in a manner antithetical to that of the rational
philosopher, who is guided by the principles ofjustice, reason, and the pursuit of
universal benevolence.
Indeed, in Caleb Williams, Godwin had already created a fictionalized portrait of
the dishonourable attorney motivated by greed and self-interest, rather than the pursuit of
justice and truth. In that novel, the tenant farmer Hawkins correctly perceives the law as
an instrument of persecution, rather than justice, a tool "better adapted for a weapon of
tyranny in the hands of the rich, than for a shield to protect the humbler part of the
community against their usurpations" (138). Although he is initially reluctant to redress
his wrongs through the law, he eventually brings an action against Tyrell, his former
landlord and current persecutor. Tyrell in turn instructs his lawyer, Swineard, to
manipulate the case in order to pervert the course of justice: "the business was, by
affidavits, motions, pleas, demurrers, flaws, and appeals, to protract the question from
term to term and from court to court" (139). Swineard, thus directed by Tyrell, is not
concerned with justice, or even with a successful "repelling of the charge" against his
client (139); instead, he employs the "whole series of his subterfuges" to manipulate the
legal system and evade disclosure of the truth (138).
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In Mandeville, Godwin returns to the figure of the unethical lawyer to illustrate
the potentially deceptive nature of language. In a letter, Audley's steward informs
Mandeville of Holloway's presence at the estate and the unlikely influence he wields over
the master. '"Such a scoundrel as this,'" writes the steward, '"ought to have no power'"
(185). Holloway does have power, however, and his power is a direct function of the way
in which he uses language to manipulate others' perceptions of reality. For Holloway,
that "pettifogger of the law," as Mandeville terms him (231), an ambitious man's greatest
skill is in learning to veil his true motives with false rhetoric, with a performance of
kindness and flattery. '"The whole world [...] the civilised world, was a scene of
warfare under the mask of civility,'" and for the lawyer, the '"most advantageously
disposed'" of all modern professionals to use language as a weapon, '"flattery is the art,
that makes him who is accomplished in it, the master of the masters of the earth'" (234).
With his well-chosen words and carefully orchestrated actions, Holloway is able to
ingratiate himself into Audley's home and confidence.
It is his skill with obfuscation, however, that serves, on at least one significant
occasion, to bring Mandeville under his control. After Audley's death, Holloway
manages to retain autonomous control over Mandeville's legal and financial affairs by
overwhelming the young man with the "sublime obscurities of [his] explanations" (220).
In deliberately shaping his explanations of business concepts and terms in such a way as
to intentionally obscure Mandeville's comprehension of such things, and in
overwhelming his young client with largely irrelevant jargon and minutiae, Holloway
uses language to cultivate ignorance, rather than knowledge. He "was a master in his
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art," asserts Mandeville. "He knew how to 'perplex, and dash maturest counsels',5 and to
congregate a cloud that should baffle the acutest vision" (220). Indeed, even Mallison,
Holloway's unscrupulous nephew, is impressed with the lawyer's facility in the
manipulation of language and legal discourse: '"He has the law at his fingers' ends, with
all its quirks and its cranks, and its ins and its outs,'" he boasts towards the end of the
novel (304). As a "pettifogger of the law," Holloway engages in obfuscation in a
deliberate attempt to veil his true intentions within a shroud of "sublime obscurities"
(220). Mandeville House, with its "thick fogs and mists" (24), is thus a fitting
environment for Holloway to practise his rhetorical deception: in their ability to trap
auditors within an entanglement of lies and confusion, Holloway's words evoke the "vast
quantities of sargassos and weeds" thrown up by the tides around Mandeville House (24).
Holloway's nephew serves as his apprentice in such deception. Mallison, whose
very name speaks to the malevolence of his character ("wa/ww" being Latin for "evil" or
"crime"), is a former schoolmate of Mandeville from Winchester College, the public
school Mandeville is sent to after Bradford's death.6 At the College, Mallison takes a
sadistic pleasure in encouraging the verbal harassment of his fellow students, in "seeing
his fellows writhe with mental pain" (84). His weapon of choice, like Holloway's, is his
keen control over language, his ability to pervert the words of another to suggest
something entirely different, something calculated to inspire the humiliation and torment
of his chosen victim. From "honey itself," declares Mandeville, he could "extract a
poison" (84). Significantly, when Mallison resurfaces in the text as Holloway's nephew
and apprentice, he manipulates Mandeville, not through "poison," as he had done years
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earlier, but through the "honey" of false flattery and well-designed conversation. With
his carefully worded "stock of anecdotes and panegyric" (244) on Mandeville's character,
combined with a memory that allows him to recite long passages from Mandeville's
favourite authors and mimic the idiosyncrasies of their former school masters, Mallison is
able to ingratiate himself into Mandeville's confidence through the power of
conversation.
It is at Winchester School that Mandeville meets Lionel Clifford, the young man
he will perceive as his life-long nemesis, the "evil genius" who will blight his every
chance at happiness or success (106). For Mandeville, Clifford's defining characteristic
is his unparalleled eloquence, his ability to expound on a variety of topics with
remarkable ease and articulate energy. Whereas Mandeville labours under the
imperatives of silence inculcated in childhood, and feels "shut up in the chamber of [his]
thoughts" as a result, Clifford seems to "attract all eyes, and to win all hearts" with the
gaiety of his wit and the open nature of his interactions with others (82). To Mandeville,
Clifford's discourse is a manifestation of the sublime, and the natural and unmediated
nature of his rhetorical effusions seem to be the inevitable overflow of an inspired soul
superior to Mandeville's own. In one of his many long speeches to his schoolmates,
Clifford declaims against the evils of wealth and touts the glories of poverty, and
Mandeville acutely recognizes the sublime effects of Clifford's eloquence on the
sensibilities of his peers: "these discourses of Clifford, while he spoke them, appeared
almost divine. He charmed, as it were, our very souls out of our bodies, and might have
led us through the world" (89). "He spoke," Mandeville continues, "because he could not
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help it, and to give vent to his full bosom. And his discourses were always so well timed,
so aptly rose out of the occasion in hand, and were so animated and pithy, that every one
longed for the occasion, and were delighted to listen to the magic of his tongue" (89-90).
Mandeville is clearly in awe of Clifford's rhetorical prowess and, more
significantly, of the power he commands over his auditors. However, as the above
descriptions suggest, he is also deeply suspicious of language and, perhaps more
importantly, of those who use it too well. He had after all, from his early interactions
with Bradford, sensed that excessive eloquence can potentially mask "specious"
argument. Eloquence, as Mandeville also knew, tends to lull its auditors into a passive
position of reverence. Mandeville thus perceives something deceptive in Clifford's
discourse, an incongruity between surface appearance and actual reality. His "discourses''
may appear to be spontaneous expressions of the authentic self, but, to Mandeville, they
also potentially bear the stamp of careful orchestration, of being "well timed," "aptly
[rising] out of the occasion in hand" (89-90). Mandeville increasingly comes to regard
Clifford as a sort of sophist, a supernatural "enchanter" who distorts reality to manipulate
the perceptions of those around him (90). In this way, Clifford, in Mandeville's eyes,
operates as a corrupting force at Winchester. While Mandeville admits to feeling envious
of Clifford, the "root" of his aversion towards him lies in a "sort of moral
disapprobation": "I considered Clifford as a kind of mountebank, debauching the
character of his equals, and destroying that sobriety and concentration of soul, without
which there can be no considerable virtue" (83). In Mandeville's mind, the sophistries of
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Clifford, combined with the gaiety and wit of his speech, fosters an unbecoming levity in
his peers which will lead to vice.
Mandeville's first interactions with Clifford at Winchester School initiate a lifelong pattern whereby his sense of self is organized around a conception of himself as the
very antithesis to Clifford and his eloquence. Ironically, despite Mandeville's moral
disapprobation of Clifford and the power he wields through language, it is on precisely
this ground that he feels most envious of his rival. In contrast to Clifford's easy sociality
and open style of communicative exchange with his schoolmates, Mandeville's "rooted
habits" are organized around the introverted processes of "reflection, silence, and reverie"
(83). "I was not like Clifford," Mandeville soon realizes upon arriving at Winchester:
I could not put my soul into my tongue, and witch all hearers with my
eloquence. Envious nature had denied to me this privilege. But I felt my
deficiency with fierce and burning impatience. Why should this youth
steal away the souls of his companions with glozing words, and I have no
tongue to check his mistakes, and expose his sophistries? (91)
We see here the ambivalence of Mandeville's relationship with language and rhetoric.
While language is something to be mistrusted, as it can "witch all hearers" into an
acceptance of false logic and ultimately vice, it is also perceived by Mandeville as both
the source and the manifestation of authentic selfhood, whereby the "tongue" becomes
the conduit for the genuine expression of one's "soul," as well as a moral force in the
correction of "mistakes" and "sophistries."
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Certainly, Mandeville feels his lack of rhetorical prowess as a decided
"deficiency" on this altruistic level. In his inability to "check [the] mistakes" and "expose
[the] sophistries" he perceives in Clifford's discourse, Mandeville fails, in his mind, to
act as a corrective force in the "sacred cause of truth" (91). More significantly, however,
Mandeville's failures with language threaten his very sense of a coherent self. Incapable
of expressing, verbally, the sentiments of his mind-unable to "unbosom [his] thoughts" to
another (96)-Mandeville increasingly projects his frustration through the body, taking
solace in the brutal physicality of inflicting violent harm on himself and his schoolmates.
"I delighted in the sight of blood," Mandeville remarks of these boyhood confrontations.
"Whether it flowed from the person of my competitor or from my own, in the one case no
less than the other, it seemed to lighten and dilute the impure and substantial fluid that
weighed on my heart. I gained some, but an imperfect relief to the injustice I felt" (93).
The masochism of this comment suggests the extent of the alienation between
Mandeville's mind and body. Trapped inside a body that, in his perception,, fails him, he
can only experience a limited sort of relief and pleasure by inflicting pain on an offending
body he cannot entirely claim as his own. "I had no respect for the limbs and members of
my body," he declares, "and viewed them as an incumbrance upon the activity of my
spirit. They were mine, not me. My arm was but an implement and a tool, of the same
nature as a hooked stick, and of no value but for the commission in which it was
employed" (94).
It is therefore significant that Mandeville describes his own subjectivity in terms
of the disconnection which he feels exists between his mind and his body. "The habit of
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my soul was endless rumination," he writes, "in which the tongue was chained up in
silence, and the limbs almost forgot their office, but the thinking part of the machine
worked incessantly, like the members and wheels of a vast machine, or like the eternal
descent of the waters in a foaming cataract" (68). Although Mandeville details his early
development in terms of the overwhelming role that silence comes to play in forming the
substantive part of his character and in structuring his interactions with the world around
him, the reader is nevertheless aware of a tremendous intellectual energy (the "endless
rumination" of a mental "machine" that operates "incessantly") which can find no release
or expression in a body from which Mandeville feels inherently alienated.
Due to a childhood spent at Mandeville House conforming to the imperatives of
silence inculcated through his experiences with a vegetative uncle and a domineering
tutor, Mandeville has retreated so far into his own mental space that he finds it almost
impossible to breach the dictate of silence he has imposed on himself. By the time he
arrives at the "moving and busy scene" of Winchester School (82), this self-silencing has
played such a central role in the development of his subjectivity that it functions more as
an involuntary silencing whereby he is unable to speak, or voice his case, even when it is
socially imperative for him to do so. Indeed, it is precisely his inability to assert his voice
at Winchester School that initiates the train of misunderstandings that will ultimately
blight his future prospects. As Mandeville tells the reader, "political party ran very high"
at Winchester (80), and the various ideological and religious tensions structuring the
School and its student body lend a combative tone to social interaction.7

Mandeville falls victim to such political prejudice when a book of satirical prints
lampooning Charles I is found in his apartments and shown to Clifford, Mandeville's
nemesis. Although the book is found in Mandeville's rooms, some doubt exists as to its
actual ownership given that Mandeville at the time had struck up a limited sort of
friendship with a boy named Waller, another social misfit at Winchester and,
significantly, the son of a famous Presbyterian military commander. As both boys are
Presbyterian and thus considered possible owners of the book, an informal judicial
assembly headed by Clifford and comprised of other head-form boys is convened to
determine both the book's owner and the penalty he will face for possessing such
seditious material. Although, in private, Waller claims the book as his own, he
nevertheless cowardly imputes ownership to Mandeville in a fearful, yet rhetorically
effective, speech delivered to the assembly of his peers. It is Mandeville's pervasive
silence in the situation, however, that allows for Waller's deception. When brought
before the assembly, Mandeville stands in "mute astonishment" (99), convinced that, in
his innocence, he is freed from the necessity of defending himself in speech. "It was not
my business to speak to justify myself" Mandeville declares, "and still less to cast the
charge upon [Waller]; and I left my companion to explain the matter as he could" (99).
Waller is thus able to weave an artful tale out of the vacuum created by Mandeville's
silence, and even when faced with the reality of his friend's treachery, Mandeville is
capable of no greater articulation in his own defence than an "interjection of
astonishment" (99) and a one-sentence denial of ownership that he naively assumes will
be credited as the truth (100).
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On one level, Mandeville ascribes his silence to choice, to his sense of pride in
refusing to justify himself on so base an accusation. "Could I have stooped," he asks, "to
make an elaborate defence against an infamous charge, which I felt within myself to be
void of the slightest foundation?" (100). Moreover, he eventually enters into Waller's
deception as a willing accomplice, agreeing to accept ownership of the book and shoulder
both the punishment and social ostracism that such a choice will yield. The masochism
of such an act, however, is ironically perceived by Mandeville as a source of power,
particularly as it allows him to effect a posture of silent suffering:
[T]here was something gallant, that at this time suited my savage temper,
in braving the imputation of guilt, when secretly, in the chambers of my
own heart, I knew that I was innocent, and more than innocent [....]
There appeared to me, while I thought of it, a sort of lordly delight in
standing the scorns and reproaches of my companions, when all the time in
my own reflections I smiled contemptuously at their error, and rose serene
above the clouds in which their misconstructions sought to envelop me.
(103)
For Mandeville, "braving" the "scorns and reproaches" of his peers will prove both his
moral superiority and strength of character, and it is significant that the demonstration of
his superiority in this regard rests on the silence he must sustain in the face of social
disapprobation. In Mandeville's conception, his moral superiority is a direct, function of
not only innocence but, more specifically, of an innocence that is never verbally
expressed, an innocence that can only be recognized in the introspective space of his own
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mind, "in the chambers of [his] own heart" (103). Mandeville thus retreats into his own
mind yet again, taking refuge in constructing his silence as a sort of masochistic choice on
his part. There is a definite sense, however, that Mandeville's decision to brave the
charge on Waller's behalf grows out of a conscious awareness of his inability to assert his
voice before his hostile peers. Even before he shoulders the blame for Waller,
Mandeville is cognizant of his rhetorical failings: "I was not eloquent," he laments. "My
nature refused to supply me with the stream of a copious discourse on any occasion"
(100).
We see another missed opportunity at vindication a few years later, when, as a
seventeen-year-old student at Oxford, Mandeville returns from a disappointing adventure
as attempted secretary to the commander-in-chief of the Royalist and Presbyterian forces
arming against the government of Cromwell. Mandeville, anxious to play a role in the
upcoming engagement, and eager to assume the post for which he had been strongly
recommended by an ambitious statesman, sees in this "first scene upon the theatre of real
life" (120), a chance to assert a burgeoning sense of masculine independence. When
Mandeville is denied the post, however, on the account of it being promised already to
Clifford, he returns to Oxford in quiet despair over this missed opportunity, his violent
hatred of Clifford strengthened all the more by the humiliation Mandeville feels he has
received at his hands.
Mandeville's inability to defend himself against the accusations of his Winchester
schoolfellows had allowed for the rumours of his anti-Royalist sentiments to take root,
and we see the fallout of this unfortunate circumstance when, after returning to Oxford,

he becomes the subject of spiteful misconstructions regarding his time spent with the
Royalist forces. When Lisle, a fervently Royalist schoolmate previously befriended by
Mandeville, accuses him of being both a cowardly deserter and a potential spy for
Cromwell's regime, a "king-killer in [his] heart" (137), Mandeville is faced, for the
second time in his life, with defending himself against false charges. Although Lisle tells
Mandeville that his "ambiguous adventure [...] admits of no honourable explanation"
(137), the very characterization of the "adventure" as "ambiguous" suggests that there is
at least a limited potential for Mandeville to clear his name in this matter. He fails,
however-just as he had failed at Winchester School-to speak up in his own defense and
launch an adequate explanation of his actions. Rather, just as at Winchester, he listens,
"with astonishment" (137), and nurtures a rage that he then refuses to express:
I thought scorn of the idea of vindicating myself, of making appeal, as to
the scales of a balance, casting the foul aspersions to which I had listened
into one scale, and my own explanations and protestations into the other,
and carefully watching which way the beam would turn. This, of all
things, was the most contrary to my temper [....] He that did not
understand me from the impulse of his own mind, that did not find in his
own heart the explanation of my conduct, and the true estimate of my
thoughts, was unworthy to hear me. (138).
Just as at Winchester, Mandeville constructs his silence as both a source and a
manifestation of his pride and superiority of character, refusing to accept a social reality
that may require him to explain himself or his conduct. His character, he believes, should
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be known and felt, in the "impulse" of the "mind" or the "heart," and should not be
reliant on any "explanations or protestations" on his part.
Just as at Winchester, however, Mandeville's "voluntary" silence carries within it
marks of a passive resignation that underscores his awareness of his own rhetorical
failings. Later in his memoir, he reflects on his schoolboy days and the "diffidence"
which "sealed up [his] lips" and destroyed his attempts at persuasive rhetoric: "I fell into
blunders inconceivable," he laments. "All that I knew before seemed to have left me at
the moment it was wanted; I could never command the recollection of things, in the
interchange of defiance and debate, that were most fully at my disposal in the cool
element of meditation" (243). Although, in the context of his memoir, Mandeville is
specifically referring to his failures in the persuasive discourse of debate, the sentiments
he expresses speak to his larger failures with language and self-expression. Damaged by
a childhood mired in silence and repression, Mandeville is, at this point in his life, unable
to assert his own voice at precisely those crucial moments of "defiance and debate," those
moments which will help shape not only his future, but his sense of self and his
perception of his own subjectivity.
Significantly, after both of his public failures in self-defense, Mandeville suffers
either a physical or mental collapse. Immediately following the judicial assembly at
Winchester, he falls into a "raging fever" that incapacitates him for several weeks. When
he recovers, he is an "altered creature," a pale and "languid" version of his former self, a
"meagre, unlaid ghost" (105). Similarly, after his confrontation with Lisle, Mandeville
plunges into the forest surrounding Oxford, mad with rage and despair, and collapses
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senselessly. Confined to an asylum for a short period, he sinks into a delirium filled with
grisly images that send him into hysterics. Struggling against those attempting to subdue
him, he is truly the picture of a madman: "My teeth were ground almost to pieces; my
head shook, and my mouth scattered foam, like that of a war-horse in the midst of the din
of arms" (144). In both of these cases, Mandeville suffers either a physical or mental
collapse in the wake of social embarrassments which underscore his failures in selfexpression. In this sense, both incidents not only foreshadow what is to come for
Mandeville, but document the very strain of silence on the mind and the body.
For Mandeville, his "first scene upon the theatre of life" (120) results in
humiliating disappointment that underscores his failed attempt at entering into masculine
life. As he relates to the reader, the post of secretary to Sir Joseph Wagstaff was so
appealing precisely because it offered him the opportunity to "count for something" in the
world of men:
I felt that the door of manly existence had just been opened upon me, that I
had been permitted for a moment to contemplate prospects that appeared
to me delicious and rapturous (for what sensation exists more rapturous,
than that which a young man experiences, when he feels for the first time,
that he is counted for something substantive in the dramatis personae of
society, that his voice is numbered, that his opinion is listened to, that
some eyes are turned upon him to remark the part he shall act?)-and then
the door was suddenly and violently clapped in my face. I was left alone,
in the narrow line between being and no-being. (123)

Like Fleetwood, who spoke of the "theatre of life" during his early years in Pans (95),
Mandeville is also aware of the performative nature of social life, and, like Fleetwood, he
also uses a theatrical metaphor to describe the process whereby one must cultivate an
exterior image of identity which then serves as the standard by which he or she will be
judged. Playing a major role in the "dramatis personae" of "manly" life would have lent
Mandeville, in his eyes, a certain masculine authority that might have compensated for
the rhetorical failures that seemed to relegate him to the margins of society. Denied such
a role, however, Mandeville retreats even further into misanthropic isolation,
experiencing a certain existential crisis of sorts, in which he feels himself occupying the
anxious space between "being" and "no-being."
The crisis Mandeville experiences at this point in his life is reminiscent of the
numerous other instances in which he exhibits a problematic sense of his own identity.
As Tysdahl has pointed out, Mandeville is fundamentally flawed in that he lacks a
"definite and secure idea of his own self (142), and we see this most obviously in his
life-long obsession over Clifford as his "evil genius" (106). Like Caleb, who sees the
"whole fortune of [his] life" as "linked" to Falkland's tragic "story" (66), Mandeville
similarly perceives himself as existentially connected to Clifford. Upon his entrance at
Winchester School, Mandeville constructs his own identity as a direct function of his
conception of Clifford. Just as Clifford has no significant existence in Mandeville's
memoirs apart from his role as Mandeville's "evil genius," Mandeville has no sense or
perception of his own identity apart from Clifford. Indeed, he uses a variety of
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compelling images to convey what he sees as his monstrous union with Clifford. "I have
read of twin children," he declares,
whose bodies were so united in their birth, that they could never after be
separated, while one carried with him, wherever he went, an intolerable
load, and of whom, when one died, it involved the necessary destruction of
the other. Something similar to this, was the connection that an eternal
decree had made between Clifford and me. I was deeply convinced, that
his bare existence, was essentially the bane of mine. (141)
Just as Caleb perceives his dyadic bond with Falkland in pathological terms-"we
were each of us a plague to the other," he writes (199)-Mandeville experiences his
"eternal" union with Clifford as equally destructive (although in Mandeville's case it is
only he who faces annihilation, and not his rival). Indeed, as his hatred and envy of
Clifford take deeper root, Mandeville indulges in images even more pathological.
"Clifford is my fate," he declares after the failed reconciliation with his rival at Beaulieu
House. "He is part of myself, a disease that has penetrated to my bones, and that I can
never get rid of, as long as any portion of consciousness shall adhere to the individual
Mandeville" (176). Notice how, in both images, Mandeville perceives himself as the
passive victim of circumstances entirely beyond his control: an "eternal decree" binds
him to Clifford, not his own obsessive insecurities, and his corporeal "union" with
Clifford is likewise perceived as an incurable disease unjustly imposed upon him for no
explicable reason. Just as Mandeville perceived himself in childhood as the helpless

victim persecuted by people and forces beyond his control, he continues in adulthood to
see himself as the unwilling casualty of a capricious fate.
Such images foreground the extent to which Mandeville relies on others to
consolidate a sense of his own identity. Although Clifford serves as the most obvious
reference point in Mandeville's construction of his own subjectivity, we see, in his
relationship with Mallison, another and perhaps more compelling example of
Mandeville's uncertain hold on his own selfhood. This is particularly true in terms of
Mandeville's weak sense of masculine authority. Tormented by the failed reconciliation
with Clifford and feeling trapped by living arrangements which-in the wake of his
uncle's death-had left him sharing a domicile with the detested Holloway and Mallison,8
Mandeville takes solitary refuge in his enjoyment of horsemanship, a pastime that affords
him a welcome sense of physical vitality. "The motion of a horseman was agreeable to
me," he relates, as "it communicated a new alacrity to the circulation of the blood; it
excited the animal spirits" (236). Riding, furthermore, "brings nameless relief to [his]
wearied spirit" (236), and he relishes the image of manly nobility conveyed, he believes,
by him and his horse. "I was no ill model of a cavalier," he declares (237).
A fall, however, abruptly ends these solitary pursuits, and Mandeville finds
himself bed-ridden for a fortnight, a period during which he forges a vexed
companionship with Mallison, the hated nephew of Holloway and the malignant schemer
responsible for much of Mandeville's social embarrassment at Winchester School. As a
lawyer, Holloway functions as the archetypal spokesman for the Law of the Father, and
Mallison, as Holloway's apprentice, is similarly at home in the Symbolic Order of
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languagefromwhich Mandeville feels so alienated. Indeed, as Mandeville relates, the
artfulness of Mallison's temperament rendered him a particularly keen disciple of
Holloway's philosophies regarding the manipulation of people and language. Holloway
had preached of the necessary "'mask of civility'" one must don to veil one's malevolent
ends (234), and Mallison becomes, in turn, an "admirable mimic," an "excellent actor,"
who "could compose the phrases and the sentences of the part he had to play" (249).
Mallison takes his lessons in mimicry a fundamental step further, however: rather
than simply donning a "mask" or playing a "part," he seems to empty himself of any
inherent being or disposition that exists prior to his chosen performance. Mallison,
Mandeville remarks,
without being any thing in himself intrinsically, superior to the dirt upon
which he trod, [] had that pliancy of disposition, that he could remove
himself for the moment into the person he wishes to represent, with a
power something similar to that, with which Fadlallah in the Persian Tales,
could shoot himself into any organized body that lay inanimate before him.
(249-50)9
When Mallison effects a posture of friendship towards Mandeville, therefore, the
performance carries within it a certain authenticity that Mandeville is unable to resist,
despite his inner conviction of Mallison's duplicity. Mallison's primary weapon is of
course flattery, and his carefully chosen words of admiration and amusing anecdotes
function to lull Mandeville into an acceptance of, and then a reliance on, his company.
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It is significant, however, that Mallison's flattery, and his bedside ministrations to
Mandeville, situates him within a gendered dynamic that casts him in a feminized role.
While Mandeville is physically incapacitated, Mallison assumes the specifically
feminized role of doting nurse. Mallison, Mandeville remarks of this period, "tended my
couch with unwearied care; nor was there any species of tenderness and attention left by
him undischarged" (239). As care giver, his actions appear to be perpetually informed by
the "utmost watchfulness and tenderness" for his charge (240): as Mandeville relates, "he
seemed to have no object but my gratification, no study but of what would be acceptable
to me, and no standard of good, but what depended on my will" (245). Such
characterizations of Mallison as self-effacing helpmeet to a male companion align him
with other compelling images of the doting female partner found in Godwin's novels.10
Indeed, this term of Mandeville's convalescence reads almost like a period of courtship,
whereby Mallison, with contrived gestures and artful conversation, not only engages
Mandeville's attention, but wins his approbation as well. "I began comparatively to like
Mallison," Mandeville tells the reader (244), displaying an awkward sense of both
ignorance and knowledge regarding the way in which he is manipulated in these
exchanges. Mallison is even characterized by Mandeville in terms of those archetypal
symbols of female seduction, the Sirens, who, with their "ravishing strains," threatened to
render even "wily" Ulysses a "fool" (245). "The company of Mallison was in some
measure to me like the song of the Sirens," Mandeville declares (245).
Such a simile, however, is double-edged and speaks to the way in which
Mandeville's sense of masculine authority is simultaneously fortified, as well as undercut,
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by his relationship with Mallison. On one level, Mandeville's masculinity is no doubt
affirmed by the feminine posture adopted by Mallison, a posture which not only relieves
Mandeville's boredom and soothes his anxieties but, most importantly, always defers to
his superior judgment. Mallison, Mandeville tells the reader, "was so implicit, bowed so
completely to all my judgments, and drank in all my suggestions, that it was a pleasure to
talk to so accommodating a pupil" (244). The Siren simile, therefore, can function as a
way for Mandeville to cast himself in the active role of Ulysses, the clever hero who,
while tempted by the Sirens, is nevertheless able to outwit them. As we see in his
exchanges with Mallison, however, Mandeville is no Ulysses, and he ultimately fails to
resist the temptations of Mallison's flattery. Rather, his ego soothed by Mallison's Siren
song, he quickly falls prey to the machinations of Holloway and his nephew. Indeed, the
seductive force that Mallison seems to exert over Mandeville's mind disempowers him to
the point of complete incapacitation. Falling "victim to the machinations of this precious
pair of devils" (254), his physical body is ultimately marked with the signs of his
psychological submission: "My health wasted daily; my powers of action seemed reduced
to almost nothing [....] My skin was dried up; my flesh perished from my bones; my
eyes became unacquainted with sleep; my joints refused to perform for me the ordinary
functions of a living being" (257).
While Mandeville is anxiously aware of the dangerous state of his dependence on
these two men, he feels physically unable to shake their hold over him, a dilemma
strikingly suggestive of Fleetwood's similar reliance on Gifford. "Holloway and
Mallison became in some degree a part of myself," laments Mandeville, and "I felt that
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day maimed and incomplete, in which I did not sup up my allotted dose of the nauseous
draught they administered" (257). Moreover, the masochism of his dependence takes on
sexualized connotations, whereby Mandeville's masculinity is compromised by the
feminized position he is forced to assume in his dealings with Holloway and Mallison:
"They had me in their hands, to play upon me as they pleased" (254); "when by their
flatteries they had laid me most naked to be assailed, that was the moment they chose to
aim at me the most deadly wound" (255).
However, despite his physical weakness in the face of "this precious pair of
devils," Mandeville is tormented by a mental energy-a "preternatural activity" of the
mind (258)-that demands he violently resist the machinations launched against him. "My
mind balanced between two tones, that of inexorable rage, and that of the lowest
despondency. The former urged me to revenge; the latter to suicide," declares Mandeville
(258). We thus see Mandeville haunted, yet again, by powerful emotions and sentiments
he is unable to articulate or act upon, and it is this inability to speak or act that feeds the
misanthropic rage that ultimately destroys his sanity.
"The Sister of My Soul"
The image of Mallison as nursemaid to Mandeville during his convalescence from
the riding accident brings to mind Henrietta's similar role as Mandeville's care giver,
particularly after the mental collapse occasioned by his public humiliation at Oxford.
With Mallison, Mandeville's attachment was a gradual development, one which
ultimately devolved into a dependence that left him anxious whenever his nursemaid "left
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[his] bed-side but for a moment" (240). With Henrietta, however, Mandeville's affection
(and dependence) runs much deeper, having taken root in a childhood deprived of any
other emotionally satisfying social connections. Indeed, it is only upon meeting his sister
Henrietta for the first time at age twelve, that he feels connected to another creature by
virtue of their shared humanity: "I seemed now for the first time to associate with a being,
with whom I felt an affinity, and whom I recognized as of the same species as myself.
This was indeed a memorable era in my existence" (63). That Mandeville recognizes this
meeting as a "memorable era in [his] existence" is significant, for it speaks to the way in
which his sister will assume for Mandeville a humanizing and connective role in his life.
From this point on, and with increasingly tragic consequences as the two grow into
adulthood, Henrietta will serve as Mandeville's link to humanity and the mediator of his
social exchange. As Mandeville recognizes at even this young age, it is only through
Henrietta-only through her soothing presence and, significantly, her inspiring
discourse-that he is reconciled to society and human interaction.
Of course, Mandeville's reliance on Henrietta as his mediator or connective link
to humanity only underscores his own troubled sense of identity, something we have
witnessed in his exchanges with both Clifford and Mallison. When Mandeville writes
that "Henrietta was father, and mother, and every thing to me in one" (63), we may recall
Macneil's similar words to Fleetwood: '"If you marry my daughter,'" he warns him,
'"you must be to her, father, and mother, and sisters, and all the world in one'" (262), a
declaration that highlights the vulnerability of Mary's position in the world. However,
whereas Mary struggles to maintain her own identity in the face of her husband's
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controlling tendencies, Mandeville, as we have seen, has never managed to consolidate
any coherent sense of his own selfhood. We thus witness Mandeville vacillating between
a conception of Henrietta as the complement to his own somewhat completed
existence-the "sister of [his] soul" (308)-and an understanding of her as inextricably
bound up with his own being, as forming the other half of his own uncompleted
subjectivity.
"As the dearest half of [his] soul" (62), Henrietta becomes the subject of
Mandeville's numerous fantasies regarding the transmutation of their souls. While
recovering from his mental collapse, Mandeville attributes his ensuing serenity and calm
to the displacement of his own soul in favour of Henrietta's: "Why was it that I felt a
serenity and a calm during this awful crisis, that I had never before experienced at any
period of my life?" asks Mandeville. "The soul of Mandeville seemed to have left me,
and the soul of Henrietta to have entered my bosom in its stead" (159). At the end of his
memoir, right before the disastrous kidnaping attempt that finally severs Mandeville's last
tie to both his sister and the familial and social community she represents, Mandeville
recounts his loss in terms of an early self hatred that compelled him to "live in," and
through, Henrietta:
I loved, as never man loved. I poured out my heart and my soul, all my
faculties, and all my thoughts, upon Henrietta. Early I learned to be
dissatisfied with myself, and to despise myself [....] Early therefore I
learned to go out of myself; and, like the dervise to whom I once before
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alluded, in the Persian Tales, I left my own rejected and loathsome corse,
to live in another, to feel her pleasures, and rejoice in her joys. (319-20)
In this allusion to the Persian prince who could enter into another's body at will,
Mandeville displaces Mallison as the empty vessel that can appropriate another's
subjectivity. As Mandeville realizes at this point in his narrative, the one consolation that
had sustained him throughout his various misfortunes was his perception that he could
cast off a "loathsome" selfhood he could not claim as his own and live vicariously
through the subjectivity of Henrietta.
It is ironic, yet at the same time highly fitting, that the one attribute which so
acutely draws Mandeville to Henrietta is his perception of her unrivaled wisdom as it is
revealed in their discursive exchanges. In her numerous speeches to Mandeville
regarding the potential perfectability of humanity and the necessity of a benevolent and
tolerant philanthropy, Henrietta exhibits a remarkable eloquence that aligns her with
much of the social idealism expressed in Political Justice. The nurturing patience of her
discourse to Mandeville also looks back to Marguerite's similar speeches to St. Leon
regarding humanity's responsibility to achieve happiness, even in the face of misfortune.
Indeed, for Elton Edward Smith and Esther Greenwell Smith, Henrietta is best viewed as
the "bearer of the Godwinian philosophic line in the novel" (104), and, for Shelley, this
was precisely the most appealing aspect of her character. As he declares to Godwin in a
December 7th, 1817 letter, "I do not think [...] that there ever was produced a moral
discourse more characteristic of all that is admirable and lovely in human Nature-more
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lovely and admirable in itself-than that of Henrietta to Mandeville as he is recovering
from madness" (260).
The humanizing role that Henrietta plays in Mandeville's life largely stems from
the way in which her eloquence and perceptive use of language reconcile him to both
himself and to the demands of sociality. After his first visit to Beaulieu Cottage,
Mandeville appropriates Henrietta as the guiding force in his life, the standard of
judgment against which he shapes his sense of self and plans his future conduct.
"Henrietta was the whole world to me," he declares. "In every thing I thought of her
approbation; and I resolved to accomplish myself in whatever was praise-worthy, because
I felt that she was capable of being my umpire and my judge [....] What should I do to
make myself the worthy mate of such a sister, was therefore the perpetual burthen of my
thoughts" (77).
Besides assuming for Mandeville the earthly roles of "umpire" and "judge,"
Henrietta also takes on qualities of the supernatural and the mystical, becoming a
"heavenly monitress" (152) who shapes Mandeville's opinions and guides his conduct
towards the path of benevolence and philanthropy. With her "divine discourses" (155),
she seemed to hold for Mandeville the "master-key of [his] soul" (173), and his "heart" is
consequently "tuned" in accordance to the sentiments she expresses (148). Indeed, in the
face of Henrietta's almost supernatural influence, Mandeville is unable to resist resigning
himself over to her guiding hand. In response to her repeated entreaties regarding a
reconciliation with Clifford, Mandeville ultimately responds, '"take me, and mould me as
you please. I can refuse you nothing. I will be the friend of Clifford!'" (159).
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Henrietta assumes a definite and rich existence in Mandeville's mind, her memory
inspiring him with an intellectual energy that nurtures his own creative impulses: "She
made me a painter. Whenever I shut my eyes, I saw her: whenever I let my thoughts
loose in imagination, I pictured to myself her gestures and her air" (62). However, unlike
Henrietta, whose "divine discourses" situate her firmly within the Symbolic Order,
Mandeville is primarily functioning on the level of images, the pre-verbal Imaginary.
Henrietta seems to realize this about her brother, and she attempts to morally reform him
by combining the verbal-her "divine discourses"-with the visual: "She talked to me of
love," recalls Mandeville of the period immediately following his emotional collapse at
Oxford. "She told me tales of her own daily experience, and the earthly paradise of
Beaulieu [....] She drew a bewitching portrait of an obscure and rural life" (148).
Although Henrietta makes Mandeville a "painter," it is telling that these creative
impulses are purely introspective. Just as he is unable to express the intellectual activity
of his mind around his peers at Winchester and Oxford, Mandeville is, around Henrietta,
similarly constrained in speech. "She talked," he remembers, "and my soul hung on the
enchanting sounds" (63). '"I have always been the principal talker,'" observed Henrietta
to Mandeville, '"and you have answered me with silence or few words'" (65). As
Mandeville later discloses to the reader, however, "Henrietta talked best, but I loved the
most" (66). This remark is significant, for it conveys Mandeville's awareness of the
disjunction between speech and feeling, his awareness that eloquence and fluid discursive
exchange are not necessarily the most authentic measures of truth.
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Indeed, it soon becomes apparent to the reader that Henrietta and her "divine
discourses" (55) are not immune to Mandeville's deep-rooted suspicion of eloquent
speech. The very act of characterizing her discourse as "divine" brings to mind
Mandeville's similar description of Clifford's extended speeches to his fellow
Wintonians (89), a characterization meant to highlight both the seductive appeal of wellphrased speech and its deceptive potential. As we may recall, Mandeville had
disapproved of Clifford and his rhetorical eloquence on the grounds that it gave him
undue power over his auditors and influenced them into accepting falsehoods as truth.
Similarly, we witness Mandeville become increasingly suspicious of Henrietta's powers
of persuasion and critical of the ways in which she employs these powers. Indeed, at
certain points in his memoir, Mandeville describes Henrietta's influence over him in
almost colonizing terms: She held an "empire over [his] soul" (158), and served as the
"despotic mistress of [his] faculties," irresponsibly carrying him away from all
"recollections," "associations," and "griefs" (178).
Whereas Mandeville assumes the role of painter solely in the introspective
processes of his own mind, Henrietta's artistry, her authorship of "bewitching portraitfs]"
and "tales" idealizing a rural life devoid of ambition (148), is very much a public process.
Such "tales" were "fiction," Mandeville realizes, "and not adapted to real life" (149). He
nevertheless emphasizes the powerful effect they had on his sensibilities, highlighting the
conscious artistry of Henrietta's "Arcadian pictures":
She drew a bewitching portrait of an obscure and rural life [.. .and]
however the Arcadian pictures drawn for me by Henrietta, might be
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imperfect in a general view, they were accurately adapted to my disease. I
was just recovered from a state of fearful perturbation; the very principles
and foundations of humanity within me, had been shaken; and music was
the restorative my condition required. Never was there so consummate an
artist in this respect as my Henrietta. Her voice was melodious; her
sentiments were all one mighty scheme of harmony; and the gay, yet
peaceful and serene pictures, with which she amused me from morning till
night, gave me a new sort of existence, to which I had hitherto been a
stranger. (148-49; emphasis added)
As a "consummate artist," Henrietta is able to manipulate her sentiments, gestures, and
the very modulation of her voice to craft a fantasy for Mandeville "accurately adapted to
[his] disease." As Mandeville implies, Henrietta's inspirational discourse is not
necessarily the unmediated and artless expression of her authentic sentiments but, rather,
a well-crafted "fiction" meant to shape his mind and conduct in accordance to her own
wishes, which, as we soon find out, involve Mandeville's reconciliation with Clifford.11
In this sense, Henrietta's "fiction" operates much like Mallison's deceptive flattery, and it
is striking that Mandeville similarly describes the effect of Henrietta's speech as "like the
song of the Sirens," which "lulled [him] into forgetfulness" (149). "I was all ear,"
Mandeville laments. "Every other sense was suspended; or was made tributary and
subordinate, to assist the impressions that the sense of hearing conveyed" (149). It thus
becomes clear that, while Mandeville may idealize Henrietta as his "heavenly monitress"
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(152), he also feels an acute anxiety regarding the nature and degree of her influence over
him.
With Clifford, we saw that Mandeville's disapproval of what he perceived as his
rival's sophistry was also matched by an envious desire for similar rhetorical powers, as
well as a resentful perception that his own voice will be perpetually eclipsed by that of his
"nemesis." It would seem that Mandeville's relationship with his sister is informed by a
similar perception that the "divine" nature of her eloquence overwhelms his own selfexpression, and it is this perception, I would argue, that ultimately alienates Mandeville
from his sister. As he relates to the reader on more than one occasion, he is desperate for
a "friend," a friend being, in his terms, one whom he can "bear to hear," but also one to
whom he can "bear to speak" (174). It is only within this conception of friendship that
Mandeville feels he would be able to engage in the reciprocal act of both listening and
speaking.
Despite this yearning for a friend, however, it is clear that Mandeville feels he can
never fulfill this conception of friendship with his sister. "Why could not Henrietta be
my friend?" he asks, anticipating the reader's question.
She could speak with eloquence divine; and I could bear to hear her; and,
while she spoke, my soul became her prisoner, and all her accents had over
me the power of enchantment. But, unfortunately, the converse of the
proposition totally failed. I could not speak to her in return. I pined for
her approbation [....] How then could I premeditatedly lay bare my
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bosom in her sight, and expose all its blackness and deformities? [....]
My lips therefore were, in this regard, for ever closed in her presence.
(174)
In much the same way as Mandeville had been unable to assert his own voice as a child,
he is similarly silenced in his relationship with Henrietta. Whereas Bradford's
overwhelming ferocity of speech left little space for the dissenting voice of a boy,
Henrietta's "eloquence divine" (174), at least as it is perceived by Mandeville, renders her
brother a diffident observer of her superior rhetorical powers. Obsessively solicitous for
her good opinion, and perhaps anxiously resentful of the passive position to which he
feels relegated, Mandeville is unable to express the true sentiments of his heart or mind.
"I secretly stood in awe of her judgment," he declares, and "tremble[d] lest she should
discover the extent of my infirmities" (244).
It is perhaps to compensate for his own failures in self-expression that Mandeville
clings so strongly to a conception of himself as somehow linked, in body and soul, with
Henrietta. The nature of Mandeville's relationship with his sister is both complex and
paradoxical. While, on the one hand, she seemingly robs him of the opportunity for
confident self-expression, on the other, she symbolizes for him an opportunity to achieve
a definite sense of his own selfhood. If Henrietta plays a humanizing role in reconciling
Mandeville to social interaction, she also assumes, in Mandeville's mind, an important
position as the conduit of his own sensibilities. Some of his earliest fantasies regarding
Henrietta involve an almost incestuous union with her that transcends larger social
realities such as marriage. Although he claims to recognize Henrietta's probable destiny
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as a wife and a mother, and declares that he is not "vain and selfish enough" to want her
as his "slave" (151), he still clings to a fantasy of domestic union with his sister: "The
most pleasing vision I couldframeto myself, was of our living together, and having the
daily fruition of her society. Our delicious wanderings, as at Beaulieu, might then be
made perpetual; and, under the fashioning care of my Henrietta, I could not fail to become
peaceful, virtuous and happy" (150-51). It is only through Henrietta-her "fashioning
care"-that Mandeville feels he can be "peaceful, virtuous and happy"-in short, that he
can be conditioned for a life he feels unable to sustain without her. In this sense,
Mandeville becomes much like his uncle Audley, who, after losing his childhood
sweetheart, "rather vegetated than lived" (41).
It is clear that a compelling part of Henrietta's appeal for Mandeville rests in his
perception of her as the socializing agent who may ultimately allow him to assert his own
selfhood. Like Fleetwood, Mandeville indulges in a fantasy of complete sympathy with
his female partner. He is aware that his attempts to live through Henrietta are predicated
on a complete identification of himself with his sister, and vice versa. "I demanded from
her a complete sympathy," Mandeville remarks, "and a sentiment in all respects
responsive to mine. It was my delight to believe, that she loved as I loved, that she would
sacrifice herself as I would, that for all the world she would not be persuaded to an act
that would give me pain, and that she was the sister of my soul" (308). Learning of
Henrietta's love for Clifford thus marks a crisis in Mandeville's conception of himself, as
he now finds himself aligned with his rival in a process that quite clearly undermines any
constructed sense of self. The loss of Henrietta to Clifford thus becomes, for Mandeville,
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the loss of the self. As his last and only tie to the world, Henrietta symbolized for
Mandeville perhaps the last hope of ever being reconciled to himself and to life. With the
ultimate loss of that hope, Mandeville enters into a misanthropic madness that literally
marks him for life.
It is therefore quite appropriate that Mandeville sees Henrietta's marriage to
Clifford as also a union between Clifford and himself-their blood will be "mingled
together" in the form of any children Henrietta may bear, he laments (312). Such an
image speaks to the larger thematic displacements between Henrietta, Mandeville, and
Clifford, displacements which have played themselves out throughout the text, but which
now, in the final pages of the narrative, become the ultimate symptom of Mandeville's
failed attempt at self-actualization.
We see this failure most acutely in the final pages of the novel, in which the
attempted kidnaping of Henrietta is thwarted and Mandeville is left disfigured by a sword
stroke to the face that leaves a grisly scar. His left cheek severed with a "deep trench,"
Mandeville characterizes his wound as the imprint left by his colonizer: "I bore Clifford
and his injuries perpetually about with me. Even as certain tyrannical planters in the
West Indies have set a brand with a red-hot iron upon the negroes they have purchased, to
denote that they are irremediably a property, so Clifford had set his mark upon me, as a
token that I was his for ever" (325). Without the humanizing touch of Henrietta,
Mandeville does in fact see himself as nothing more than a commodity or piece of
"property" to be "branded" as such. Indeed, in this sense, Mandeville's scar-his une
balafre or cicatrix luculenta-is quite simply the presence of an absence, a corporeal
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symbol of an inner emptiness that allows, and even invites, the colonizer to place his (or
her) mark.
The balafre thus evokes the presence of the absence within Mandeville's
subjectivity. His scar functions as a fitting symbol of his inability to self-actualize, to
achieve a coherent sense of self and present an integrated "face" to the world.
Throughout his narrative, Mandeville has experienced his identity as split or divided.
Without Henrietta, for example, he cannot experience himself as a whole being. She is
the "dearest half of [his] soul" (62), and he feels himself compelled to "live in," and
through, her (319-20). Likewise, Mandeville's appreciation of his own subjectivity is
inextricably bound up with his hatred of Clifford, whom he envisions as part of his
corporeal existence-"a disease that has penetrated to my bones" (176). Such
displacements of self speak to the split nature of Mandeville's subjectivity, a divided self
that ultimately manifests itself on the body in the symbol of the balafre-o. scar that
literally divides Mandeville's face in two. The balafre thus functions as a material
inscription testifying to the madness that has fractured Mandeville's psyche.

"Of History and Romance": Modern Man and the Dystopian World of Godwin's Fiction
As I discussed in the Introduction, Godwin measured the value of written history
by its moral effects on the reader. "Those histories alone are worthy of attentive and
persevering study, that treat of the development of great genius, or the exhibition of bold
and masculine virtues," argues the philosopher in his 1797 essay, "Of History and
Romance" (458). In that essay, Godwin makes the argument for the degeneracy of a
modern humanity whose potential is blighted by oppressive social and cultural
institutions. Ancient Greece and Rome, with their democratic states and republican
sentiments, produced men with "bold and masculine virtues" (458). Modem states,
however, built on a foundation of political oppression that is maintained by social
prejudice and superstition, simply enslave and debase their citizens.
"The ancients," contends Godwin, "were giants, but we, their degenerate
successors, are pygmies. There was something in the nature of the Greek and Roman
republics that expanded and fired the soul [....] The ancients [...] are men of afreeand
undaunted spirit" (459). In contrast, the "greatest personages" of modern history,
appear in the comparison encumbered with their rank. Their march is
slow, weighed down as they are on every side with prejudices and
precedents. They are disciplined to dull monotony [....] There is
something in the nature of modern governments and institutions, that
seems to blight in the bud every grander and more ample development of
the soul. When we attempt to display the agility or the grace, the capacity
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for which inheres in our nature, we resemble a vaulter or figurante that
should undertake to dance in fetters. (459)
While humanity carries within it this capacity for spiritual greatness-the "capacity" for
such greatness, contends Godwin, "inheres in our nature"-modern men fail to achieve the
"free and undaunted spirit" that informed the ancients. Whereas the ancients were able to
"proceed to their object with an unerring aim" and a "full and undivided soul," modern
men "lose themselves in dark, inexplicable windings" (460). The difference between
both groups of men is so distinct and compelling, argues Godwin, that the student of
history "will almost imagine that he is reading of a different species" (460).
For Godwin, the spiritual failings of modern humanity reside not in some inherent
inferiority of the mind or soul, but in the social context in which the modern man finds
himself, a context which "blight[s] in the bud every grander and more ample development
of the soul" (459). "There is something in the nature of modern governments and
institutions" that keeps modern humanity from achieving the greatness of their ancient
predecessors (459). Of course, for Godwin, that "something" is political oppression and
the various social injustices which debase modern man. The oppression of monarchies
and other forms of tyrannical government, religious and cultural superstitions which
impede the rational development of humanity, violence that goes unchecked by the forces
of reason and education-all of these phenomena come together in a history informed by
"fanaticism and hypocrisy," where "scarcely a trace is to be found of a sense of the rights
of men" (461). Whereas the republican institutions and sentiments of ancient Greece and
Rome nourished "giants," the political and social tyranny of Britain's history has created
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"pygmies," men "lost" in "dark, inexplicable windings." Our history, argues Godwin, is
the "history of corruption and political profligacy," "not the history of genuine,
independent man" (461).
As I argued in the Introduction, Godwin's vision of the political included broader
social forces like education, which was understood by the philosopher in the "most
comprehensive sense" as all those childhood experiences "that produce[] an idea in the
mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" (Vol. 1 ofPolitical Justice 45). This
childhood education, for Godwin, serves as the single most important element in the
creation of a happy and virtuous subject capable of universal benevolence through
enlightenment and reason. If a sound childhood education can produce this happy and
virtuous subject committed to benevolence and philanthropy, a defective education, a
"mis-education," can do much to thwart the development of happiness and virtue in the
subject. The forms of mis-education experienced by the "modern" men in this study
operate, in much the same way as political oppression does, to create "pygmies" out of
protagonists who might have been "giants."
Godwin's description of modern men in this 1797 essay thus serves as a useful
theoretical framework for Caleb Williams and the three "middle" novels I have examined
in this study. Indeed, Godwin's description of men "encumbered with their rank" and
"weighed down [. ..] on every side with prejudices and precedents" aptly evokes the
experiences of Caleb, Falkland, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville. Like Godwin's
modern man, whose "march is slow" and whose soul is blighted, these Goclwinian heroes
are also mired in the "fetters" of both society and their own minds: "lost" in the "dark,
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inexplicable windings" of misanthropy and neuroses, all of these "heroes" struggle to
find their place within social environments from which they are hopelessly alienated. In
the case of each hero, a childhood mis-education manifests itself in a later crisis of
subjectivity that radically compromises his experience of identity. All of these
protagonists "lose" themselves in some way.
Moreover, it is significant that the crises brought about by childhood miseducation are never resolved for any of these characters. Each narrative ends
ambivalently without a clear sense of closure: Falkland dies a disgraced man, and Caleb's
formal vindication only serves to make him more miserable than ever; St. Leon's newfound self-assurance is compromised by the fact that it is only gained through his
connection with a son from whom he is forever estranged; although Fleetwood, at the end
of his narrative, is formally reconciled with Mary, he still seems a broken man, and the
reader is left unconvinced of his moral reformation; finally, in the case of Mandeville, the
reader is presented, at the end of the novel, with an utterly fragmented and psychotic
figure, a madman cut off from the social order. All of these Godwinian heroes seem, at
novel's end, perpetually "lost" in the "dark, inexplicable windings" of their own fractured
psyches.
Godwin's disillusionment with modern humanity, as he expresses it in "Of
History and Romance," locates itself in these fictional portraits. This disillusionment,
however, speaks to a fascinating disjunction between the Utopian idealism of Political
Justice-where humanity is potentially perfectible and the irrational passions of the soul
can be brought under the sway of the rational mind through education and reason-and the
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dystopian world of Godwin's fiction-which is littered with men who seem irrevocably
damaged by the destructive influences of a childhood "mis-education." Indeed, as
George Woodcock has pointed out, "nowhere in his novels does Godwin in fact describe
the Utopian world to which his reasonings as a political philosopher would seem to lead"
(696). B.J. Tysdahl likewise argues that, in Godwin's fiction, "we often hear another
voice than that of the confident spokesman of late eighteenth-century radicalism and
rationalism" (6).
The other "voice" which Tysdahl identifies in Godwin's fiction evokes Mikhail
Bakhtin's notion of the "dialogic" text, a work-usually a novel, in Bakhtin's
theorization-permeated with the dialogue of multiple voices, forms, and perspectives. In
The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin celebrates the novel for its unique brand of "novelistic
discourse" which structures the narrative and provides a complex and rich
"heteroglossia." The novel, contends Bakhtin, contains a "diversity of individual voices,
artistically organized" (262). "Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted
genres, the speech of characters are merely those fundamental compositional unities with
whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel," argues Bakhtin (262). Godwin's novels
embody these dialogic characteristics: in these texts, an optimistic philosophy of human
perfectibility collides with the brutal realities of the human condition to produce texts
which offer a "diversity of individual voices." Godwin as rational philosopher seems at
odds with his neurotic fictional creations, and even within the texts, there are tensions
that exist between individual characters as symbolic representations of humanity's
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potential. There is, in these novels, a stark incongruity between what could be and what
is.
Moreover, it is striking that the women in the three "middle" novels come much
closer to achieving the sort of human perfectibility espoused by Godwin in Political
Justice. Indeed, the female characters in these texts serve as foils for the moral and
spiritual failings of their male counterparts. St Leon's Marguerite is selfless and utterly
gracious in forgiving a vain husband who has just beggared his family through gambling;
a committed advocate of Wollstonecraft's "culture of the heart," Marguerite takes solace
in her philosophical celebration of the domestic affections. Likewise, Fleetwood's Mary
exhibits a striking moral virtue and generosity in forgiving a husband who throws her,
pregnant and penniless, out of their marital home. Finally, Mandeville's noble sister,
Henrietta, remains loyal and committed to a brother whose misanthropic nature alienates
everyone around him; in contrast to Marguerite, who celebrates the private affections,
Henrietta is an advocate for the philosophical doctrine of universal benevolence, and, as
such, she serves as a spokeswoman for much of Godwin's own philosophy.
While the female characters in these middle novels are portrayed in idealized
terms, the male characters are complex representations of human struggle-of the
psychological turmoil, emotional frailty, and moral failure which inform the human
condition. As complex case studies of masculine identity in crisis, these novels are
compelling portraits of modern man as the philosopher theorized him in "Of History and
Romance." If, as Godwin contends in his essay, modern history is the history of
"fanaticism" and "corruption," and "not the history of genuine, independent man," then it
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is fitting that the philosopher offers, in his fiction, portraits of modern men who are both
caught up in the corruption of modern life, and mired in the fanaticism of their own
minds. Caleb, Falkland, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville are thus quintessential
examples of Godwin's modern man, and the profound identity crises each experiences
can surely be read as the philosopher's fictional representation of how modern men "lose
themselves in dark, inexplicable windings."
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Notes to Introduction
1. My decision not to include a full chapter-length reading of Caleb Williams in this
study was also influenced by a desire to focus on those novels of Godwin which have
received little attention by scholars and readers. Modern critics of Godwin's fiction have
directed the bulk of their energies towards Caleb Williams, and that novel is thus well
represented in the scholarly literature examining the philosopher's fiction. It was one of
my larger goals in this study to provide critical readings of Godwin's lesser-known
novels.
2. As Godwin recorded in an autobiographical sketch, he wrote and published these three
novels in quick succession over a period of five months at the end of 1783 and the
beginning of 1784 (Woodcock, "Notes" 685-86). All three of these texts were long
considered "lost," only to be "rediscovered" by scholars in the 1960s and 1970s.
3. Most critics are in agreement that Godwin's last two novels are reductive and poorly
structured in terms of plot and character development. For George Woodcock, Godwin's
final novels suffer from a "decline" in his "inventive powers," and he singles out
Cloudesley as the "worst crafted" of all his books ("Notes" 695), as does Mona
Scheuermann {The Novels of William Godwin 188-89). Moreover, although critics
concede that Deloraine is superior to Cloudesley on a structural level, most do not find
the text particularly engaging. "Its final interest is probably biographical," contends
Woodcock ("Notes" 696), referring to the scholarly consensus that views Emilia,
Deloraine's first wife, as Godwin's last fictional portrait of Wollstonecraft. Deloraine
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becomes even more significant on a biographical level when one considers the possibility
that Catherine-the impassioned, fiercely loyal, and articulate daughter of Deloraine and
Emilia-is quite likely a fictional portrait of Godwin's own daughter Mary Shelley, who
remained emotionally and intellectually close to her father in the last decades of his life.
A notable exception to this overwhelming critical dismissal of Godwin's last two
novels is A. A. Markley, who reads Cloudesley as the culmination of Godwin's attempts
to "transform" traditional conceptions of manhood and put forth a new image of
masculinity. In Cloudesley, argues Markley, "the social benefits of a particular
Godwinian ideal of love and devotion between men is fully illustrated and celebrated"
(39).
4. This quotation is taken from the third edition of PoliticalJustice, published in 1798.
In the original edition of the text, this passage was perhaps made even more scandalous
by the fact that the "valet" was a "chambermaid," and the sacrificed relative consequently
a "wife" or a "mother," rather than a "brother" or a "father."
5. The Reverend Richard Polwhele (1760-1838) was an outspoken critic of the radical, or
"jacobin," cause. Most notoriously, his 1798 anti-feminist satire, The Unsex'dFemales,
attacked Godwin's wife, feminist reformer Mary Wollstonecraft, who had recently died
giving birth to their daughter, the future Mary Shelley. In his poem, Polwhele presents
Wollstonecraft as the "intrepid champion of her sex, " the leader of her band of "unsex'd"
female followers (13). She is represented by Polwhele as a pathological aberration, a
vision of bodily disease and moral sickness that threatens the "healthy" state of femininity
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best embodied by the "seraphic" Hannah More, the conservative poet, dramatist, and
moralist. The climax of Polwhele's poem presents More, a "seraphic" vision of grace and
happiness, recalling her "unsex'd" "sisters" from the "pale form" and "livid limbs" of
Wollstonecraft, the "dire apostate" and "fell suicide" (28).
Less virulent, but just as damning, was Elizabeth Hamilton's Memoirs of Modern
Philosophers, a satirical novel published in 1800 which caricatured a number of
intellectuals well known for their radical, "jacobin" views. Godwin is caricatured in the
novel as the founder of a "New Philosophy" modelled on the principles of Political
Justice; his ideas attract ridiculous devotees who take his ideas to absurd levels.
6. Along with the Memoirs, Godwin edited and published the 1798 Posthumous Works of
the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, a four-volume collection of
Wollstonecraft's unpublished texts, her unfinished manuscripts, and some of her private
correspondence.
7. For a general overview of the shifting assessment of Wollstonecraft throughout the
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, see Amy Rambow, '"Come Kick Me':
Godwin's Memoirs and the Posthumous Infamy of Mary Wollstonecraft," 45-54.

Notes to Chapter 1
1. Godwin's resistance to Rousseau's educational model has been traced in a number of
critical examinations of his fiction-most notably, Anne Chandler's "Romanticizing
Adolescence: Godwin's St. Leon and the Matter of Rousseau," and Gary Handwerk's
"Mapping Misogyny: Godwin's Fleetwood and the Staging of Rousseauvian Education.''
2. Godwin's novel was also quite effective in its narrative mode. As Gerard A. Barker
has argued, Godwin's choice of first-person narration for his novel, a mode he was both
inexperienced in and which sometimes created technical difficulties for the construction
of the text, nevertheless contributes to the reader's engagement in the story, lending an
urgent realism to the narrative which innovatively conveys Godwin's philosophical and
political arguments.
3. See, for example, Robert J. Corber, "Representing the 'Unspeakable': William
Godwin and the Politics of Homophobia;" Alex Gold, Jr., "It's Only Love: The Politics
of Passion in Godwin's Caleb Williams;" Kenneth W. Graham, The Politics of
Narrative: Ideology and Social Change in William Godwin's Caleb Williams; Mitzi
Myers, "Godwin's Changing Conception of Caleb Williams;" Masao Miyoshi, The
Divided Self: A Perspective on the Literature of the Double; Andrew J. Scheiber,
"Falkland's Story: Caleb Williams' Other Voice;" Rudolf F. Storch, "Metaphors of
Private Guilt and Social Rebellion in Godwin's Caleb Williams;" and Robert W.
Uphaus, "Caleb Williams: Godwin's Epoch of Mind;"

4. David McCracken, in "Godwin's Caleb Williams: A Fictional Rebuttal of Burke" and
"Godwin's Reading in Burke," has also highlighted the influence of Burke on Godwin's
writing of Caleb Williams, and on his creation of Falkland.
5. For a full discussion of the pedagogical framework underpinning eighteenth-century
sentimentalfiction,see the first two chapters of Todd's Sensibility: An Introduction.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. As a tormented drifter, St. Leon prefigures the quintessential Romantic trope of the
troubled wanderer, as represented most compellingly by Lord Byron's Manfred, S. T.
Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, and, ultimately, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. For a
reading of St. Leon's textual and thematic influence on Shelley's novel, see Gregory
Maertz's "Family Resemblances: Intertextual Dialogue between Father and Daughter
Novelists in Godwin's St. Leon and Shelley's Frankenstein.'"
2. Dubois's St. Godwin has recently appeared in Volume 9 of Pickering and Chatto's tenvolume series, Anti-Jacobin Novels, published in 2005.
3. As Marie Roberts has shown, however, Godwin's interest, and subsequent belief, in
the clearly fantastic possibility of human immortality is paradoxically grounded in the
rationalist philosophy laid out in PoliticalJustice. In the section entitled "Of Health, and
the Prolongation of Human Life," Godwin had theorized that, as humanity gradually
progressed, through the exercise and refinement of its rational faculties, into a state of
ultimate perfection, the limits of mortality could be overcome. Although Godwin
declares that "it would be idle to talk of the absolute immortality of man," he nevertheless
contends that, "by the immediate operation of intellect," the "term of human life may be
prolonged [...] beyond any limits which we are able to assign" (Vol. 2 of Political
Justice 527). Thus, for Roberts, Godwin's central critique in St. Leon is not of
immortality, but of an immortality obtained through the dangerous and unnatural means
associated with scientific advance and magic. As Roberts argues, St. Leon "is a warning
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to those enlightened thinkers who sought to shortcut the path of human progress, which
Godwin believed should be achieved only by evolutionary means" (1199).
4. P.N. Furbank points out that St. Leon's fear of poverty is made particularly poignant
by Godwin's own financial troubles during this time (227). It would seem that Godwin
was only too acutely aware of the anxiety and deep shame associated with pecuniary
distress.
5. For an alternative interpretation of the novel's gambling theme, one which reads St.
Leon as the quintessential capitalist, see Kate Ferguson Ellis, The Contested Castle:
Gothic Novels and the Subversion of Domestic Ideology, 160-64.
6. Godwin's changing views on the importance of the domestic affections are in fact
quite compatible with the theoretical principles underpinning his philosophic vision of
progressive enlightenment. In the Enquirer, Godwin had argued that "the salutary
condition of the human mind, is that in which it is prepared to bring every principle upon
which it proceeds, within the scope of its own examination" (223). All ideas and
opinions should therefore be subject to a rational analysis that is both rigorous and
continual, argues Godwin, for "nothing is more suspicious than a system of conduct,
which, forming itself inflexibly on general rules, refuses to take the impression, and yield
to the dictates, of circumstances as they may arise" {Enquirer 195). By thus modifying
his opinions on cohabitation based on his personal experiences living with
Wollstonecraft, Godwin is participating in this rational practice of continual examination,
and his changing views on the subject represent an inevitable progression of his thought:

"Who is it that is likely, through Shakespear's seven ages of man, to think always alike?"
asks Godwin. "The slave of prejudice, or the slave of idleness. The active and
independent mind, the genuine lover of and enquirer after truth, will inevitably pass
through certain revolutions of opinion" (Enquirer 325).
7. St. Leon and Marguerite's living arrangement is suggestive of Godwin's own
complicated views on marriage and cohabitation. While he celebrates the "domestic and
private affections" in the 1799 Preface to St. Leon, deeming them "inseparable from the
nature of man" (52), he had previously, in the 1797 Enquirer, warned against "excessive
familiarity" as the "bane of social happiness" (86). In the essay, "Of Cohabitation,"
Godwin argued that
the ill humour which is so prevalent through all the different walks of life,
is the result of familiarity, and consequently of cohabitation. If we did not
see each other too frequently, we should accustom ourselves to act
reasonably and with urbanity. But, according to a well known maxim,
familiarity breeds contempt. The first and most fundamental principle in
the intercourse of man with man, is reverence; but we soon cease to
reverence what is always before our eyes [....] In order that we may
properly exercise this sentiment, the occasions for calling it forth towards
any particular individual, should be economised and rare. (91-92)
In his description of St. Leon and Marguerite's domestic habits, Godwin seems to have
struck a balance between the dangers of "excessive familiarity" and the benefits he had
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come to recognize in the private affections.

Moreover, St. Leon's narration of the

satisfactions attendant on a marriage partially informed by "separate pursuits" evokes
Godwin's description, in the Memoirs, of his own relationship with Wollstonecraft.
Recalling his practice, during their marriage, of maintaining a separate residence a short
distance from their marital home, as well as their shared practice of maintaining separate
social engagements and intellectual pursuits, Godwin asserts that he and Wollstonecraft
were thus able to "combine, in a considerable degree, the novelty and lively sensation of
a visit, with the more delicious and heart-felt pleasures of domestic life" (Memoirs 110).
8. Marguerite's celebration of rural retirement prefigures William Wordsworth's similar
philosophical meditations on "low and rustic life" in the 1802 Preface to the Lyrical
Ballads. Freed from the "influence of social vanity," argues Wordsworth in the Preface,
"the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their
maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language" (357).
For Wordsworth, rustic life is thus more conducive to spiritual development and moral
elevation. Marguerite's impassioned speeches to St. Leon on this issue also foreshadow
many of the arguments against wealth put forth by a character in Mandeville, one of
Godwin's later novels. In that text, the morally virtuous Clifford argues against wealth
on the grounds that it compromises one's self-sufficiency and true appreciation of life.
Moreover, in Fleetwood, Godwin will explore even further the Wordsworthian elements
of nature, rural life, and the effects of both on imagination and intellectual development.
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9. For a discussion of the ideology of "separate spheres" in Victorian marital culture, see
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 18501895.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. Mona Scheuermann also points out how Fleetwood's expressed preference for day
dreams over night dreams in this passage indicates his significant "preoccupation with
power" (Novels of William Godwin 159) and the need to exert that power "over all and
sundry" (Novels of William Godwin 160).
2. Despite Scheuermann's contention that Fleetwood is unable to "adjust himself to
another human being" ("Study of Mind" 19), never able to make that "total human
connection" ("Study of Mind" 20) with another creature that would enable him to
overcome, even temporarily, the destructive misanthropy of his temperament, we see a
number of significant instances where Fleetwood cultivates interpersonal relationships
that are emotionally, morally, or intellectually salutary. The friendship that the young
Fleetwood shares with Ruffigny, for instance, develops into a bond not only predicated on
a sense of duty, but also on mutual respect and affection, a bond that endures until
Ruffigny's death and provides the catalyst for Fleetwood's moral improvement in the
form of his ultimate repudiation of the libertine tendencies that had marred his youth. In
middle age, Fleetwood again manages to transcend his misanthropic inclinations enough
to forge a stimulating intellectual alliance, built on "temperate and sober discussion"
(259), with Macneil, the father of his future wife, Mary. Note, however, how all of these
satisfying emotional connections are with men. In contrast, not once in the novel is
Fleetwood able to develop and sustain a similar relationship with a woman.

267
3. Gary Handwerk, in particular, has argued that Fleetwood's misogyny functions as
Godwin's critique of Rousseau's discussion of gender in Book Five of Entile. Although
Rousseau's philosophical conception of gender conforms to the traditional construction of
women as passive and weak relative to men's superior intellectual and physical powers, it
also posits them as singularly informed by a propensity towards guile and deception.
"Cunning is a natural gift of woman," argues Rousseau (Emile 334). "This special skill
with which the female sex is endowed is a fair equivalent for its lack of strength; without
it woman would be man's slave, not his helpmeet" (Emile 334-35). "Women have a
natural gift for managing men," continues Rousseau, but their control is artfully
concealed under a facade of weakness and soft manners (Emile 370). "Woman's reign is
a reign of gentleness, tact, and kindness; her commands are caresses, her threats are tears"
(Emile 370). As Handwerk points out, Rousseau's emphasis on the inherent guile of
women dovetails with his construction of a passive Emile who is manipulated into a
subordinate and dependent position by a deceptive tutor. In the novel, argues Handwerk,
Ruffigny plays the role of Rousseauvian tutor to Fleetwood, manipulating, often through
subterfuge, Fleetwood's emotional responses and his moral development.

The tutor's

(Ruffigny's) deceptive "mode of operation," asserts Handwerk, "feminizes" him (388),
and he argues that Fleetwood's later misogyny could thus be read as the "displacement of
resentment toward his paternal figures and of their rational (or rationalized) insistence
upon his immaturity" (396).
For another example of Godwin's revisionist approach to Rousseauvian
educational theory, see Anne Chandler's "Romanticizing Adolescence: Godwin's St.
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Leon and the Matter of Rousseau." As Chandler argues, Godwin took issue with what he
saw as the reductive nature of Rousseau's highly structured and tightly controlled
pedagogical model. In his depiction of a middle-aged St. Leon in a young man's body, a
body which then comes into contact with numerous "tutor figures," notably Bethlam
Gabor and his own son Charles, Godwin complicates the established age and power
differentials between tutor and pupil, restoring-in Chandler's view-"the libidinous
energy so readily tamed in Rousseau's accounts of male adolescence" (410).
4. Significantly, this metaphor also points to Fleetwood's position as the despotic
"Other." A "sultana" is of course the female relative or mistress of a sultan; as the
Countess is the mistress of Fleetwood, the metaphor then serves to situate Fleetwood as
the sultan-a figure conventionally associated, within the western imagination, with
corruption, vice, and despotic power. In St. Leon, we see such a figure represented in the
character of Muzaffer Bey, the Turkish military governor and extortionist. Also see note
6 in the chapter on Mandeville.
5. Ruffigny's narrative, while seemingly unconnected with the later events of the text, is
nevertheless one section of the novel consistently praised by critics for its original
depiction of child labour in a silk mill at Lyons. Handwerk and A. A. Markley deem it
"an example of literary realism [...] remarkable for its time" (Introduction to Fleetwood
36), while Ivanka Kovacevic calls it the "first occurrence in prose fiction of social
criticism directed against the factory system" (qtd. in Tysdahl 109).
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6. Mrs. Macneil's history is almost parodically recounted by Fleetwood, who seems to
savour every sensational detail of the tale, but it is troubling how the mother's
past-particularly her abusive union with a controlling older man who won the approval of
her father through "conversation" (234)-will be eventually resurrected as the daughter's
future.
7. The play recounts the tragedy of Valerio, who enters into an agreement with the ruler
of Naples that allows him to marry his beloved, Evanthe. The agreement requires Valerio
to submit to decapitation after one month of marriage.
8. Specifically, Act 2, lines 34-40
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. Godwin's novel was published, in three volumes, in London and Edinburgh on
December 1,1817. In 1818, a French translation of the novel appeared, as well as two
pirated versions of the text by American publishers in New York and Philadelphia
(Marshall 340). In both American editions, the original three volumes of the novel are
conflated into two. Moreover, the unfinished quality of the novel's ending no doubt
encouraged the anonymous 1818 publication of a spurious and highly satirical fourth and
"final" volume of the text, entitled Mandeville; or The Last Words of a Maniac! As both
Burton R. Pollin and Mona Scheuermann have observed, a number of later critics have
mistaken this spurious volume as an authentic addition to the novel (34, n. 7; Novels of
William Godwin 210, n. 53).
2. Pollin has proposed that Shelley's enthusiasm for Mandeville can be traced in the
several linguistic and thematic similarities with the novel that he identifies in the poet's
"Ozymandias" (1818) and "Love's Philosophy" (1819). See "Godwin's Mandeville in
Poems of Shelley." Moreover, as John Colmer and, more recently, James Mulvihill have
argued, signs of Mandeville's influence can also be found in the work of another
Romantic author, Thomas Love Peacock, whose 1818 novel Nightmare Abbey includes a
scene in which the characters receive a packet of texts, one of which is entitled Devilman,
a novel. Described by one of the characters as a tale of'"hatred-revengemisanthropy-and quotations from the Bible [....] the morbid anatomy of black bile,'"
Devilman has traditionally been read as an allusion to Godwin's Mandeville, the former
being an anagram for the latter (qtd. in Colmer 331). As Colmer demonstrates,
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Nightmare Abbey's setting, as well as its satiric depiction of a gloomy misanthropy, was
at least partially influenced by Mandeville and the "popular cult of misanthropy" to which
it both contributed and helped to produce (332). See Colmer's "Godwin's Mandeville
and Peacock's Nightmare Abbey," as well as Mulvihill's "A Prototype for Mr. Toobad in
Peacock's Nightmare Abbey."
3. Shakespeare, in Macbeth (4.3.209)
4. Matthew 12:34
5. Milton, in Paradise Lost (2.114-15)
6. Like Gifford, who had a "dark complexion, approaching to the mulatto" (337),
Mallison also possesses a "dark, sallow complexion" (84). Significantly, in both cases,
villainy seems to reveal itself on the body in particularly racialized terms. In St. Leon,
Godwin directly represented racial difference in his portrayal of Muzaffer Bey, the
Turkish bashaw to whom St. Leon appeals for protection when he becomes a target of
Hungarian civil unrest. In the novel, Bey's "muddy" complexion and "coarse,"
"distorted" features are reflective of his corrupt and avaricious character (374), a trope
very much in keeping with contemporary representations of the Oriental "Other."
7. Despite the uneasy alliance between the Royalist and Presbyterian factions of the
English state, both of which were united, at least in theory, in their desire for an
overthrow of Oliver Cromwell's rule and the restoration of at least a limited form of
monarchy, conflict between the two parties created suspicion and mistrust, especially on
the part of the Royalists towards their new allies {Mandeville 81-82). This, Mandeville
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explains, was the historical context that determined the social climate at Winchester
School, where every boy was a Royalist and on guard against any Presbyterian sentiment
deemed injurious to the house of Stuart (80-81).
8. This is yet another instance in which Mandeville's inability to speak forcefully, or at
all, on an issue sets up the train of events that consequently result in his future
misfortunes. Although his "whole soul rose against the thought" of sharing a domicile
with Holloway and Mallison and being thus subject to their company and potential
duplicity (232), Mandeville is unable to formulate any verbal response or plan of
confrontation. Instead, he retreats further into the isolation of a resentful silence: "I shut
myself up, more than I had ever yet been accustomed to. When my occasions or my
inclination prompted me to go out of my apartment, I asked myself, 'Now, the moment I
open the door, shall I not meet these scoundrels?' [....] Often I saw nothing of them:
when I did, for the most part I scowled, and turned away in silence" (232; emphasis
added).
9. Godwin's allusion here is a reference to "The History of Prince Fadlallah, Son of BinOrtoc, King of Mousel," a tale found in The Thousand and One Days: Persian Tales,
compiled by Francois Petis de la Croix and translated into English by A. Philips in the
early eighteenth century. Of course, Mandeville's allusion to this tale is an anachronism,
since he is presumably narrating his history in the mid-seventeenth century.
10. One may recall St. Leon's Marguerite, a quintessential example of a self-effacing care
giver who unwearingly ministers to her husband's psychological and physical needs
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during his lengthy and recurring periods of incapacitation. As we will soon see,
Mandeville's sister, Henrietta, also figures significantly as a nursemaid.
11. Shelley registered his extreme disappointment in the character of Henrietta on
precisely this ground. For Shelley, the philosophical beauty of Henrietta's eloquent
appeal to Mandeville for a disinterested philanthropy is undercut by what is later revealed
to be her true motivation-her love for Clifford and her understandable desire to reconcile
her brother with her suitor. On December 7th, 1817, Shelley wrote to Godwin: "Shall I
say that, when I discovered that she was pleading all this time secretly for her lover, and
when at last she abandoned-weakly abandoned poor Mandeville, I felt an involuntary
and, perhaps, an unreasonable pang?" (260). In his Examiner review, Shelley elaborates
in greater depth on Henrietta's character as a failed experiment in the ultimate
representation of truth and virtue:
One regrets that Henrietta, who soared far beyond her contemporaries in
her opinions, who was so beautiful that she seemed a spirit among
mankind should act and feel no otherwise than the least exalted of her sex;
and still more that the author capable of conceiving something so
admirable and lovely should have been withheld by the tenor of the fiction
which he chose from executing it to its full extent. It almost seems in the
original conception of the character of Henrietta that something was
imagined too vast and too uncommon to be realized; and the feeling
weighs like disappointment on the mind. (Graham 359)

274

Works Cited
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael
Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1981.
Barker, Gerard A. "The Narrative Mode of Caleb Williams: Problems and Resolutions."
Studies in the Novel 25 (1993): 1-15.
Bour, Isabelle. "Sensibility as Epistemology in Caleb Williams, Waverley, and
Frankenstein." Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 AS (2005): 813-27.
Brewer, William D. Introduction. Brewer 11-39.
—. "Male Rivalry and Friendship in the Novels of William Godwin." Mapping Male
Sexuality: Nineteenth-Century England. Ed. Jay Losey and William D. Brewer.
London: Associated University Presses, 2000. 49-68.
—. The Mental Anatomies of William Godwin and Mary Shelley. London: Associated
University Presses, 2001.
—, ed. St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century. By William Godwin. Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2006.
Bruhm, Steven. "William Godwin's Fleetwood: The Epistemology of the Tortured
Body." Eighteenth-Century Life 16 (1992): 25-43.
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful. 2nded. London, 1759. New York, Garland Publishing, 1971.

275

—. Reflections on the Revolution in France. 1790. Amherst, New York: Prometheus
Books, 1987.
Butler, Marilyn. "Godwin, Burke, and Caleb Williams." Essays in Criticism 32 (1982):
237-57.
Chandler, Anne. "Romanticizing Adolescence: Godwin's St. Leon and the Matter of
Rousseau." Studies in Romanticism 41 (2002): 399-414.
Clemit, Pamela. The Godwinian Novel: The Rational Fictions of Godwin, Brockden
Brown, Mary Shelley. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
—. Introduction. St. Leon. By William Godwin. Ed. Pamela Clemit. Oxford: Oxford
UP, 1994. vii-xxiii.
—, and Gina Luria Walker. Introduction. Clemit and Luria Walker 11-36.
— , eds. Memoirs of the Author of A. Vindication of the Rights of Woman. By William
Godwin. London, 1798. Peterborough: Broadview, 2001.
Rev. of Cloudesley, by William Godwin. Athenaeum 125 (1830): 162-64. Graham 51213.
Collings, David. "The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin in the Empty Place
of Reason." English Literary History 70 (2003): 847-74.
Colmer, John. "Godwin's Mandeville and Peacock's Nightmare Abbey.'''' Review of
English Studies 21 (1970): 331-36.

276

Corber, Robert J. "Representing the 'Unspeakable': William Godwin and the Politics of
Homophobia." Journal of the History of Sexuality 1 (1990): 85-101.
[Croker, John Wilson.] Rev. of Mandeville, by William Godwin. Quarterly Review 18
(1817): 176-77. Graham 366-68.
Crump, Justine. "Gambling, History, and Godwin's St. Leon." European Romantic
Review 11 (2000): 393-407.
Ellis, Kate Ferguson. The Contested Castle: Gothic Novels and the Subversion of
Domestic Ideology. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989.
Rev. of The Enquirer, by William Godwin. British Critic (1798): 20-27. Graham 11420.
Farouk, Marion Omar. "Mandeville, A Tale of the Seventeenth Century: Historical Novel
or Psychological Study?" Essays in Honour of William Gallacher. Eds. P.M.
Kemp-Ashraf, Jack Mitchell, and Erika Lingner. Berlin: Humboldt University,
1966. 111-17.
Flanders, Wallace Austin. "Godwin and Gothicism: St. Leon." Texas Studies in
Literature and Language 8 (1967): 533-45.
Rev. of Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling, by William Godwin. Critical Review 4
(1805): 383-91. Graham 256-57.

277

Fulford, Tim. Romanticism and Masculinity: Gender, Politics and Poetics in the
Writings of Burke, Coleridge, Cobbett, Wordsworth, De Quincey and Hazlitt.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Furbank, P.N. "Godwin's Novels." Essays in Criticism 5 (1955): 214-28.
Garofalo, Daniela. '"A Left-Handed Way': Modern Masters in William Godwin's Caleb
Williams." European Romantic Review 17 (2006): 237-44.
Gilfillan, George. Vol. 1 of Sketches of Modern Literature, and Eminent Literary Men,
Being A Gallery of Literary Portraits. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846.
Godwin, William. Caleb Williams. London, 1794. Handwerk and Markley 55-434.
—. Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature. London, 1797. New
York: Garland, 1971.
—. Vol. 1 of Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and
Happiness. 1790. 3rd ed. Ed. F. E. L. Priestley. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1946. 3 vols.
—. Vol. 2 of Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and
Happiness. 1790. 3rd ed. Ed. F. E. L. Priestley. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1946. 3 vols.
—. Vol. 3 of Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and
Happiness. 1790. 3rd ed. Ed. F. E. L. Priestley. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1946. 3 vols.

278

—. Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling. London, 1805. Handwerk and Markley
45-423.
—. "Of History and Romance." Caleb Williams. By William Godwin. Ed. Gary
Handwerk and A. A. Markley. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000. 453-67.
—. Letter to the Editor. British Critic 6 (July 1795): 94-95. Caleb Williams. By
William Godwin. Ed. Gary Handwerk and A. A. Markley. Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2000. 450-53.
—. Mandeville: A Tale of the Seventeenth Century in England. London, 1817. Ed.
Pamela Clemit. London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992. Vol. 6 of CollectedNovels
and Memoirs of William Godwin. Mark Philp, gen. ed. 8 vols.
—. Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. London, 1798.
Clemit and Walker 43-122.
—. St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century. London, 1799. Brewer 47-450.
Gold, Alex, Jr. "It's Only Love: The Politics of Passion in Godwin's Caleb Williams."
Texas Studies in Language and Literature 19 (1977): 135-60.
Graham, Kenneth W. The Politics of Narrative: Ideology and Social Change in William
Godwin's Caleb Williams. New York: AMS Press, 1990.
—. William Godwin Reviewed: A Reception History, 1783-1834. New York: AMS
Press, 2001.

279

Handwerk, Gary. "Mapping Misogyny: Godwin's Fleetwood and the Staging of
Rousseauvian Education." Studies in Romanticism 41 (2002): 375-98.
—, and A. A. Markley. Introduction to Fleetwood. Handwerk and Markley 9-39.
—. Introduction to Caleb Williams. Handwerk and Markley 9-46.
—, eds. Caleb Williams. By William Godwin. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000.
—. Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling. By William Godwin. Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2001.
Hazlitt, William. The Spirit of the Age: Or Contemporary Portraits. London, 1825.
Yorkshire, England: Scolar Press, 1971.
Index. Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine 1 (1798): 849-61.
Jacobus, Mary. "Intimate Connections: Scandalous Memoirs and Epistolary
Indiscretion." Women, Writing and the Public Sphere, 1700-1830. Ed. Elizabeth
Eger, Charlotte Grant, Cliona 6 Gallchoir, and Penny Warburton. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2001. 274-89.
Jimack, P.D. Introduction. Emile. By Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. Barbara Foxley.
London: Dent, 1974. v-xxvi.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. 1790. Ed. Nicholas Walker. Trans. James
Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
Kelly, Gary. The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

280

Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Ed. Kenneth P.
Winkler. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.
Logan, Peter Melville. Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in
Nineteenth-Century British Prose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Mackenzie, Henry. The Man of Feeling. 1771. Ed. Brian Vickers. London: Oxford UP,
1967.
Maertz, Gregory. "Generic Fusion and Appropriation in Godwin's St. Leon." European
Romantic Review 5 (1995): 214-29.
Markley. A. A. '"The Success of Gentleness': Homosocial Desire and the Homosexual
Personality in the Novels of William Godwin." Romanticism on the Net 36-37
(2004-05). 28 August 2007
<http://www.erudit.Org/revue/ron/2004/v/n36-37/011139ar.html>.
Marshall, Peter H. William Godwin. New Haven: Yale UP, 1984.
David McCracken. "Godwin's Caleb Williams: A Fictional Rebuttal of Burke." Studies
in Burke and His Time 11 (1969-70): 1442-52.
—. "Godwin's Reading in Burke." English Language Notes 7 (1970): 264-70.
Mellor, Anne K. Romanticism and Gender. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Miyoshi, Masao. The Divided Self: A Perspective on the Literature of the Double. New
York: New York UP, 1969.

281

[Moody, Christopher Lake.] Rev. of Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the
Rights of Woman, by William Godwin. Monthly Review 27 (1798): 321-25.
Graham 149-51.
Myers, Mitzi. "Godwin's Changing Conception of Caleb Williams.'''' Studies in English
Literature 12 (1972): 591-628.
Pollin, Burton R. "Godwin's Mandeville in Poems of Shelley." Keats-Shelley Memorial
Bulletin 19 (1968): 33-40.
Polwhele, Richard. The Unsex'dFemales: A Poem. London, 1798. Ed. and Intro. Gina
Luria. New York: Garland, 1974. 1-37.
Rambow, Amy. '"Come Kick Me': Godwin's Memoirs and the Posthumous Infamy of
Mary Wollstonecraft." Keats-Shelley Review 13 (1999): 24-57.
Roberts, Marie. "Science and Irrationality in William Godwin's St. Leon." Studies on
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 264 (1989): 1196-99.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile. 1762. Intro. P.D. Jimack. Trans. Barbara Foxley.
London: Dent, 1974.
Scheiber, Andrew J. "Falkland's Story: Caleb Williams'' Other Voice." Studies in the
Novel 17 (1985): 255-66.
Scheuermann, Mona. The Novels of William Godwin and Those of His Contemporaries.
Diss. State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1974. New York: Arno
Press, 1980.

282

—. "The Study of Mind: The Later Novels of William Godwin." Forum for Modern
Language Studies 19(1983): 16-30.
[Scott, Sir Walter.] Rev. ofFleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling, by William
Godwin. Edinburgh Review 6 (1805): 182-93. Graham 258-60.
Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft. Frankenstein. London, 1818. Ed. D.L. Macdonald and
Kathleen Scherf. 2nd ed. Peterborough: Broadview, 1999.
[—, Percy Bysshe.] Rev. of. Mandeville, by William Godwin. Examiner 28 Dec. 1817:
826-27. Graham 356-59.
—. "To William Godwin." 7 December 1817. Letters: 1812 to 1818. Vol 9 of The
Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Ed. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck.
New York: Gordian Press, 1965. 10 vols. 258-60.
Sherburn, George. "Godwin's Later Novels." Studies in Romanticism 1 (1962): 65-82.
Smith, Elton Edward, and Esther Greenwell Smith. William Godwin. New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1965.
Rev. of St. Leon, by William Godwin. Antijacobin Review 5 (Jan. 1800): 23-28;
(Feb. 1800): 145-153. Graham 156-58.
Rev. of St. Leon, by William Godwin. Dublin Magazine and Irish Monthly Register 4
(1800): 185. Graham 161-62.
Stephen, Leslie. Vol. 3 of Studies of a Biographer. London: Duckworth and Co., 1902.

283

—. "William Godwin." Vol. 22 of the Dictionary of National Biography. Ed. Leslie
Stephen and Sidney Lee. New York: MacMillan and Co., 1890.
Storch, Rudolf F. "Metaphors of Private Guilt and Social Rebellion in Godwin's Caleb
Williams." English Literary History 34 (1967): 188-207.
Todd, Janet. Sensibility: An Introduction. London: Methuen, 1986.
Trott, Nicola. "Sexing the Critic: Mary Wollstonecraft at the Turn of the Century."
1798: The Year of the Lyrical Ballads. Ed. Richard Cronin. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1998. 32-67.
Tysdahl, B.J. William Godwin as Novelist. London: Athlone Press, 1981.
Uphaus, Robert W. "Caleb Williams: Godwin's Epoch of Mind." Studies in the Novel 9
(1977): 279-96.
Vickers, Brian. Introduction. The Man of Feeling. By Henry Mackenzie. London:
Oxford UP, 1967. vii-xxiv.
Woodcock, George. "Things As They Might Be, Things As They Are: Notes on the
Novels of William Godwin." Dalhousie Review 54 (1974-75): 685-97.
—. William Godwin: A Biographical Study. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989.
Wordsworth, William. Preface to Lyrical Ballads. 1802. Romanticism: An Anthology.
2nd ed. Ed. Duncan Wu. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 357-63.
—. The Five-Book Prelude. Ed. Duncan Wu. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

284

—. The Prelude, or Growth ofA Poet's Mind [1806-07 and 1850 texts]. Ed. Ernest De
Selincourt. London: Oxford UP, 1926.

